

# THE MONIST

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## PHILOSOPHY IN THE NORTH IN THE LAST DECADES<sup>1</sup>

HAVING been requested to give a characterization of contemporary philosophy in the three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), I find a natural starting point in the year 1908, in which year an article of mine treating the same subject appeared in the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale*. I will therefore confine myself to a particular consideration of those treatises which have appeared subsequently and will refer to previous works only when the connection makes it necessary.

Even though these three countries have in many respects the same culture, and although they have very closely related languages, their philosophies nevertheless exhibit characteristic differences. My presentation will undoubtedly bear evidence of being the work of a Danish writer. Furthermore, the character of it will quite naturally reflect my individual viewpoint; while my critical remarks will be conditioned by the standpoint I have finally adopted as my own.

At Upsala University, the oldest university of Sweden and the whole of Scandinavia, there had developed in the course of the nineteenth century a distinct idealistic-speculative movement which is known, after the actual founder, as *Boströmianism*, and which may be described as a personalistic metaphysics according to which true reality consists

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Danish by Merrill Egeland.

of a realm of spiritual beings. It was a revival of Plato's theory of the Idea, except that it conceived the Ideas as personal beings. In this way the monad theory of Leibniz could be combined with Plato's theory of the Idea. The movement saw as an error of Kant that he regarded self-consciousness as something merely subjective and did not recognize a perfect self-consciousness, the ideal knowledge, as the actual ultimate reality. Later, in opposition to this movement, a theory of epistemology sprang up which asked with Kant, how the consciousness of an absolute reality is at all possible. But *the new Upsala school*, whose most famous representatives are Hägerström and Phalen, raise against the theory of knowledge, as it had previously developed, a criticism analogous to that which the latter had raised against metaphysics; the new school finds in the theory of knowledge a hidden metaphysics insofar as it presupposes judgments and interpretations of judgments which are not capable of complete analysis. It is maintained that the error consists in false formulations of problems and that therefore a great deal of work is required to correct the premises from which the problems derive. Not only in popular thought but also in science, especially in philosophy, is this error found. Historical conditions constantly influence the manner in which problems are presented; and it is very important by sharp analysis to determine these influences so that the problems can be presented in their true form. According to the position of the new Upsala school such an analysis of concepts is philosophy's true task. The concepts especially requiring analysis, it is believed, are those relating to value and also those of reality and unreality, truth and falsity, positive and negative, and a series of concepts akin thereto. Difficulties arise when *the philosopher's* problems are formulated according to the popular forms of such conceptions. Kant overlooked the fact that both concepts and their com-

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ponent elements (perception and reflection) are historical in nature and do not necessarily designate anything real. When, for instance, one defines reality as a certain condition, a certain relation between different elements, one takes for granted that the relation itself refers to something real. Similarly when reality is defined as a complete unity; for the concept of unity needs thorough clarification. It has been overlooked that the concept reality, as a term in a judgment, has no content but only indicates that a judgment refers beyond itself to something that is not a part of its content.

This movement which I have attempted to sketch, following the condensed exposition given by Professor Adolf Phalen in the fifth volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* (Leipzig, 1924), has, as far as I can see, a clear understanding that no thinking without qualifications is possible.

Even in ancient times the skeptics made this an issue in connection with Carneadeis' attempt to define the concept of reality; and in more recent times, it has been used to prove the impossibility of a theory of knowledge. The fact of the matter is that the problem of knowledge can never be fully solved, as consciousness constantly is given new tasks and more work under different conditions. But it occurs to me that more fruitful than an abstract dialectical discussion would be an investigation of the various ways in which, especially in our time, problems and problem-thoughts are conditioned by the culture of the time, especially by the development of science.

Particular concepts, and precisely those that are the most fundamental, have histories and can only be understood by closely connecting the history of philosophy with that of science. The history of philosophy is neither intelligible nor serviceable except in connection with the history of other sciences. Plato's and Descartes' philosophies were

determined by mathematics, Kant's by Newton's physics. A future theory of knowledge will hardly be able to avoid Einstein's theory. And in the domains of ethics or of the philosophy of religion a philosopher will not be able to escape a consideration of the way in which the subject matter has been affected by the cultural development. French sociology has particularly given itself the task of illuminating this point. The philosopher, then, may not refuse to consider historical influences but must investigate which methods of thought they provide or allow.

As Upsala is the intellectual center of North Sweden, so is Lund of South Sweden. There is evidently a certain contrast in viewpoint between the two schools. It is quite evident that whereas the Upsala school lays the main stress on the analysis of concepts, Hans Larsson, the Lund representative, especially emphasizes intuition. It is Larsson's conviction that reflection and analysis destroy the fundamental unity with which science begins and ends, and that this involves a disadvantage to science and to art as well.

Intuition, for Larsson, does not mean passive perception but an immediate, unitary apprehension, in which one can with ease pass from one datum to the other. All criticism and analysis is a stage between an initial and a final intuition—a stage which, when it becomes too protracted, can precipitate a spiritual crisis. A determining factor in this situation, no doubt, is the fact that the various elements in the unity demand that their intrinsic conditions and qualities be brought clearly to light. But their union is still upheld by intuition. We note here an interesting contrast between Larsson's notion of intuition and Bergson's. While Bergson contrasts intuition with reflection on the ground that the latter is concerned merely with relations, Larsson holds that intuition may be the culmination of reflection in a comprehensive synthesis. As intuition is

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for Larsson a reality insistently active, he displays closer kinship with Fichte than with Bergson. According to Fichte, intuition, being of the nature of activity, cannot be completed in a simple perception; it is really a continual presupposition which can never be entirely revealed. In the opinion of Bergson, on the contrary, intuition, when it is freed from all reflection, is an immediate revelation of a higher reality. According to Larsson it is a consideration of utmost importance that intuition can have so large a content that no reflection or analysis can exhaust it; consequently no limited concept of existence can be formed. Through comparative studies of Plato and the romantic philosophy in Germany, Larsson has tried to show that intuition has played an important role in the history of philosophy. There has been developed a more and more definite break between intuition and reflection, between percepts and concepts. His *Critique of Kant's Theory of the Antinomies* is of special interest. According to Larsson the antinomies are unavoidable. For him they do not merely mark the limits of knowledge but become more and more compelling within experience. Our life is a constant struggle to join the unjoinable. The cultural and historical significance of German transcendentalism, according to Larsson, lies in its lesson that life is a *struggle* between contradictions whereas it seeks unification in the world of reality. Schiller was one who notably moved from speculation to cultural philosophy, although it was really in art that he saw the possibility of a harmony of contradictions. Larsson finds that Hegel's "Dialectic" contains this truth, that both thinking and life are a constant struggle of antitheses. It is a common defect of the German philosophers, whose investigations Larsson thinks himself to be continuing, that they confine themselves too much to fundamental problems rather than focus attention upon the

relation between perception and concepts by investigating particular instances.

While Larsson's philosophy is occupied with the antitheses of life and thought, there is one antithesis it has especially attempted to elucidate, that between thought and poetry. His most interesting essay is *The Logic of Poetry* (*Poesiens Logik*; first edition, 1896; fourth edition, 1922; also translated into French). According to his own declaration, his aim in this work is not aesthetic but logical. He wishes to show that intuition, as he views it, is in fact governed by laws of logic—indeed, that it involves a finer logic than thought. It is for this reason that poetry can have its logic. Starting out from this point of view, Larsson presents a series of interesting observations. He gives, e. g., much weight to the fact that our psychological concepts are relative inasmuch as each can include in itself many kinds; there are, for instance, many kinds (or degrees) of sympathy, intuition, and so forth. This must not be overlooked when any such concept plays a part in discussion. Again, he finds the significance of intuition in the fact that it is through immediate perception, rather than through the abstract form of the concept, that knowledge influences feeling and will. From this angle also the necessity of individualizing concepts appears. Of particular interest is Larsson's discussion of what is usually called in grammar "synecdoche," that is a perception in which a whole finds expression through an individual part, with which, however, all the elements of the whole are more or less connected. This is of course what Levy Bruhl later has called participation and which he has demonstrated to be a normal feature of the primitive mind. Psychology has long known it as partial recognition. Moreover, several world views (metaphysical and religious), as I shall later show, take a particular trait or a particular age as an expression of the whole of existence.

In accordance with his interpretation Larsson naturally comes to place great emphasis upon the significance of the picture for perception. On the other hand, a mere abstract concept can not be formed, he holds, without the aid of a graphic scheme. Language is through and through metaphorical. But a distinction must be made between basic metaphors, that is images which by constant use have become mere thought forms, and images of living nature. And further one must distinguish between the abstract and the concrete. Scientific thinking, which goes back constantly to basic metaphors and images, is thus in contrast with poetry, which abides with a living image (a single instance). Poetry by predilection is *personal description* because personality is a unity of such a sort that a single trait may suffice to characterize it. Here, as so often, art more easily than science penetrates into life; with that synthetic quality that art possesses in a higher degree than science, which works through analysis, art attains to life's inner nature, to an inner union of the one and the many.

It is no wonder that Hans Larsson, who so vigorously asserts the relation between perception and thought, has also the impulsion and talent for poetic production which in itself has won him recognition among his countrymen. With his ability to introduce the most stubborn questions into the daily conditions of life, and with his quiet humor, he has become an author of significance in the *Kulturge-schichte* of his native country; and philosophy at the same time may be enriched by his untrammelled and original thoughts.

In Denmark, the lately deceased Kristian Kroman was the first to become interested in epistemological studies. His main work, *The Conception of Nature* (translated into German), appeared as early as 1883 but its principle ideas have extended their influence into the period we are particularly considering here, in part through his instruction at

the university and also through his later writings. Kroman tries to demonstrate that the first principles of science (the principles of identity and causality) are established in the form of postulates by a spontaneous act. Scientific proofs are derivative from these but they themselves cannot be proven. Psychologically, he recognized that they are necessary conditions (qualifications) for the continuance of life in the world as we find it. Consequently, they satisfy a demand for self-preservation. While Kroman discusses, with untiring penetration, the significance of the postulates and their value for science, he does not go into the more basic problem as to how self-preservation requires the support of just those postulates that express the pre-suppositions of science. Further reflection upon this question would have led him in the direction of the so-called pragmatism. He would also have been obliged to differentiate between various kinds of self-preservation and to consider the different demands that self-preservation would make under varying circumstances, especially in cases of new experiences.

Kroman's book was reviewed with high praise by Paul Tannery in the *Revue Philosophique*. Other writers found it precarious to stress so strongly the doctrine of postulates. The fundamental principles of science must coincide with the nature of the human mind as it actually is. They must express the various ways in which the human mind inevitably works. The forms which are revealed not merely in the common principles but also in working methods and hypotheses, may not be unchangeable; but they rest not only on volition so that they could be pushed aside when their consequences are to our inconvenience. On the mathematical side, there was doubt about Kroman's polemic against the non-Euclidean geometry (a polemic that he took up again in his later years). In spite of all this, the book nevertheless represents a turning point in Danish

thought; although, prior to it, the postulate point of view had already been made influential by Kierkegaard in his doctrine relating to the conditions of a connected science.

Kroman was early drawn away from a pure philosophical interest and busied himself with pedagogical works, among which must be mentioned an acute and brilliant essay discussing higher education, wherein he vigorously championed the scientific courses in preference to the humanistic.

Whereas Kroman began his authorship with epistemological investigations, the writer of this review did not until later give a detailed discussion of the problem of knowledge. Researches in psychology, ethics, and philosophy of religion had first invited my attention. But it may be seen from the expositions I have elsewhere given of psychology, ethics, and the philosophy of religion (in works earlier than 1908) that I constantly had in mind the significance epistemological theory has for a clear formulation of the basic problems in the fields just mentioned. I have never been an empiricist, although from several sides I have been characterized as such. In my psychology I have always sharply distinguished between the psychological and the epistemological points of view, that is between the description of mental life, especially the *actual* nature of the thought-life, and the question of the validity of its functions. In ethics, the strict principles of scientific proof led me to doubt the possibility of a rational ethic. In my philosophy of religion, epistemology is the basis for my denial of the theoretical significance of religion. In the introduction to my exposition of the history of modern philosophy, I refer to epistemology as the central philosophical problem. And in the essay, *Problems of Philosophy*, I gave a preliminary discussion of the various problems and their mutual relations. Only after these and other preparatory works, did I write



as the exposition of my central thoughts, *The Human Mind, Its Forms and Tasks* (*Den Menneskelige Tanke, dens Former og dens Opgaver*, 1910; later, in German and French). In the present brief account of this work, I shall make use of an exposition which I have previously written in Danish and which has been published in German in the second volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*.

Even before reflection, mental life manifests traces of the forms that scientific thought develops further, specializes and carries through with greater accuracy. Consequently the history of science shows us the various forms through which man in different ages has thought to find his way to true knowledge. The fundamental concepts of science are not at all times the same. It was Kant's fatal error that he believed he could establish once and for all these fundamental concepts (the categories) and arrange them in a closed system. Categories may appear and disappear. A category dies when it can no longer play a part in scientific knowledge. Thus, the category of substance will soon have disappeared, whereas the concept of evolution is still full of vitality. In my exposition of the categories, I discuss first those fundamental concepts with which the popular mind operates: synthesis and relation, continuity and discontinuity, similarity and difference; from these, I pass over to the formal (identity), the real (quality, totality, evolution), and the ideal (value concepts). A theory of categories would, according to this interpretation, be a schematic classification of the sciences. The categories, like the sciences, form a series within which each part presupposes the earlier without being evolved therefrom.

As knowledge is one of the enterprises in which the human mind reveals its nature, the categories contribute to the understanding of the human mind. Kant's great contribution lay in his emphatic assertion that the funda-

mental concepts of science are expressions of the nature of the human mind. But the human mind changes with new tasks and new work, and the categories may therefore undergo corresponding changes. The attractive thing about the study of the theory of knowledge is the insight it yields into the fact that the mind's structure is retained, in part, in new forms, and is changed, in part, in new work. It is through a misunderstanding at this point that William James, whom I remember with heart-felt friendship, in one of his letters, calls me a good pragmatist and pluralist. Pragmatism can indeed show how new tasks can determine new thought; but it fails to appreciate that both the new tasks and the new forms of thought will themselves be conditioned by the structure of the mental life as it then exists. And as far as pluralism is concerned, it represents for me an opposition that must be overcome, not a solution. If existence were an absolute plurality, so that its elements formed chaotic, changing successions, where parts could be arranged in any sort of manner, science would be impossible. The lowest level for scientific research—and this is a level not found within experience—would be a chaotic series of differences; the most favorable conditions—likewise not discoverable within experience—would be an absolute series of identities. The former would denote the impossibility of knowledge; the latter its conclusion.

If I were asked to give my philosophy a name, I could call it critical positivism, for I place great emphasis upon the extent of experience and I consider experience itself a problem. But I could also designate it critical monism, inasmuch as I am striving toward a doctrine of unity but find fundamental difficulties in establishing monism. I consider metaphysics (in its proper meaning) subject to a basic difficulty. Existence cannot, and neither can the thought of it, be given us as a totality. In all metaphysical speculation (as I have already remarked in connection with

Hans Larsson's synecdoche) one confines oneself to a particular part, or branch, of existence and considers it a true expression of the whole. This is poetry rather than philosophy. I confess to a certain sympathy with the statement of the Swedish poet Tegner, that metaphysics is castrated poetry.

The exposition of thought-life and its forms that I offered in *The Human Mind* I have since supplemented by some special investigations in the theory of knowledge. First, I considered the concept of totality (1917). Our minds in thought actively endeavor to form a totality out of the often very diverse details present to them. But whereas experience itself brings us face to face with totalities (atom, organism, personality, community) we can, nevertheless, understand them only by separating them into elements whose mutual relations we must then discover. The value concept is closely allied to that of totality, because all value depends upon the relation between a whole, its parts, and its conditions. In an essay dealing with the concept of relation (1921) I endeavored to describe the significance of this concept at each stage of our thought life. In all our thinking, we put down, as it were, one leg of the compass at one particular spot and seek a place for the other so that the relation between the two places can be determined, perhaps measured. We cannot always find a place for the second leg of the compass; we can ask more than we can answer.

A third investigation concerned itself with the concept of analogy (1923). Both in primitive thought and in science analogy plays an important role, though one that varies in the different sciences. Only the formal sciences are based on identities. Natural sciences, that operate with the elements of experience, are based on rational analogies, that is, on a parallelism between the laws that govern different domains, so that from the relation that exists be-

tween two parts within the one given domain one can learn the relation existing between two particular parts in the other domain. Where rational analogy is not possible, analogies may, nevertheless, play an important role; but in such cases they are poetic or religious symbols, and it is not science that we are discussing. These three essays are all translated into German, and the first two into French (under the common title of *Relativité Philosophique*.)

The history of philosophy is zealously studied in the northern countries. Of recent publications two from Norway should be mentioned. Anathon Aall has produced a history of ancient and medieval philosophy. This subject has been of particular interest for him since he began as a church historian and wrote an important monograph on the Logos concept, a concept that not only played an important part in Greek philosophy but was also used by theologians in connecting Greek philosophy with the doctrines of the church.

More recently Harald Schjelderup has given an account of the history of philosophy from the Renaissance to the present, thus supplementing an earlier exposition (in German) of the development of philosophy from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present time. These works are of interest not only because of their content but also because of their points of view regarding philosophy as a whole.

Schjelderup's introductory remarks appear to me of particular significance. He sees the constant task of philosophy as the attempt to gain a unified view of existence, an understanding of the actual nature of existence, and of the significance and aim of life. In every man there is manifest an urge in this direction, and from this urge philosophy is born as "man's total intellectual reaction, in free thought, to existence." It is therefore the task of philos-

ophy to give us both a world-view, in which it develops points of view for the theoretical comprehension of the world, and a life-view, in which it develops points of view for our practical situations. Philosophy is, therefore, not purely scientific. It has always a personal background. The various philosophers experience their fundamental relations to the world and life in different ways and these differences express themselves in divergent reflections on the problems considered. The particular philosophy a man champions depends, as Fichte has said, on the sort of man he is. Philosophy herein approaches art. A genuine philosophical work can have the same eternal worth as a genuine piece of art. And the history of philosophy, just as truly as the history of art, must illumine its theme by reference to the cultural and historical conditions within which it appeared. Schjelderup's conception of philosophy as thus suggested is one with which I am in hearty sympathy. However, I would emphasize more strongly that the philosophical critic should give prominence to logical consistency and to actual connections even where personal attitudes and the state of contemporary culture may have blinded individual philosophers thereto.

Among the best historical studies in Danish literature is Frithjof Brandt's large and thorough monograph, *The Mechanical Interpretation of Nature of Thomas Hobbes* (*Den Mekaniske Naturopfattelse hos Thomas Hobbes*, 1922). This makes an interesting contribution to our understanding of the so-called "mechanical" interpretation of nature; that is, of that point of view which considers everything that exists in nature as motion, regardless of how it appears to the senses. This point of view originated in the mind of Hobbes before he became acquainted with the founders of the new natural science, and as a result of his own reflection. Making use of earlier writings of Hobbes that had not previously been taken into

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consideration, the author with great acumen shows how scholasticism and modern reasoning clashed for Hobbes before he adopted his definite mechanical position. It was only after he had in solitude struggled with this new problem that he came in contact with the science of the day, became Galileo's friend and a critic of Descartes.

I, myself, have in recent years again taken up historical studies after having earlier (1895) published an exposition of the history of modern philosophy. Since my youth I have been much interested in Spinoza. I do not completely subscribe to his doctrine, but I have come independently to adopt several of his basic ideas, and the deep sincere philosophical spirit that animated his works has made him an example for everyone who attributes to the life of thought an actual significance for one's world-view.

As a university professor, I have several times worked through Spinoza's *Ethics* with advanced students. In so doing, I have prepared notes analyzing this, Spinoza's most important, work. For the convenience of those who wish independently to delve into this wonderful treatise I have followed its exposition, publishing my study under the title *Spinoza's Ethics; Analysis and Characterization* (*Spinoza's Ethica, Analyse og Karakteristik*). It appeared in Danish in 1918 and later in German under the auspices of the international *Societas Spinozana*, which is furthering Spinoza research through the publication of essays and of a periodical, *Chronicum Spinozanum*. I have also in recent years turned back to Plato, writing about *Parmenides* (1920) and about *Plato's State* (1924). Finally, in *Leading Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (*Ledende Tanker i det Nittende Aarhundre*, 1920), I have endeavored to characterize the nineteenth century in contrast with the two previous centuries from which our cultural and scientific ideas originated, as an age of corroboration by experience, specialization, and technical application. I seek

to point out the characteristic importance of these features in their bearing upon the scientific, the religious, and the social situation. I consider the greatness of the nineteenth century to lie in the faithful, independent and exhaustive investigation of basic thoughts that unify the mind of modern times.

In the field of psychology, investigation here in the North has proceeded in the last ten years along both descriptive-analytical and experimental lines. Axel Herrlin, in his comprehensive work on the memory (*Minnet*—Stockholm, 1909), has employed the various methods to describe primary psychological phenomena, with special attention to the needs of teachers. In other works he has elucidated the differences between normal and pathological mental life. It is, of course, clear that in many ways the diseased mentality can throw light upon the sound. It is, accordingly, of particular interest that one of Sweden's foremost psychiatrists, Bror Gadelius, has discussed psychology in the light of observations he has been able to make of the abnormal mind. His work, *The Mental Life of Man in the Light of Experience with Insanity* (*Det Mannskliga Sjalslivet i belysning af Sindsygeläkarens Erfarenhet*, 1921), represents one of the most able contributions to an understanding of mental life from a psychiatric angle, a contribution for which psychologists should be highly thankful.

Sigurd Naesgaard has embodied the results of an essentially analytical research in a series of books of which *The Form of Conscience* (*Bevishedens Form*, 1922), is the first. He contrasts the interpretation which holds that the content of consciousness is inseparable from its form on the ground that each of the elements is determined in its nature by the connections in which it appears, with the doctrine, taught particularly by Brentano (not without scholastic influence), that "form" is an expression of the

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activity of the mind toward its own content. Naesgaard favors this latter interpretation and attempts to substantiate it in a series of investigations relating to various active attitudes which consciousness may assume. Genetic investigation plays no important part in these studies.

As a sequel to my earlier psychological works (especially to the *Psychology*, which first appeared in 1882) I have investigated several complex mental phenomena. In *The Great Humour* (*Den Store Humor*, 1916; translated into German), I have tried to describe humor by a psychological-historical method as a sort of higher life-feeling which is determined by the relation between a serious background and life's multifarious evils, trifles, and peculiarities. Precisely because the humorist is dealing with the great, he can refer jokingly to the small. In another essay, *Experience and Interpretation* (1918), I found in the comparison between a Spanish mystic of the sixteenth century and a Swiss mystic of the twentieth century an example of how experiences of practically the same nature (ecstatic) may be differently interpreted under different cultural conditions.

In the field of experimental psychology especially, the three northern countries offer an imposing series of works. This results from the fact that at the various universities there are now well equipped laboratories. Alfred Lehman, the Danish scientist, belongs in the foremost rank. He began as a student of natural science but through his study of Fechner's *Elemente der Psychophysik* he gained an interest in psychological questions susceptible of experimental verification. He studied in Wundt's laboratory at Leipzig. Untiringly occupied with research work until his death in 1921, Lehman completed a long series of studies. He was constantly devising new instruments and discovering new methods for the exact determination and measurement of psychological phenomena. Very notice-

able in his books is a growing realization of the significance of the experimental method as well as of its limitations particularly in connection with involuntary and very complex phenomena

Lehman was capable of severely criticising his own work and he did not hesitate to withdraw an hypothesis if it was proved unsatisfactory. In his zeal for bringing psychology into close connection with physiology he had postulated a peculiar form of physical energy as the cause of psychical phenomena; but this suggestion he recalled when it was shown by a critic (myself) that it merely complicated the problem and did not solve it. But in a long series of special experiments upon elementary phenomena he showed his ability to illuminate mental phenomena by scientific methods. More particularly he made very valuable contributions to the theory of sense impressions and feelings. He also investigated hypnotic and spiritualistic phenomena, and occupied himself in addition with experimental pedagogy. His principal work is written in German, *Grundzüge der Psychophysiologie* (1912). While Lehman endeavored to keep his standpoint distinct from philosophy proper, his work is nevertheless of great philosophical significance. He shows how elementary psychical phenomena, through analogy, cast light upon the more complex phenomena, and he endeavors wherever possible to discover the physical conditions that in one way or another accompany them.

Edgar Rubin, Lehman's successor as Professor of Experimental Psychology at Copenhagen, in his important essay on visually experienced figures (*Synsoplevede Figurer*, 1915, translated into German), showed that in the perception of figured plane surfaces one must distinguish two different experiences; that of the surface (background) itself, and that of the form (contour). By an immediate perception of the background a whole with-

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out a discernment of parts is given; whereas a perception of contour is received gradually as one follows the edges of the background. One and the same object, accordingly, may be experienced in two different ways under different conditions. Of the two experiences, that of the perception of a contour requires more psychic work than the perception of a surface; and, as a contour perception, is of more significance for knowledge than a surface perception, an interesting fact now appears, namely, that it is the experience requiring most psychical work that is of most significance for our knowledge of the world. Rubin's interesting essay, which has naturally attracted the attention of the mathematicians, contains also suggestions of no mean interest in connection with the theory of knowledge. These suggestions have not been enlarged upon by Rubin, but in a series of shorter essays he has continued his studies in experimental psychology.

In Sweden the late Sidney Alrutz has worked zealously in the furtherance of experimental psychology. After extensive experiments on the sensations of heat and pain, he published a large work on the dynamics of the nervous system. He has described the contents of this work as an experimental investigation in sensibility, mobility, suggestibility, and nervous energy, in waking and hypnotic states (1915-1917). His results will surely be tested by other investigators but it will be admitted that he has done an energetic piece of work. One of the principal points Alrutz endeavored to ascertain was whether the passes of a hypnotist can without contact influence man's sensations and movements. He did not doubt after observation that the answer was necessarily in the affirmative. He was very confident but perhaps he was not quite self-critical enough in a question of this sort. He also devoted a great deal of work to so-called spiritualistic phenomena but he was not always cautious in his conduct of experiments with

them. A posthumous work of this indefatigable investigator of the obscure life of the mind, *The Unconscious* (*Det Ubevidte*), will soon be published. In addition to his research work he also served as a psychological "soul-physician." Many who were suffering from insomnia, nervousness, and mental disorders appealed of their own volition to the widely known psychologist, and came to look up to him as the one who had saved them for life. It is one of the signs of the times that people are now appealing to psychologists in their need. In the Genevan psychologist, Theodore Flournoy, we have another example of one who possesses ability as a psychological "soul-physician."

In Norway, Anathon Aall, to whom I have referred above as a historian of philosophy, has also devoted himself to experimental psychology. He has himself stated (in the 5th volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*) that his philosophical labors have been concentrated on the history of philosophy and experimental psychology and from the latter he believes it possible to derive a "doctrine of existence." Aall's psychological experiments concern themselves with perceptions of depth, memory, simultaneous impressions and reciprocal checking. In his theory regarding the perception of space, he is a confirmed nativist. In connection therewith, he stresses strongly the ability not only to perceive qualities but also to arrange the various contents of sensations in the different parts of space—an ability which cannot be attributed to mechanical influence and hence indicates a limitation of the mechanical interpretation of existence. Thus does Aall take psychology into metaphysics, especially through his theory of the perception of space; for space is represented as a cosmo-physical magnitude corresponding to the subjectively experienced space values. Aall does not attempt to meet the many and oft-recurring objections to such a leap from psychology to

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metaphysics. According to his interpretation it becomes an easy task to construct a metaphysics.

I am not underestimating experimental psychology when I express the opinion that there will always be need for a descriptive-analytical psychology in which, analogously to the manner in which the history of science is utilized by the theory of knowledge, the history of the spiritual life of mankind will be used in its entirety. There will certainly be felt again and again a certain antagonism between investigators who come to psychology from humanistic studies and those who come from the natural sciences. But the work must some day be taken up from both sides and the boundary line between the demands of the two points of view cannot be established once and for all.

HARALD HOFFDING.

COPENHAGEN, DENMARK.

## CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS IN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

### I. THE TURN TO METAPHYSICS

1. As regards the attitude and endeavors of contemporary German philosophy, nothing is more characteristic or illuminating than its turn to metaphysics. This metaphysical interest is very pronounced and full of promise. There is a very wide-spread demand that the richly-adorned temple of the sciences be again given its holy of holies, if we may borrow the figure by which Hegel referred to metaphysics in the preface to his *Logic* of 1912.

Only a few decades ago this turn to metaphysics represented little more than blind groping and sporadic efforts characterized by uncertainty and indecisiveness. Not infrequently, indeed, writers on metaphysics entertained certain apprehensions and sought to justify themselves as though they feared to be treading forbidden paths. At the present time, however, the invasion of metaphysics is complete. Not as though we in Germany were as yet in possession of a new and original system of metaphysics, fully elaborated and widely accepted, or capable of affording complete satisfaction to the metaphysical needs and demands and to the requirements set by recent science. What one may affirm, however, is that the various metaphysical efforts which are current converge upon a clearly discernible point, and that they concentrate upon a comprehensive metaphysical achievement. For this reason neither the possibility nor the justification of metaphysics is any longer seriously questioned. Even the neo-Kantian schools are engaging in the effort to develop a metaphysics. In part, this is due to a recognition of the fact that epistem-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

ology by itself does not exhaust the tasks of philosophy—that systematic completeness makes unavoidable the step to metaphysics. In part, it springs from the insight that a critical epistemology presupposes a critical metaphysics and ontology. Particularly instructive as regards this point is the development of a former student and follower of the Marburg neo-Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann. In his widely noticed work, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, he has traversed the way from epistemology to ontology. And the present writer also, in his book *Wie ist kritische Philosophie überhaupt möglich?* has sought to exhibit the close relation between critical epistemology and speculative metaphysics within philosophy as a whole. Closely connected herewith are various tendencies to describe Kant himself as a metaphysician, as one of the greatest and keenest, one of the most constructive and fruitful metaphysicians of all time. We might refer, for example, to the *Kant-Festheft* published by the *Kant-Studien* during the commemoration year of 1924. Among its essays are one by Heinz Heimsoeth on *Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus* and another by Nicolai Hartmann on *Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus*. We might further mention the work of Max Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker*. The earlier tendency of neo-Kantianism to regard Immanuel Kant as primarily or exclusively a critical epistemologist is everywhere on the decline. To exhibit the metaphysical foundations of Kantianism and to bring to light the metaphysics immanent within the critical philosophy is clearly justified on the basis of systematic as well as present historical interests. Even more than this may be claimed: Failure to participate in the prevailing movement towards metaphysics tends even today to be judged as an indication of philosophical backwardness and of an antiquated point of view. If definite coöperation is not extended, one at least expects explicit approval.



It was in 1904 that Wilhelm Windelband, in association with a number of leading philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt, Rickert, Troeltsch, Bauch and others, published an admirable *Festschrift* on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of Kuno Fischer. It presented a general survey entitled *Die Philosophie im Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Included within it were comprehensive portrayals, in large outlines, of the contemporary psychology, ethics, logic, æsthetics, philosophy of law and philosophy of history. But it omitted metaphysics. This is not surprising if one realizes that this fundamental philosophical discipline was as yet still somewhat under the cloud of disrespect and of academic distrust. Moreover, would not the established conclusions of metaphysics at that time have been very meager—indeed, altogether paltry? Apart from the last echoes of the philosophy of the epigones, as Windelband has referred to the systems of Fechner, Lotze and Eduard von Hartmann, one could at most have pointed to that form of metaphysical idealism which, at the turn of the century, had already been given wide currency through the efforts of Rudolph Eucken; or also to some of the followers of the classic exponents of constructive idealism—to Adolf Lasson and Paul Deussen. The teaching and studies of these scholars were metaphysical in character. Yet these thinkers were entirely dependent upon either Hegel or Schopenhauer and developed no systems of their own. In the wider circles of the uncritical public, a certain homage was paid to a number of shallow naturalistic writers who found their departure in Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Ostwald. That these naturalistic world views, unsecurely grounded as they were, and without any appreciation of the great complexity of the problems under discussion, should very soon be overtaken by fate and succumb to an early death is not at all strange. In connection with their breakdown one must always bear in mind how com-

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pletely helpless they were, and had to be, in the matter of interpreting historical life and social phenomena.

2. What were the underlying causes of this turn to metaphysics? Why did it enjoy a revival after long decades of quiescence? As early as September, 1919, I was able to speak of a "duty to metaphysics" in an essay published in *Der Spiegel*. Earlier still indeed, in a paper appearing in the *Kant-Studien* of 1916, I had discussed the "Psychological Presuppositions of Metaphysics." In 1915 I wrote a work entitled *Geltungswert der Metaphysik*. (Cf. also Peter Wust, *Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik*, 1920). For the change thus indicated three distinct lines of determining influences should be distinguished and considered.

In the first place, we would point to the development of the concrete sciences, the natural and the social sciences alike. The tree of the sciences had developed a tremendous wealth of branches. But the wider its expanse the more urgent became the question concerning its presuppositions and roots, and concerning the viewpoints and the principles involved in its magnificent growth. This presented a philosophical question, the problem of the Kantian epistemology. The theoretical and critical spirit that was so successful in the individual sciences inevitably turned to reflect on the bases and conditions of its achievements. But this epistemological orientation did not of itself suffice. For the results of the individual sciences were so extensive that they created a need for philosophical synthesis. It became necessary to exhibit the interconnection of the objects of knowledge by synthesizing the results of the individual sciences into an harmonious system. This gigantic task was undertaken more particularly by Wilhelm Wundt, in his *System der Philosophie*. That the result was not much more than an encyclopedia lies in the very nature of the case. The metaphysical task should not and cannot

be deferred until the sciences have produced their fruits. Otherwise when could it be undertaken? And what philosophical mind is sufficiently vast and informed really to encompass the results of the individual sciences? Nevertheless, the luxuriant development of the positive sciences led to the two tasks just indicated, namely, those of laying the epistemological foundations and of effecting the systematic unification of knowledge. It is clear that this cleared the way for a renaissance of metaphysics. The central task, as we shall presently see, was set not so much by metaphysics and the natural sciences—for in this field Kantianism had already achieved exhaustive and decisive results—as by the social sciences. A very large part of the metaphysical endeavor of today is concerned with the methodology of historical knowledge. And this indeed presents an extraordinary number of the most urgent and fruitful problems. It is necessary, for example, to establish a genuinely critical conception of the nature of the social sciences and to delimit them from the natural sciences. Moreover, one must seek an understanding of the methods by which one may attain to a scientific knowledge of mental phenomena and must ascertain the fundamental categories of such knowledge. Still again one must determine the method by which a theory of knowledge may establish the bases of the social sciences. For it is still a matter of dispute whether one should follow the critical method of Kantianism or adopt a psychological procedure. And there are numerous other problems of a related nature.

We pass to a second line of influences, those arising from the development of philosophy and its inevitable *nisus* toward systematic completion. If we disregard the systems of the above-mentioned epigones, we may say that in the period of scientific positivism, that is, from about 1850 to the end of the century, philosophical endeavor had

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likewise split up into a number of special investigations. These related to logic, ethics, æsthetics, and psychology, but especially to the history of philosophy. It was these decades that likewise mark the birth and the early development of so-called neo-Kantianism. Hence it is altogether natural that the early interest of this movement was exclusively epistemological. After the horrible abortion called philosophical materialism had come to the light of day, in about the middle of the past century, and had for a time indulged in its excesses, there was need for a scientific philosophy that would forcefully terminate the nefarious career of the pseudo-philosophy. And thus the construction of philosophy was begun anew from the very foundations. Investigation again turned to the bases of any philosophy that might lay claim to being scientific, and to the validity and the possible scope of such a philosophy. The result was an extraordinarily widespread epistemological movement. Representative of it are a succession of brilliant men of whom we would mention Otto Liebmann and Alois Riehl.

But it was, of course, impossible to stop simply with epistemology. Once the latter had laid the foundations of philosophy and disclosed its immanent presuppositions (as was done so brilliantly by one who fell a sacrifice to the war, the highly-gifted Emil Lask, in his *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*), thought was bound to turn to the construction and elaboration of a philosophical system. Otherwise epistemology would have achieved a task that was but partial and to a certain extent superfluous. Conditions were precisely as they were in the time of Kant. The founder of the critical philosophy was similarly impelled beyond his epistemology (supplied in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) to a system of critical philosophy, created in his later works. But it was not he alone who felt this urge. Every one of his successors saw in the

achievement of Kant only a beginning, that is, the basis from which one must proceed to develop a system of philosophy. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—each regarded himself, with more or less justification, as the one who continued and carried to completion the task of Kant. Windelband has declared that to understand Kant one must go beyond him. This well-known saying is true also in the sense that every preoccupation with Kant impels one beyond the *Kritik der Vernunft* to the *System der Vernunft*. Confirmation hereof is furnished by the history of neo-Kantianism. This exhibits the irrepressible fruitfulness of the Kantian doctrine and presents a close similarity to the original development from Kant to Fichte and thence to Schelling and Hegel. Epistemological investigation extended its sweep so as to include not merely the natural sciences but also the historical disciplines, and it was thus embarked upon the task of systematization. In view of the enormous wealth of presuppositions and motives involved in the critical philosophy of Kant, it is not unnatural that the development just indicated assumed a variety of forms and adopted divergent paths. Yet while there are, to be sure, very marked differences between the Marburger and the Southwest German schools of neo-Kantianism, both schools aspired to a system—the former in the case of Cohen and Natorp, and the latter in the case particularly of Rickert.

Thus we were indeed justified in contending that the development of philosophy itself tended toward the elaboration of systems. The decisive influences were, on the one hand, the splitting up of philosophy into a number of very fruitful special investigations whose conclusions required synthesis, and, on the other hand, the fact that the particular interest of neo-Kantianism in its early stages was epistemological and led to results that likewise made necessary the advance to a system. The revival of meta-

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physical systematization was indeed due in part to movements within philosophy itself.

Thirdly, we would stress influences connected with the demand for a philosophy of life and with religious experience. For these two forces made irresistibly for the discovery of a metaphysical orientation and a system of thought capable of affording satisfaction more especially to the human spirit. In this connection, one thinks first of all, among the technical philosophers, of Rudolph Eucken; for this was the task to which he devoted himself. Among his numerous widely known and favorably received works are: *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt*, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, *Mensch und Welt*, *Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, *Zur Sammlung der Geister*. Graf Hermann Keyserling, though scarcely to be counted in the ranks of technical philosophers, should be mentioned as an energetic and successful exponent of a metaphysics growing out of the need for a world view. Among his more important works are: *Unsterblichkeit*, *Philosophie als Kunst*, *Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen*, *Schöpferische Erkenntnis*—the last mentioned of which also indicates the purpose of the *Schule der Weisheit*. Keyserling does not seek to create a scientific and logically established philosophy, capable of formulation in terms of concepts. He aims at the development of a fundamental attitude toward life and reality, or, as he is fond of saying, toward the realization of values. In none of his numerous publications and addresses is he really concerned with intellectual goals or the enrichment of knowledge; he does not attempt to express the nature of things in conceptual formulæ. His primary concern is rather that the excessively busy and intellectual European again acquire wisdom. This also explains his commendations of the Orient. For in the Orient one may find precisely that "wisdom," that poise and repose, that inner

self-control and simplicity which we Europeans have lost because of the disintegrating influence of an extreme intellectualism. Philosophy, in his judgment, should therefore not be an academic discipline concerned with concepts and the attainment of scientific knowledge, but a matter of practical import yielding a world-view. And thus philosophy is for Keyserling an art. It is a form of the art of life, and can be exemplified by him alone who, through self-cultivation, has become a complete, a "wise", man.

The philosophies resulting from these influences throughout have the character of a practical ethics or of a certain religious orientation. The need in Germany today parallels that of other epochs of serious spiritual and moral cataclysms and religious crises. What is required of a new metaphysics is not so much strictly theoretical enlightenment concerning the nature of the world as, much rather, religious edification and inner peace, an indubitable basis for the faith that, despite all horrible disillusionings, the world nevertheless has a rational meaning and a rational goal. Out of the depths of need there has arisen among us the demand and the search for a teleology and a theodicy of history and of human life. And not infrequently academic and scientific philosophy is reproached for its inadequate recognition of this need and for its too exclusive preoccupation with epistemological or other specialized theoretical investigations. For among the general public, the justification and the value of philosophy are very commonly found in its contribution to the amelioration of the worries and troubles of existence. One demands that it shall give to life a clearly discernible value. It enjoys greater confidence than the preachments representing a confession or a church, for the reason that it is supposed to express more than mere faith. Because of its relation to science and of its own scientific character, it is respected even among those who, for some inner or exter-

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nal causes or reasons, feel themselves alienated from the official church and religious life, and who place no confidence in doctrines based on faith. And it is because they satisfy these wide-spread yearnings for a world-view that the writings of Eucken and Keyserling, for example, meet with respect and approbation.

3. The particular characteristics of the three lines of influence above described are reflected in the specific metaphysical syntheses to which they give rise. They thus afford a basis for an illuminating classification of the most important and noteworthy attempts on the part of contemporary German scholars to develop a metaphysics.

*First*—From the side of the natural sciences, particularly biology, has come the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch.<sup>2</sup>

*Second*—Psychology has led to the personalism of William Stern.<sup>3</sup>

*Third*—The social sciences, particularly theology and history, have furnished the basis of the so-called *Lebensphilosophie*. It counts many followers. Its real founder and trail-blazer in contemporary life may be said to be Friedrich Nietzsche, if we disregard certain predecessors. The fact that Nietzsche's fame has risen and is now acknowledged even in the strictly scientific world is due fundamentally to the fact that he was one of the founders and promoters of this *Lebensphilosophie*, which is at the present time enjoying an increasing esteem also in scientific circles. In scientific and academic philosophy, the chief representative of this general movement is Wilhelm Dilthey, with his book *Die geistige Welt* and his two-volume work, *Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens*. These writings give an historical and psychological portrayal of the philosophy of life which is no less ingenuous than it

<sup>2</sup> *Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und Lehre; Philosophie des Organischen; Ordnungslehre; Wirklichkeitslehre.*

<sup>3</sup> *Person und Sache*, three volumes; *Die Psychologie und der Personalismus; Grundgedanken der personalistischen Philosophie.*

is penetrating. Among the philosophers influenced by Dilthey and particularly versed with the details of historical and social life are Georg Simmel,<sup>4</sup> Ernst Troeltsch<sup>5</sup> and Eduard Spranger.<sup>6</sup>

*Fourth*—Out of the immanent development of philosophy from epistemology to philosophical systematization have emerged the Kantian-Hegelian constructions of the Marburger School. Here we would cite Hermann Cohen's *System der Philosophie*, comprising several volumes. Cohen's renowned exposition of the Kantian system of philosophy itself exhibits a systematic and a systematizing spirit, and to this its great philosophical value is undoubtedly due. Under the present head belongs also the value-metaphysics of the school of Southwest Germany. Heinrich Rickert, its outstanding spokesman, is at present preparing a systematic formulation of his doctrines in his *System der Philosophie*, the first volume of which has appeared under the title, *Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie*. In this connection should be mentioned also Hugo Münsterberg's *Philosophie der Werte, Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung*.

*Fifth*—The problems and needs connected with the demand for a general world-view have given rise to the metaphysically oriented works of Rudolph Eucken and Graf Hermann Keyserling, as already mentioned.

*Sixth*—In addition to these metaphysical tendencies one finds in Germany also neo-Thomism. It draws sustenance from several sources. To be sure it lacks genuine originality and is only a revival, with the fewest possible changes, of mediæval dogmatism. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic feature of the present metaphysical situa-

<sup>4</sup> *Philosophische Kultur; Hauptprobleme der Philosophie*. Penetrating essays relating to the metaphysics of life are to be found in his last work, *Lebensanschauung; vier metaphysische Kapitel*.

<sup>5</sup> *Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik; Der Historismus und seine Probleme; Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung*.

<sup>6</sup> *Lebensformen; Psychologie des Jugendalters*.

tion. It is bound up with the fact that there is an unmistakable strengthening of the Roman Catholic spirit, whose intellectual aspect, as it were, it represents. This philosophy is the creation of a period scientifically remote from ours; yet, whatever our attitude towards it, its revival is logically intelligible. For the entire history of the human spirit probably presents not another system of thought that develops such a closed world-view and establishes with such radical one-sidedness and energy an imposing unity of the mental life. It asserts an inviolable harmony between the needs of the spirit and the results of knowledge and of science. It denies that cleavage between knowledge and faith from which modern mankind suffers. Through its alleged removal of this conflict neo-Thomism believes that it offers our age spiritual health and frees it in large measure from its afflictions. It is this fiction, primarily, that accounts for the growing influence of this dogmatic world-view. It is a philosophy that rejects the validity and the value of that differentiation between faith and knowledge which had become inevitable as a fateful characteristic of modern Europe. Thereby it at bottom disallows the autonomy of science, though yielding the attractive and welcome illusion of a harmony between that which we can know and that which we can believe and await with hope. The presupposition of this harmony is the basis upon which the metaphysics of neo-Thomism rests. The system is one of harmonization and, as every harmony, it also is pleasing to all who prefer rest and the feeling of security to movement and the restless but fruitful play of dialectic. But because dialectic is lacking to neo-Thomism, the latter stands somewhat aside from that vital and dynamic metaphysics to whose development German philosophers are zealously devoting themselves. Neo-Thomism does not exemplify the fundamental traits characteristic of the metaphysics of Germany.

## II. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF GERMAN METAPHYSICS

We shall not enter upon a detailed consideration of the metaphysical movements thus briefly indicated. Rather would we point out that the turn to metaphysics, taken as a whole, is a development as necessary as it is obvious. Underlying it are factors of a thoroughly objective character. It cannot be ascribed entirely or primarily to subjective needs. To be sure, as we have already pointed out, subjective and emotional influences are in play. It is true that without such needs no metaphysical systems ever arise. But these needs are nevertheless only, as it were, the personal and private presuppositions of metaphysics. Ultimately they neither account for nor explain its origin or its specific character. Really to understand the creation of a metaphysical system one must always turn to the objective presuppositions and developmental forces involved, and not consider merely psychical and subjective longings. What we mean by this will shortly appear.

By disclosing the universal factors that underlie metaphysics, we shall understand not merely the inevitability of the present turn to it but also the general character and the essential nature of the metaphysics which is in process of development. For, numerous and diverse as are the contemporary metaphysical tendencies and constructive attempts, they nevertheless have one trait in common. And this common trait is at once obvious. Negatively, each of them is characterized by the rejection of the mechanistic standpoint and mode of interpretation. None of them attempts to define the structure and the meaning of reality in the terms of the concepts of the natural sciences. None of them conceives the real after the pattern of mathemati-

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cal physics; none of them regards it as mathematically calculable or formulable; none of them thinks that phenomena are exhausted by mathematical concepts or dominated by mathematical-physical laws.

Hence none of the metaphysical constructions now under discussion may be regarded as strictly rationalistic, if we take this term in its customary, that is, in its mathematical, connotation. Of the older metaphysical systems none shows slighter evidences of revival than that of Descartes. The fundamental reason for this will soon appear. What we today find is a revival of those older systems that reject the viewpoint of a mechanistic rationalism and set themselves in opposition to it. The survival or the renewal—as the case may be—of the Kantian philosophy is often objected to because of the misunderstanding that Kant's mode of thought is mechanistic and rationalistic—a misconception that appears even in Oswald Spengler's widely-known work, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. This mode of thought is now regarded as antiquated and as inadequate for the acquisition of a comprehensive world-view.

The universal rejection of the mathematical-mechanistic point of view within metaphysics is associated with a departure from those interpretations which place the entire emphasis, in the case of metaphysical knowledge, upon formal, fixed, limited, logically unequivocal and determinate features. Our thought is turning away from the static toward the dynamic. This anti-mechanistic and dynamic trait of contemporary metaphysics, as it seems to me, mirrors, intellectually and theoretically, a general feature characteristic of our spiritual culture and of its leading representatives. Life itself has discarded the traits of fixity and changelessness and has again assumed its original nature as dynamic. This dynamic character, and the knowledge of it, receives its glorification from no less a thinker than Friedrich Nietzsche. In his dynamic philoso-

phy of life, it acquires its most powerful expression. At the present time we are unquestionably in an era marked by the unlimbering or at least by a certain depreciation and neglect of that which is formal. This holds true no matter whether we have reference to established political constitutions, the maintenance of tradition, feelings of piety and faith in authority, modes of intercourse, social convention and rule, the economic order, theological and ecclesiastical dogma, artistic style, absolute scientific knowledge, philosophical systematization, or any other avenues along which form may manifest itself. The salvation for which we long is today no longer found in the acquisition and preservation of a strictly formalistic attitude of mind and mode of knowledge.

This now brings us face to face with the positive trait common to all the numerous world-views of our day. These are much less shut off from life than was mathematical, formalistic rationalism. They are all touched and influenced by the agitation and by the dialectic of life. Insofar they are all dialectical. This does not mean merely that the richly developed philosophy of life which we now possess has a theoretical interest in life, seeking to master its problematic and irrational details; it means also, and conversely, that life with all its problematic and irrational details impinges upon the rationality of knowledge and thus contributes to the gradual development of a strictly dialectical metaphysics. We now pay more faithful and receptive attention to the intricate complications of reality; we are more mindful of the alluring multiplicity of its forms than was the constructive rationalism and idealism of former times. Our metaphysical interest is directed not to the creation of new connections and forms but to fathoming and illuminating new depths and movements, new structural relations and strata of life. We seek new revelations of content, enrichments of content. Our concern is

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not with laws but with that which first receives its form by and in law. We are eager to immerse ourselves in the *life* of problems and are not primarily interested in discovering either conceptual forms or logically justifying categories. Not as though we were in general indifferent to all form or depreciated it. On the contrary, the most serious effort of our metaphysics, as it appears to me, is engaged in gaining and developing a conception of form which, in distinction from the earlier and different notion, makes some provision in its structure for the problematic and dialectical features of life—a conception which, without entirely sacrificing relatively formal determinateness, nevertheless appropriately incorporates the irrepressible dialectic and the luxuriantly problematic features typical of life.

Hence the emerging metaphysics does not neglect expressly and emphatically to set forth its relation to traditional rationalism. We have said that the former is anti-mechanistic. This does not mean, however, that it is thorough-going and anti-rationalistic. No philosophy, no metaphysics, can dispense with rationalism. The modern philosophy of life may not place itself in complete antithesis to rationalism if it is not entirely to renounce the hope of knowledge. What it seeks is simply such a notion of philosophical knowledge as can give adequate expression to the dialectic of life without destroying the guarantees and forms of conception.

The turn to metaphysics and the entire development of metaphysical investigation are therefore without doubt to be regarded as a redirection and a development of rationalism. What is required is an energetic attempt to develop or reconstruct formal and constructive rationalism into a dialectic rationalism. One must advance far beyond even the dialectical interpretation of the concept and the thoroughly dialectic mode of procedure espoused by Hegel.



The Hegelian philosophy is enjoying a renaissance not simply because Hegel was the greatest thinker concerned with the philosophy and metaphysics of history but because he disclosed the dialectic of the concept, because he was the most nearly modern representative of a logic of dialectic and of the dialectic of logic. Nevertheless, the Hegelian dialectic and doctrine of dialectic as yet represented a logic that is altogether too formal and one-sided. In consequence, concepts, in this philosophy, could not take adequate cognizance of the problematic character of reality. Hegel came to his view of dialectic from the side of logic. To be sure, it was a magnificent and a dynamic logic. Nevertheless the approach was too exclusively from logic. Hegel failed to import into his logic, from the beginning and as a matter of principle, the dialectic of history and of historical flux. In his dialectic, this powerful philosopher of history thought in logical, constructive terms. This was indeed an advance, for it disclosed a new aspect of the concept not known to the old formal logic. And yet Hegel had not separated himself widely enough from the latter. If one would adequately understand and do justice to the nature of dialectic, must he not think of it itself in dialectical terms and apply it in a thoroughly dialectical manner? Hegel extracted too little from the endless fertility of the idea of dialectic. As a very natural result of his logistic point of view, he was too impatient an opponent of the Kantian idea of an eternal antinomies, and of the splendid and praiseworthy revival and championship by Kant of the notion of antinomies. However great may have been its dynamic tendency, Hegel's dialectic was nevertheless too static. To show why this was the case does not fall within our present plan. But it seemed fitting, in our general survey of contemporary metaphysics in Germany, to refer to the renaissance of Hegel and briefly to indicate both its justification and also the limits thereof.

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It is evident that the revival of metaphysics in general derives not a little strength from this renaissance of Hegel.

Now, however, we confront the important question as to what gave rise to and maintained the anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of the German metaphysics of today. For the turn to metaphysics is a very general feature of present-day philosophy, and this turn has as its clearly-defined and specific trait the character just mentioned.

### III. THE TURN TO THE METAPHYSICS OF HISTORY

The anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of contemporary metaphysics results of necessity from the object of its primary concern. The latter relates, in the main, not to inorganic, physical nature but to organic nature and life—primarily, indeed, to that form of life which we call history. The central tendency of our metaphysics is not in the direction of a mechanistic philosophy of inorganic nature. It aims rather to develop a philosophy of the organic, whether this be biological in character (neo-vitalism), personal (personalism), or historical (metaphysics of history).

It is chiefly attracted, however, by life in the sense of history. If we would not simply lump together diverse tendencies with an excessive disregard of their differences, we must distinguish clearly between two types of the philosophy of life, represented, on the one hand, by vitalism and neo-vitalism, and, on the other, by the metaphysics of history. Though both movements are metaphysical, they are radically distinct in character. Vitalism centers about the biological life, whereas the metaphysics of history concerns itself with historical life.

Now it is the latter that unquestionably enjoys the

ascendency as regards both the interest manifested and its achievements. This is due to circumstances which we will now briefly describe. The rapid development, during the nineteenth century, of the so-called social sciences has made it increasingly clear that man is not alone a living being in the sense of the natural sciences, inclusive of biology, but likewise a member of an historical order, and that the laws of history are no less truly the laws of his being and development than are the laws of so-called nature. This insight, which originated in the social sciences, served in turn constantly to increase both the attention devoted to the latter and the esteem which they acquired. In consequence, there developed an extraordinarily fruitful relation between the social sciences and philosophy. The situation was analogous to that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the outstanding position of mathematics and of the mathematical sciences led to a philosophy that was based on mathematics and the natural sciences and that was oriented accordingly. The results of the social sciences during the nineteenth century, as regards both form and content, could impossibly be disregarded by philosophy once the latter again became conscious of its metaphysical task and sought to gain a comprehensive interpretation of the world. Scientific philosophy and metaphysics have always maintained a close relation with the concrete sciences. Indeed, it is more especially by virtue of this relation that they may be distinguished as scientific and thus be demarcated from all mere dilettantism in the way of metaphysics and the formulation of world-views. So long as mathematics and the natural sciences were in the ascendency as regards both their stage of development and the respect they enjoyed, it was only natural and imperative that metaphysics should primarily base itself upon them and take them into account. But since the first third of the past century the social sciences

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have enjoyed an increasingly flourishing growth, and this has made it necessary for philosophy to give the most careful consideration to their formal structure and to their conclusions.

The formal structure of the social sciences raises problems that fall to epistemology and the methodology of the social sciences. To them German scholars have been devoting themselves most assiduously during the last decades. Insofar our philosophy is a theory and methodology of history. This is a field of investigation cultivated by a large number of thinkers. As a matter of fact, it is at present the central concern of scientific philosophy, and to it almost the majority of our best minds have turned. The interpretation of the conclusions of the social sciences is the task of the metaphysics of life and of history. The latter aims at a metaphysical interpretation and systematization of the empirical facts which the social sciences have disclosed concerning the play of historical life and the genesis and the fall of political, legal, economic, ethical, artistic, and religious institutions. Thus our philosophy maintains intimate connections with the social sciences. Whether as epistemology and methodology, on the one hand, or as metaphysics, on the other, it is distinctly a philosophy of history.

It is both obvious and incontestable that in this field philosophy still faces important tasks. If, taking our cue from speculative philosophy, we designate the unitary principle at the basis of historical reality as *reason*, the main task of the philosophy of history becomes what Wilhelm Dilthey called a "critique of historical reason." This would be the continuation and perhaps the completion of the critical philosophy of Kant. For it would supplement Kant's investigations of the foundations of mathematics, the mathematical sciences and biology, with similar investigations relating to the sciences of the historical order. Upon these

epistemological and critical foundations would arise the system of the social sciences. As the continuation of the critical investigations, the latter leads to knowledge of the historical and social world, and may thus be called a developed metaphysics of history. To be sure, neither the critical bases nor the systematic superstructure as yet appear in their finished form in the philosophy of history of any German writer. Considered as a whole, however, the various endeavors and tendencies of our present day philosophy of history appear to center upon the two tasks just described, namely, laying the epistemological foundations of the historical sciences and supplying a metaphysical and systematic interpretation of historical life through an appeal to and a utilization of the facts established by the historical sciences.

Just as there is unity in respect to the tasks of philosophy, so likewise may we discern a high degree of unity in respect to the points of view and methods utilized in their accomplishment. By thus bringing together and unifying the object and the form of all of these activities we shall obtain a clear view of what the metaphysics in Germany aims at and what it has already in part achieved.

#### IV. THE NEW DIALECTIC

Contemporary German metaphysics, as has already been indicated, tends to adopt an anti-mechanical and dialectical procedure. Closely connected as this is with the entire spirit and culture of our times, it prevails very especially in the metaphysics of history. The reason is easy to understand. For in the case of the metaphysics of history, the viewpoint and method of dialectic—thinking in terms of and with antinomies—is unavoidable and indispensable. A real

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philosophy of life that would be faithful to the object and the meaning of its task could have no other character.

Not that there is the slightest intention or tendency to condone any form of skepticism or relativism. Practically all of the metaphysical efforts are at one in expressly steering clear of every skeptical and relativistic mode of interpretation as one that eventually always leads to an untenable historicism. Precisely because of its relativistic tendencies, historicism is condensed. It is regarded as unsatisfactory from the standpoint of knowledge and is recognized as a psychological peril—a force undermining that moral spirit which is so indispensable for strict philosophical inquiry. It would be an extremely tempting task to investigate the characteristic ethos of our metaphysics, for it exhibits very clearly the change of temper that has come over our philosophical thinking.

Relativism and historicism are regarded as manifestations of a mental disease, a spiritual crisis. From it one seeks to become free. This I have set forth in some detail in my book, *Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart*, where the overcoming of relativism is presented as a theoretical and as a moral and practical requirement.

The nineteenth century had acquired a most extraordinarily keen consciousness of the irrationalities and antinomies of existence. The more deeply one penetrated into historical and social life—that is, the greater the advances made by the social sciences—the more clearly one realized the impossibility of formulating in the inflexible forms of abstract conceptions, the many different contradictions of historical life, or the diversity and multiplicity of its mental, moral, artistic, religious, economic and political, of its impulsive and erotic, relations and objectivizations. And yet this metaphysics of history could not permanently and deliberately rely solely upon irrational intuitions and direct experiences of life. For thus the doors would be opened

to an uncontrollable mysticism involving the destruction of all serious and scientific philosophy. However hospitable the metaphysics of history may be to the irrationalities of life, it must nevertheless exhibit their connection with the world of concepts, forms, and categories, for it claims to be knowledge and seeks to be recognized and valued as such. No mere experiencing of life, however deep or overpowering, and no intuitive or impressionistic grasp of historical culture, however rich, can suffice as a foundation for metaphysics. Hence irrationalism itself requires a rationalism that shall provide the form for the vision and give to experience a clear and universally valid methodical structure. Only thus may one acquire conceptually organized knowledge. No metaphysics of history can possibly be constructed without the express employment of critically validated categories and sharply defined concepts.

That such a rationalism differs from the older form whose character was determined by mathematics and natural science has already been indicated. The indisputably dialectical character of all knowledge relating to historical and social life exhibits itself in the fact that rational elements are combined with others that are thoroughly irrational, intuitive, and neither reducible to nor expressible in conceptual terms. The manner of this combination is fundamentally antinomical and paradoxical. Thus the metaphysics of history recognizes and utilizes that particular form of rationalism which may be designated dialectical. It was brilliantly exemplified by Georg Simmel in his book, *Lebensanschauung*. It was employed likewise by Theodor Litt in establishing the metaphysical foundations of pedagogy, as he has presented them in his work, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart und ihr Einfluss auf das Bildungsideal*. That it offers the most suitable and the most promising method for a systematic metaphysics of history is perhaps beyond all question. It recognizes the reciprocal

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relations between life and knowledge. It realizes that constructions proceeding solely from life become unscientific and degenerate into romantic mysticism, whereas, on the other hand, all constructions operating exclusively with formal and logical principles remain suspended in the sphere of high and dry rationalism, abstract and remote from life. It knows well that rationalizing and systematizing processes cannot yield a thoroughly satisfactory or ultimate comprehension or mastery of any phenomenon of life.

The rationalism we are describing at every point admits the possibility of further question; it leaves the way open for a continuation and a deepening of the discussion. Thoroughly alive to the problematical character of life, it does not deaden but it rather strengthens the consciousness that all knowledge is problematical. It thinks of knowledge as endless, not merely in respect to its range—this was recognized even by formal rationalism—but likewise in respect to its depth. At every point it discloses a new profundity, a new intellectual challenge; and thus it generates the necessity for constant reinterpretation.

The task confronting this dialectical rationalism is that of elaborating a doctrine of the categories of historical reason. The unique character of these categories must consist in the fact that they establish the significant yet antinomical interrelation between rationality as the form and the irrationality of life as the content of the metaphysics of history. This means that the principles for a comprehensive and systematic interpretation of the phenomena of historical life must be dialectical and antinomical. Thus an extensive, temptingly beautiful, and extraordinarily fertile field of investigation lies within the horizon of the German metaphysician of history.

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## THE PRESENT STATUS OF LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

WERE one to characterize in a brief phrase the present status, in Germany, of logic and, along with it, also of epistemology, one would be forced to say that the almost unlimited dominance which Kantianism at one time enjoyed has come to an end. The interest and the affiliations of leading investigators are more and more turning to movements that are in express opposition to Kantianism. Before we here enter upon details, however, a number of preliminary remarks are necessary.

It was with intention that we just used the expression, "of logic, and, along with it, also of epistemology." For the two disciplines are very closely related. The latter affords the scientific foundations of the former. Logic, however, as Bolzano was the first to declare, is a discipline relating to scientific knowledge (*Wissenschaftslehre*). To achieve a thoroughly clear distinction between it and epistemology we will do well to fall back upon a relatively external but nevertheless a precisely delimited conception of *Wissenschaftslehre*.

If we compare the various sciences in the form in which they actually exist and are accepted by us, and if we abstract their common features, we will find that they have an identical structure. It is because of their structure that we call them sciences; it is to this that we refer when we use the terms "scientific" or "logical." In every-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

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day life we frequently speak of certain connections as logical. What we mean is precisely the same as when we say that they are such as might find place in a nexus of scientific assertions, or more precisely, of assertions such as are characteristic of science.

A science is a body of assertions (concerning some field of reality) so organized as to induce the conviction that the assertions are true. That is to say, the nature and organization of the assertions must be such as to yield assurances and guarantees of their truth. This is the case when they are related to one another as are conclusions to that which establishes them, and when the truth of that which is simply basic to other assertions and not in itself further confirmable is validated in some distinctive way, perhaps by reference to observable facts. The laws underlying these guarantees of truth are the laws of a scientific or logical structure. We call them logical laws in the widest sense of the term. Any procedure governed by them may be called scientific or logical. Thus considered, every proposition established scientifically is likewise logical.

It follows from what has been said that there must be two very different types of logical laws and therefore also of logical procedure. On the one hand, there are laws of logical confirmation, that is, laws through whose employment propositions may be carried back to others or, differently expressed, may be derived from them. So far as *these* laws are concerned, the truth of the propositions is obviously immaterial—it need only be presupposed hypothetically. What is here significant is simply the correctness of the derivation or deduction. The laws in question are those of formal logic. In this context the word "*logical*" acquires the more restricted meaning of "being properly derived." The science of that which necessarily belongs in a validly organized body of propositions is formal logic. On the other hand, and in distinction herefrom, we

may characterize as logical those laws through whose employment we may be assured of the truth of those assertions which lie at the basis of others but may not themselves in turn be similarly established. The totality of the laws and the science which elaborates them may be called material logic.

Both divisions of logic are concerned with the actually existing sciences. The fact of their existence and likewise their validity are taken as self-evident. The truth of their pronouncements and the validity of the formal structure within which they have their place are not questioned. But what if these presuppositions are untenable? What if the sciences as they now actually appear are after all not radically different from the "sciences of alchemy and astrology"? What if their truth and the validity of their conclusions are only apparent? It is obvious that the mere presupposition of the validity and the unconditioned reliability of the positive sciences cannot satisfy the final demands of thought. The philosopher insists on knowing whether the conclusions reached by the sciences through their specific procedure may be unconditionally regarded as "objective" truths, at least in the most favorable cases, or whether the things advanced as true by the sciences must, perhaps just because of the procedure of the latter, be thought of as tainted with an unavoidable constant error. Thus the problem arises as to whether the organizing principles of the sciences, as these are exhibited in formal and in material logic, may not in some manner be demonstrated to be unconditionally valid and trustworthy in themselves, that is, independently of any reference to the sciences. In other words, are there guarantees or confirmations with respect to the scientific structures themselves and are these guarantees thoroughly reliable? This is the problem that falls to epistemology.

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Inasmuch as it is concerned with the unconditioned, epistemology, far more than logic, is really a philosophic discipline. As a rule, however, the logician has philosophical interests and he therefore tends to develop his subject from the outset from an epistemological point of view. Indeed, this is really always the case, even though frequently to so limited a degree that no one is at first clearly conscious of the fact. Nevertheless, as our preceding discussion has indicated, it must be possible pretty thoroughly to free logic from epistemological accretions. This is particularly true in the case of formal logic, as is clear when we consider mathematical logic or logistic. For, as is well known, we have come to realize that logical relations may be so formulated that it is possible to express them in the language of mathematical formulae and symbols. Thereby the boundaries of mathematics have become extended beyond the field of a mere science of magnitude. But as a result, logic has likewise been expanded. It has ceased to be exclusively such as we have above defined it, namely, the doctrine of scientific knowledge, or—what according to our conception is the same—the doctrine of the laws of inference, and thus, in particular, of the laws regulating the formation of concepts, judgments and syllogisms. For a useful mathematical reconstruction of the logical propositions can be achieved only if logic is applied to those purely objective relations which, on the one hand, lie at the basis of the propositions in question and, on the other, make possible the reconstruction. Inasmuch, however, as these relations must likewise be considered when one is concerned with the foundations of mathematics, mathematics and that type of logic which is carried on from a mathematical point of view may fuse into a single, great, comprehensive science. The basis of the latter is the expanded logic. To be sure, we must here note a fact which is very often overlooked, namely, that, within this compre-

hensive science, the older logic, so far as it in general may adapt itself to mathematical forms, is conserved as the doctrine of the inferences that are exhibited in propositions. And thus this latter type of logic maintains a particular place within the wider field. Might it not have been in closer accord with tradition and linguistic usage to reserve the old name of logic (and likewise the newer one of logistics) exclusively for this more particular field of study? For the total field, perhaps a different name, such as the mathematical theory of objectivity (*mathematische Gegenstandstheorie*), would have been more suitable and less subject to misunderstanding.

Mathematical logic, which has never been very intensively cultivated in Germany, has often been strongly attacked by the philosophers of our country, first of all doubtless by Lotze. These attacks must be regarded as unwarranted insofar as they were directed upon various inadequacies that were of but secondary importance. For these limitations were only natural in a science still so young; they were capable of removal and have indeed already in part been overcome. On the other hand, the attacks were justified insofar as the upholders of mathematical logic identified the latter with logic in general and finally even believed that it could supersede the epistemological interpretation of logic.

Nevertheless, the great reformation in logic which originated in Germany at the beginning of the present century and which, as is at once obvious from what has already been said, likewise had an epistemological aspect, was very closely connected, at least at the outset, with mathematical logic. For at bottom it was but a continuation of ideas first expressed by the Jena mathematician, Gottlob Frege. This prominent investigator has been acclaimed by Bertrand Russell to be the first thinker who correctly understood the nature of numbers. And thus Frege has played

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an important role in the philosophy of mathematics as well as in that of mathematical logic, among whose founders he must be counted. His philosophic mind has developed the epistemological consequences of the fundamental thought of mathematical logic, namely, the identical nature of mathematical and logical laws. Thus he arrived at nothing less than the fundamental epistemological problem of logic, particularly of formal logic. What is the nature of logical laws? Where are they to be classified? With what other laws are they most closely related?

At the turn of the century, the answer almost universally given in Germany was that, inasmuch as logical laws are laws of thought, they are laws of thinking and therefore of consciousness. Thus, in the last analysis, they are psychological laws, even though of a unique sort, not to be thought of, for example, on a parallel with the so-called laws of association. This view prevailed, in the main, even in the older neo-Kantianism. Indeed, the chief founder of this movement, F. A. Lange, even championed it in its most extreme form. He, as also Helmholtz, thought of the logical order as conditioned by the psychological organization of man. In several passages of his works, Otto Liebmann approaches close to this view. The realistic Kantianism of Alois Riehl, though otherwise oriented, was yet unable to supply the weapons necessary to destroy the psychologistic conception of logic. It was the leaders of the Marburg school, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, who first of all brought about the change. They clearly recognized the close kinship between the logical and mathematical orders and they regarded the former as in no wise related to the psychological but as independent and unique. Nevertheless, even they could not directly free logic from the psychological prejudices adhering to it. For such an achievement they were too closely attached to the traditional modes of thought. Indeed—curiously enough,



though intelligible in the light of the tradition of Kantianism—some of their expressions were such as to seem to an uninitiated person like the theses of an outright psychologism. An example of this is Cohen's noted assertion—the basis of his transcendental-logical idealism—that thinking creates things. As one proceeds, one of course comes to learn that thinking here denotes not what is universally understood by the term, but something specifically logical. But why, then, the misleading expression? And why was it necessary to make the attack upon psychologism with anti-realistic propositions?

Nothing of this is to be found in Frege.<sup>2</sup> He exhibits the impossibility of psychological logic by developing the absurd consequences of a favorite supposition of its representatives. The supposition is that there might be beings who think in accordance with logical laws different from ours. In such an event, Frege shows, these beings would obviously be compelled to regard entirely different things to be true than do we. He then continues: "The person who, on the other hand, means by logical laws such laws as prescribe how one ought to think, that is, laws of what is true and not the natural laws underlying ideas as to what is true will ask, 'Who is in the right? Whose laws with reference to what is held to be true are in accord with the laws of what is true?' The psychological logician can not ask this question; otherwise he would acknowledge that there are laws with regard to what is true which are not psychological in character."

But even Frege did not win a complete triumph. He himself had no such expectation. And who would have looked for it at that time (1893) in so secluded a place as the preface of a work on the fundamental principles of arithmetic? Success was achieved first of all by Edmund Husserl, who took up and developed the thought of Frege

<sup>2</sup> Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet*. 2 Bde., 1893, 1903.

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in the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen*.<sup>3</sup> Husserl's success was unparalleled. The book just mentioned has very rightly been called the most influential philosophical work of the present century. But Husserl's doctrines are not so completely novel as is commonly assumed. The fundamental purpose common to the two volumes of the *Logische Untersuchungen* is to establish a particular order whose significance is not merely logical. This order is conceived by Husserl as consisting of ideal entities which may not be identified with the psychological acts of representation, judgment, etc., and need not necessarily consist of the actual objects to which these acts relate. This conception was expressed also by Frege. He speaks of an order that is objective, but not actual. Lotze advances a similar notion in his critical revival of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. More emphatically still the thought was brought out by Bolzano<sup>4</sup> in his doctrine of truths—as well as of propositions, that is, of the real status of things and of representations—in themselves. Bolzano is a neglected thinker of the first half of the nineteenth century. Originally a Catholic priest, he later became a professor in Prague. He was also a mathematician of importance; indeed his greatness in this field was recognized very much earlier than in that of philosophy. He played a part in extending the bounds of mathematics beyond the confines of a pure science of magnitude. He prepared the way for the theory of classes and championed the doctrine of the non-intuitional nature of geometry, insofar anticipating thoroughly modern ideas. As a philosopher, his position was expressly opposed to that of Kant and of the German idealism of his day, more particularly to that of Hegel.

<sup>3</sup> Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. 2 Bde., Halle, 1900, 1901. 2. Aufl., 1913, 1921.

<sup>4</sup> Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*. 4 Bde., Sulzbach, 1837. Neudruck von Bd. 1 u. 2, Leipzig, 1914, 1915.

Against the latter this otherwise very mild man expresses very sharp words of criticism.

The credit of being the first among contemporary writers again to call attention to Bolzano may be claimed by the distinguished Polish investigator K. Twardowski. But Bolzano really became known only through Husserl. And then after a delay of more than half a century he began to exercise, upon philosophy as well as upon mathematics, an influence whose magnitude may best be measured by the newly-arising and ever-increasing literature relating to him. But this alone does not tell the story. His strongest influence was exercised upon Husserl—though, in so saying, we in no wise mean to detract from the originality of this outstanding investigator. Husserl's originality is especially pronounced in the second volume of the work to which we have referred. What here aroused the attention of scholars was especially the thorough rejection of the psychological theories of abstraction that had previously been dominant. This involved nothing less than a resumption of the old controversy regarding universals, and its decision in favor of the doctrine which the majority regarded as having long ago been decisively refuted, namely, realism. Prior to this time, German philosophers, linking themselves with British empiricism, were accustomed to deny the existence of universals. According to their view, a universal is in reality something individual that possesses a representative function. It resembles several other things which it represents in idea and which, precisely because of this resemblance and representation, are combined only subjectively and psychologically into a so-called universal, a species or genus. The decisive point is here obviously that of resemblance. Two things, for example, a ball and a die, are precisely alike as regards their color. For example, they may both be a certain shade of red. Both have this color quality in common; qualitatively there

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is but a single color for the two objects. But how is this possible? For only individual things are recognized. The color quality inheres in the ball; it comes into being and disappears with the latter. And the same is true of the die. And yet we speak of common possession! Inasmuch as an individual quality can not be a common one, Husserl believes that he is justified in concluding that a non-individual, that is a universal, an ideal, quality is presupposed from the beginning. Thus the theory contains a circular movement of thought: resemblance is not to be taken as final, but, as in the main Bolzano had already realized, it points to an identical ideal element. Thus "there are" universals, "there are" ideas,—indeed, everyone whose eyes are not blurred by false theories may directly intuit them. The assertion that there *are* only things, only individuals, discloses itself as an error arising from an interpretation that is one-sidedly psychological and, to use the language of Frege, that is unwilling to acknowledge entities that *are* not existential—for, of course, universals may not be said to exist.

Husserl's doctrines, as is, of course, only natural, exercised a fruitful influence upon the other opponents of psychologism. This is particularly true in the case of the Marburg school which stood close to him. Husserl himself had received stimulating suggestions from Natorp and was later appreciatively criticized by the latter. The youngest among the chief representatives of the Marburg school, Ernst Cassirer, who is known primarily through his thoughtful history of the problem of knowledge in modern times,<sup>5</sup> was doubtless led to a new functional theory of the concept primarily by Husserl's critique of theories of abstraction and by Frege's doctrine of the concept. Entirely in accord with the tradition of his school, which is in many respects reminiscent of Hegel, Cassirer, in his doctrine of

<sup>5</sup> Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*. Berlin, 1910.

the formation of concepts, seeks to do away with a static in favor of a developmental point of view. He acknowledges nothing as "given" but contends that everything is resolved in the unending process of knowledge. Clearly noticeable relations to Husserl and perhaps even more so to Bolzano are discernible also in the case of the second of the two great Kantian schools, that is, the so-called Southwest German school. This was founded only a few years after the Marburg school by Wilhelm Windelband, and was developed by his student Heinrich Rickert. For this school the main problem of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, namely, the problem of objective truth and its laws, was from the beginning far more central than it was for the Marburg philosophers.

The latter may be reproached with the fact that they failed to carry their epistemology beyond the position of mere logic. For, in the last analysis, they contented themselves with disclosing the presuppositions of the sciences as they actually lie at hand—"in printed books," as Cohen says. The Southwest German philosophers go further. They assign to philosophy as a whole, and so also to epistemology, an independent field represented by the universally valid values. For them, philosophy must penetrate with its interpretations not merely the sciences but likewise the totality of culture; and, among the sciences, they are concerned to exhibit the methods of those which had been most neglected by the earlier Kantians, as well as by the Marburg thinkers, namely, the historical sciences. That the structure and basic concepts of the latter are fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences, Windelband attempted to show in his studies of nomothetic and ideographic sciences, or the sciences of law and of occurrence.\* In this work he was a pioneer. Rickert followed with investigations that were comprehensive and aroused

\* Windelband, *Präludien*. Freiburg, 7.-8. Aufl., 1921.

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wide attention.<sup>7</sup> Inasmuch as the historical sciences satisfy the requirements of what others had called sciences of law, the work of Windelband and of Rickert is noteworthy. For these thinkers sought to differentiate the two realms, and to define the unique character of each in terms purely of methodology. The goal of natural science, even where this is not as yet at every turn clearly apparent (as, for example, in the case of geography) is that which is universal, the law; history, on the other hand, is concerned with that which occurs but a single time, with events. Not every event, however, may be characterized as historical, but only such as are important or significant, and this, not for the historian, but in the nexus of other events. This sort of importance, however, ultimately always points to a realm of absolute values which, being on the "yonder side of subject and object," represents the true and central concern of philosophy. Windelband and Rickert sharply distinguish the realm of absolute values from the existential world, as well as from a "third realm," that of meaning, which, in acts of valuation, forms a bond joining the other two orders. With respect to absolute values Lotze himself had already declared that we may predicate not existence but validity. In the last analysis these values are supposed to furnish the measure for everything that may be called valuable, even for life. Thus, in the view of Rickert, life in no wise possesses an independent value. Science is thought of as embodying the absolute values of truth; and these had already been coordinated by Windelband with the absolute values of the good and the beautiful. We may not assert that thoughts *should* be or *ought* to be thought because they are true. The converse obtains. They are true because, on the ground of their value, they *ought* to be thought. At all times, even in cases of error, our thinking proceeds in accordance with psychological laws.

<sup>7</sup> Rickert, *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*. 4.-5. verb. Aufl., 1921; *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*. 3.-4. verb. Aufl., 1922.

But it may likewise exhibit logical laws, though it does so only when its contents are true. Man, as even Windelband had believed himself to have established, is subject alike to natural and to normative laws. Otherwise expressed, there is manifest in the totality of psychical processes an over-individual consciousness of norms, called by Rickert the transcendental consciousness. To think logically means to think in accordance with this consciousness. And the situation is analogous in the fields of ethics and of aesthetics.

It is thus clear that the entire system of Windelband and Rickert stands and falls with the doctrine of normative laws and of the over-individual values basic to them. Unceasingly, and along constantly fresh lines, these thinkers stress the unique character of normative laws and the unbridgeable chasm which divides them from natural laws. And yet this doctrine is completely erroneous. Indeed, it had already been refuted in advance by Frege. He was the first clearly to point out that the word "law" has a two-fold meaning. Of this duplicity Windelband is scarcely aware; and insofar as it comes to his notice, he at once misinterprets it. "In the one sense," Frege says, "the word law denotes that which *is*, whereas in the other it prescribes that which *ought* to be. . . . Every law which declares what *is* may be regarded as prescriptive—one should think in accord with it, and thus it is a law for thought. This holds true of the geometrical and physical, no less than of the logical, laws. The latter more properly deserve the name "laws of thought" only because they are the most general laws and prescribe how one ought to think on every occasion whatsoever that one thinks."

Thus, according to Frege, all those laws, i. e., the natural laws, which Windelband and Rickert seek to place in sharpest contrast with the logical laws, are on precisely the same plane as the latter. Normative and natural laws

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do not represent opposed forms of laws, but only contrasting attitudes toward laws. If I say simply, "Between two points (A and B) a straight line is the shortest," I express the matter in the form of a natural law. If, on the other hand, I say that, "inasmuch as I desire to reach B from A by the shortest path, a straight line is prescribed for me," then I have formulated the same content as above in the form of a normative law. Moreover, it is self-evident that precisely the same holds true of logical laws; they become norms for everyone who seeks the truth. The bold hypothesis of a transcendental consciousness is not at all necessary. And this is all the more gratifying because the hypothesis—in spite of the suspiciously violent attacks which its upholders frequently launch against psychologism—is without any doubt a psychological hypothesis. For how may such an over-individual consciousness be conceived if not in analogy with our individual consciousness?

Thus we must turn from the logic of thought to the logic of objects. The terms *Denklogik* and *Gegenstandslogik*, used to denote these two sorts of logic, were first clearly defined by Honecker.<sup>8</sup> In an admirable little book he weighed them over against each other. *Gegenstandslogik* is bound up with a more universal theory, *Gegenstandstheorie*. The latter investigates everything that may be denoted by the word "object" in the very widest sense of the word—that is, every "something," entirely regardless of whether or not it is represented, whether it is a thing, a condition, a quality, a relation, or a concept, and whether it is physical or psychical, actual or non-actual; indeed, whether even it be impossible and irrational, as, for example, a round square. The founder of *Gegenstandstheorie* was A. Meinong.<sup>9</sup> His colleague, A. Höfler, incorporated the doctrine in his comprehensive presenta-

<sup>8</sup> Honecker, *Gegenstandslogik und Denklogik*. Berlin, 1921.

<sup>9</sup> Meinong, *Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften*.

tion of logic;<sup>10</sup> and Mally, Meinong's successor in Graz, took particular pains to indicate the close relation between *Gegenstandstheorie* and logic.

Nevertheless, the views also of these thinkers, the Graz school, are not free from a psychological strain. This appears most clearly of all in their *Gestalttheorie*. By *Gestalten*, or, to refer to the original term, *Gestaltqualitäten*, Chr. v. Ehrenfels<sup>11</sup> meant such complexes as contain a peculiar "more," that is, something not contained within the parts of which they are constituted. An illustration would be a melody in its relation to its constituent tones. Meinong and his school regard this "more" as "founded" in the parts, and they therefore designate the *Gestalten*, as likewise all relations resembling them, "founded objects," or "objects of a higher order." The process of "founding" is interpreted as a particular sort of productive process. The supposition of the latter, and the attempt to exhibit it by the methods of experimental psychology, is characteristic of the Graz school in the persons of Witasek and Benussi. The more modern investigators of *Gestalt*, however, as represented on the one hand by the group of Wertheimer,<sup>12</sup> Koffka and Köhler, and on the other by the present writer,<sup>13</sup> have been unable to discover such a productive process, even though making the most careful theoretical and experimental studies.

For us, the most noteworthy fact is that the hypothesis of a productive process brings the Graz school, as indeed its representatives clearly recognize, close to the position of neo-Kantianism. For this latter school also, as we know, emphasizes creative processes, syntheses by which

<sup>10</sup> Höfler, *Logik*. 2. sehr verm. Aufl. mit vier Beiträgen als Überleitung zur Logistik von E. Mally. Wien, 1922.

<sup>11</sup> von Ehrenfels, *Über Gestaltqualitäten*. Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., Bd. 14 (1890).

<sup>12</sup> Wertheimer, *Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt*. Psychologische Forschungen, I., 1921.

<sup>13</sup> Linke, *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre*. München, 1918. (2. Aufl. in Vorbereitung.)

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objects are constituted. Neo-Kantianism, of course, explicitly contends that these processes are logical. This, to be sure, lessens the kinship between the two schools, but it very materially adds to the limitations of neo-Kantianism. For, the nature of the logical, or, let us say, the scientific, is misconceived if one ascribes to it a capacity to create things. Science is creative only in the sense that it creates ways by which we may attain to that which has heretofore been unattainable, and may come to know that which has thus far been unknown. At this point, also, there is a difference between the two schools. For the Graz philosophers, it is only the objects of a higher order that are produced, whereas for the neo-Kantians it is all objects whatsoever. It is precisely this radicalism which the latter proudly seek to maintain to the last. "How is it possible to begin with objects?" they ask their opponents. Transcendental philosophy regards the object itself as a problem; it shows that the object is constituted through the categories. This criticism, however, in no wise touches an upholder of the *Gegenstandstheorie*. For, inasmuch as he identifies "object" with "something," and inasmuch as every category is, of course, also a "something," the process whereby an object is said to be constituted by categories would be a process whereby an object is constituted by objects. Thus we would be in the toils of a *circulus vitiosus*.

The particular point of concern, however, was doubtless the well-known theory that everything temporal and empirical depends upon timeless, super-empirical conditions. Insofar, the new logic, championing as it did the doctrine of timeless truths in themselves, proved very opportune to the Kantians, more especially where the Lotzean traditions were strong, as, for example, in the Southwest German school. The doctrine seemed to have been developed with such clarity and keenness of thought

by Bolzano that the thinkers of this school at once accepted it as a confirmation of their own viewpoint. What was antithetical to their view—and Bolzano, as stated above, always thought of himself as an outright opponent of Kantianism—they disregarded as much as possible. The inevitable result was that precisely the deepest thinkers among them fell into difficulties and conflicts, as is exemplified most conspicuously by Emil Lask, who unfortunately fell a victim to the World War.

More or less closely connected with this turn to objectivity are the activities of other representatives of the same movement. Jonas Cohn, for example, ascribes a decisive importance to non-logical or, as they are sometimes called, irrational factors in the development of the object. This is a tendency that appears more clearly in the Southwest German school than among the Marburg thinkers. It invites a reference to Fritz Münch and especially to Bruno Bauch.<sup>14</sup> The latter, through a thorough study of the historical Kant, and by placing the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* in the foreground, arrived at an interpretation of Kant that was in many respects original. His divergence from Rickert was marked. Though retaining the transcendental consciousness in name, he, in fact, discarded it. In other respects also he energetically sought to develop the philosophy of values and of validity in such a way that it might do full justice to the realistic procedure of the natural sciences and the historical disciplines. Bauch, just as Hönlswald, whose thought is closely allied to that of Bauch, was vigorously stimulated by Rickert. He was, moreover, influenced also by Frege. This decided opponent of idealism, however, who directed very sharp words more especially against H. Cohen, could, of course, not shake Bauch's fundamental position. This perhaps only shows that the terms "idealism" and "realism" have

<sup>14</sup> Bauch, *Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit*. Leipzig, 1923.

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many meanings and must be used with caution. The "realistic" school of Graz and the "idealistic" school of Southwest Germany are in many respects so similar that thinkers such as Hans Pilcher and Ferdinand Weinhandl may with equal justification be counted to either school. The same holds of Friedrich Kuntze, though his alliances, to be sure, are not so much with *Gegenstandstheorie* as with logic.

To me, of course, it seems that there is a completely unspannable gulf between a consistently developed *Gegenstandstheorie* and every form of transcendental idealism.<sup>15</sup> The former alone, in my judgment, is in the right. I charge the latter with "rationism." By this I mean something quite other than "rationalism." I mean the doctrine that seeks to understand truth and objects in terms of the "ratio" and the logical, instead, conversely, of conceiving the "ratio" and the logical by reference to truth and objects—the only really natural thing to do. For in the widest sense, "ratio" is but the capacity to discover and to establish truth. Truth, and in this contention the Kantians are sound, does not consist in copying objects or in a correspondence with them. It resides within the objects or somethings—indeed, if these are actual things, it is even comprised within actual things. Truth itself is simply the existence (by which we mean the aspect of "in itself") of a status of fact. Meinong calls it an *Objektiv*, this term denoting the fact that a characteristic attaches to an object—the blueness, for example, to the heavens. Truth (that is, an existing factual status) is expressed in propositions; and thus we again establish a connection with the definition above given of logic. Logic indeed presupposes nothing but objects and their characteristics in some wise apprehended. If we are governed in our conscious life by the laws of logical objects, then we think logically.

<sup>15</sup> Linke, *Die Existentialtheorie der Wahrheit und der Psychologismus der Geltungslogik*. Kant-Studien, Bd. 29.

Here, of course, Kantianism springs forward anew and the question as to how such a "direction by laws," such as "apprehension," "comprehension," or "knowing" of objects is at all possible. The question is certainly a legitimate one. Kantianism, however, at once answers it by invoking its dogma that the world is "logically" conditioned. We can achieve a logical mastery of objects, it alleges, only because objects themselves are already of a logical structure and are dependent upon "thinking." This, of course, at the very least presupposes an independent "logical sphere" distinguishable from psychological thinking no less truly than are the objects that are thought. In establishing this view, use is made of the doctrine that truth is timeless or supra-temporal. The true content or status of fact in the proposition, "Socrates was a wise man" is valid throughout all changes of time. Being timeless or eternal, how could it reside within or attach to Socrates, this real being who, in common with everything that is real, is a temporally determined and transient "something"? Socrates has ceased to exist. The truth referring to him, however, abides throughout all time. In reference to an assertion, we say that it *is* true, and not that it *was* true, or *will be* true. Now this is, indeed, the case. But in explanation we need not in the least appeal to a particular sphere conceived as logical validity. The feature to which attention has been called is to be found in the stratum of being and, in the particular case in question, of reality. That to which reference is made in the assertion that Socrates was a wise man, is and remains something that has been; it today no longer exists and it may therefore be contrasted with everything that *now* has being. It may not, however, be contrasted with everything that has being if, as language certainly permits us to do, we include under the head of being all entities to which the character "being" either now does or

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it did belong—quite immaterial which; if, in other words, we look aside from the particular temporal locus of being. Thus considered, the status of fact expressed by the affirmation that Socrates was a wise man must most certainly be regarded as being or existing. Such an existing status of fact, however, is called a true status of fact, or a truth. Thus it follows that the particular status of fact which we have been discussing is true. Were one to say that it *was* true, one would bring it into contrast with the comprehensive realm of entities that have being, inclusive of those that have been. This would be equivalent to now placing it in the realm of that which is not and has not been, and thus of the untrue. This is the whole secret regarding timeless validity. It is obvious how thoroughly it harmonizes with our contention that truths concerning real entities always lie within them or attach to them. The line of argument above indicated in no wise establishes a logical order that forms a bridge between a thinking consciousness and things that are thought.

All the more insistently, however, there again arises the question as to how thinking arrives at things. Are those philosophers perhaps after all in the right who, after the manner of a psychologistic interpretation of Kant, regard things as complexes of sense data or, at any rate, of conscious contents organized in accordance with law? This indeed seems to promise at least the simplest solution of the problem. Thinking or consciousness, it contends, does not pass out beyond itself, but only experiences, even though in particular modifications, its own contents. E. von Aster, perhaps the keenest and most profound of the present-day representatives of this general tendency of thought, has attempted a new formulation of nominalism.<sup>16</sup> In sharp opposition to Husserl, he conceives a thing as a functional organization of series of expectations. In so

<sup>16</sup> von Aster, *Prinzipien der Erkenntnislehre. Versuch zu einer Neubegründung des Nominalismus*. Leipzig, 1913.



doing, as in his nominalism in general, he carries further the ideas of his master, H. Cornelius. With the latter he has bonds of connection not only in the Kantianism common to them, but also in E. Mach's and R. Avenarius' interpretation of thought in terms of economy, and, in general, in positivism and empirio-criticism as also in the so-called philosophy of immanentism.

All of these movements must be regarded as mere variants of one and the same fundamental tendency, that of conscientianism or empirical-subjective idealism. In Germany this is at the present time on the wane. To some this statement might seem disputable, in view of the unparalleled success of H. Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als-Ob*. In this work the well-known founder of the *Kantgesellschaft* interprets the categories as economical methods of thought, as mere instruments for the mastery of experienced data. Accordingly, he regards all knowledge as a tissue of fictions. Vaihinger's success, we would urge, may be accounted for not merely by the similarity of his doctrines to pragmatism, which had just then appeared in Germany, but even more by the fact that a talented author for the first time brought together a comprehensive body of material exhibiting the role which fictions play in science—a point theretofore but little noticed. This achievement naturally aroused interest quite independently of the author's particular point of view. The only independent representative of German positivism now living is Th. Ziehen.<sup>17</sup> His *Logik* exhibits remarkable learning but it nevertheless shows a surprising failure to understand the logical problems that have today become decisive. For the living science of logic it is therefore no longer of importance.

Joh. Rehmke, the last thinker to uphold the philosophy of immanentism, on the other hand, has long since aban-

<sup>17</sup> Ziehen, *Logik auf positivistischer Grundlage mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Logik*. Bonn, 1920.

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done this doctrine. His *Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft* espouses a distinctly anti-psychologistic point of view.<sup>18</sup> In this, as in its denial of a separate logical order, it approximates very closely to the *Gegenstandstheorie* which we have been defending—strange as this may seem in view of the fact that Rehmke appears to acknowledge as “being” only that which is “given.” Günther Jakoby, who was formerly likewise inclined to positivism (more specifically, to pragmatism) has most definitely developed into an adherent of a genuine *Gegenstandstheorie*, or, in his own terminology, into an ontologist.<sup>19</sup> Representing the same tendency is also R. Herbertz. Originally a follower of B. Erdmann, he came to be an outspoken anti-psychologist, thinking of logic as concerned with being. Mention should be made also to the *Kulturphilosoph*, G. Simmel, who died in 1918. Prior even to William James he gave expression to the fundamental thought of pragmatism. Later, however, he became untrue to biological relativism. It must indeed be acknowledged that the striking successes of Einstein’s theory of relativity led to a certain reinforcement of current relativistic and positivistic tendencies. And thus it happened that J. Petzoldt again received attention. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that most investigators are agreed in regarding the theory of relativity as purely a doctrine of physical science and, in the last analysis, as bound up but very loosely with positivism in its epistemological sense.<sup>20</sup> It is also worthy of note that so prominent a scholar as Hugo Dingler, who is as well versed in the physical as in the philosophical aspects of the problem, must be counted among the opponents of the theory of relativity.<sup>21</sup> Hence it is not surprising that, though a student of Mach’s, he developed into an anti-psy-

<sup>18</sup> Rehmke, *Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft*. Leipzig u. Frankfurt, 1910

<sup>19</sup> Jakoby, *Allgemeine Ontologie der Wirklichkeit*. 1. Bd., Halle, 1925.

<sup>20</sup> *Annalen der Philosophie: Relativitätstheorie-Heft* (Bd. 2. Heft 3.).

<sup>21</sup> Dingler, *Physik und Hypothese. Versuch einer induktiven Wissenschaftslehre nebst einer kritischen Analyse der Relativitätstheorie*. Berlin, 1921.

chologist. In spite of distinctly noticeable strains of earlier tendencies, he must rather be said to approximate to the position of Husserl and of O. Kraus, the latter of whom is the most energetic critic of Einstein among the philosophers.

These various tendencies converge upon the recognition of ontology, the doctrine of being or *Gegenstandstheorie*, as the truly fundamental philosophical science. This has always been the standpoint of scholasticism (as it was that of Aristotle), and it is therefore also that of the so-called Catholic philosophy. In consequence, the latter at the present time enjoys an ever-increasing importance even in non-Catholic circles. As its representatives, so far as our present problem is concerned, we may mention, in addition to Honecker, to whom we have already referred: von Hertling (the former Imperial Chancellor), M. Grabmann, B. W. Switalski, and, especially, Joseph Geyser,<sup>22</sup> who so untiringly strove to deepen his epistemological views. They all are decidedly opposed to Kantianism in any form, though most of all to positivism and the doctrine of immanence. Their viewpoint is that of "critical" realism, and it is in so far not Aristotelian. On the basis of ancient traditions, they champion a doctrine which, after long struggles, is at length again becoming to prevail in non-Catholic Germany, where it is regarded as the truly modern philosophy. In this connection mention should be made of Frischeisen-Köhler,<sup>23</sup> a student of Dilthey, of G. Störing, and of E. Becher, the philosopher of nature. It was particularly, however, Oswald Külpe, unfortunately so early deceased (1915), who strove, in exceptionally thorough studies, to exhibit the untenability of all views opposed to the recognition of things in themselves that are

<sup>22</sup> Geyser, *Erkenntnistheorie*. Münster i. W., 1922.

<sup>23</sup> Frischeisen-Köhler, *Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit*. Sammlung, Wissenschaft und Hypothese, XV., Leipzig, 1912.

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knowable and yet not conditioned either psychologically or logically.<sup>24</sup>

To be sure, one must admit that, however successfully Külpe—as, after him, his student, A. Messer—disclosed the weaknesses of Kantianism, he nevertheless failed to appreciate the most fundamental aims of the movement. He gave no adequate answer to the simple question as to how consciousness reaches objects. He indeed had the key to the right answer, yet he did not recognize it as such and so he failed to make adequate use of it. This key was Franz Brentano's well-known doctrine of the "intentional" character of consciousness. We will proceed to sketch it, while at the same time adding certain elements to it. Things exist and exercise an influence upon the psychological subject. As a rule, however, the latter experiences and notices but very little of their direct effect. Rather does a mechanism of which the psychological subject is not conscious effect a transformation that brings into the forefront the object which is at the time exercising the influence. What is directly experienced, or, more accurately, noted in the experience, is not the state of consciousness evoked, for example, by certain vibrations; rather is it that which evokes the states of consciousness, though this, to be sure, is very considerably modified, indeed, is even transposed into a different sphere which once it is experienced, no longer really exercises an influence upon the real subject. In short, it becomes the heard tone.

Here we have the setting of Brentano's doctrine.<sup>25</sup> Phenomenological analysis, it insists, reveals the necessity of distinguishing between two factors: on the one hand, we have the "intentional"—the experiencing, the representing—*act*, instanced in our illustration by the hearing; on

<sup>24</sup> Külpe, *Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften*. Bd. 1, Leipzig, 1912; Bd. 2-4 aus dem Nachlasz herausgegeben von A. Messer.

<sup>25</sup> Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*. 1. (einziger) Bd., 2. Aufl. neu herausgegeben u. eingeleitet von O. Kraus, Leipzig, 1925.

the other hand, the "intentional" *object*,—that which is comprehended or represented by the act—instanced in our illustration by the tone. A marked difference between the act and the object is to be found in the fact that the former is *always* actual whereas the latter may or may not be actual. The acts are through and through psychical. Everything, on the other hand, that is not an act, not a process or state of consciousness, is external to consciousness, being perhaps in certain instances physical. Hearing, seeing, representing, recalling, judging, doubting, striving and all kinds of feeling are psychical; colors, tones, figures, landscapes, etc., on the other hand, are physical. And they remain physical under all circumstances. When they are perceived or even only imagined, they do not become "contents of consciousness" or mere "pictures." Even when I as yet do not know whether they are actually present or not, and even when they are as a matter of fact not really present, they, as everything that is represented, are entities that "stand over against" me; they do not belong to the apprehending consciousness. In the process of perception and imagination, consciousness does not draw objects into itself as "contents," as Brentano himself at the outset still believed. It leaves them in their externality; it merely lays hold upon them. They themselves may perhaps be actual, but again they may not, in which latter case, the present writer would add, they are transformed or perhaps even first created by the psychophysical mechanism operative prior to all perception and representation. Whether or not they are actual only empirical investigation is able to determine with any measure of certainty.

The important bearings of this doctrine are not recognized by realists of the ordinary type. In certain cases, indeed, they even combat the doctrine, as does M. Schlick, though his outlook, to be sure, is semi-positivistic. Nevertheless, it is alone the standpoint which we have sketched

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that enables realism to face the problem as to how consciousness seizes upon things, and to solve this problem without falling back upon the copy theory—which has already sufficiently been proven to be false—or upon other inadequate doctrines. The problem is an illusory one. Consciousness, or better, the subject, the ego, “has” the things from the very beginning; and the property of “having” things, or, at any rate, objects (that is, an “intentional” character), belongs to its nature. The real problem is that of finding in the objects criteria on the basis of which one may classify them first of all as actual or non-actual and subsequently along other lines in accordance with their particular natures. In brief, the problem consists in placing objects in orderly arrangement.

But now there arises a new and extremely important question which we have hitherto been careful to ignore. To a certain extent I am able correctly to establish the order of actually given things—that is, I can attain to a valid knowledge concerning them—without a direct examination of them. Without reference to trees, hills or any objects of the external world, for example, I can develop the laws of mathematics, and I find to my surprise that these hold true of the external objects. There are, to use a Kantian expression, “a priori” laws, “subjective” conditions of “thought,” that are nevertheless valid for objective experience. May also this, the most important problem of the “transcendental deduction,” be solved on the basis of the new conceptions we have sketched?

It devolves upon an exact descriptive analysis of the given, upon a thorough phenomenology, as Brentano had already designated this standpoint, to give an answer to this question. Husserl, to whom the eyes of all investigators were turned after the publication of his stimulating *Logische Untersuchungen*, had intimated that he would set forth the fundamental principles of such a phenom-

ology. They were awaited with high expectation. When they finally appeared they proved disappointing.<sup>26</sup> Husserl defined phenomenology as "idetic" in character, as the science of essences. To utilize the terminology of others, he conceived of it as concerned not with *Dasein* but with *Sosein*. The latter, Husserl refers to as the "essence" which we can immediately apprehend or intuit; he speaks of *Wesenschauung*. Connected with this doctrine is that of a "pure (transcendental) consciousness" which, after we abstract from all actuality, is supposed to remain as the factor that provides meanings. This is truly a remarkable diversion, and one that renews the errors of transcendental philosophy; indeed, it does this at a time when the chief representatives of the latter had already in reality abandoned the conception of pure consciousness. Husserl was led also to a radical rejection of thorough-going realism. "An absolute reality," he says, "signifies no more than does a round square."

Husserl was a student of Brentano's, as were also Meinong and Ehrenfels. It is he, however, who doubtless deserves the credit of having exposed the weaknesses in his teacher's theory of judgment. For his critique he found a point of departure in the superior doctrines of Bolzano. But, as has lately been shown by O. Kraus,<sup>27</sup> a student of Brentano's as also of Marty's, an earlier student of Brentano's, Husserl misunderstood precisely the most important and profound thought of the extraordinary thinker he was criticizing. He interpreted the "intentionality" and also the pure consciousness described by Brentano as signifying comprehension, or a process of conferring meanings. In antithesis, "sense data"—colors, tones, etc.—he interpreted, in the manner of the traditional psychology, as mere contents of consciousness, as phenomena or "reflec-

<sup>26</sup> Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie u. phänomenologische Philosophie*. Halle, 1913; (auch im Jahrbuch f. Phil. u. phän. Forschung, I.).

<sup>27</sup> Kraus, *F. Brentano*, München, 1919.



tions," which come to constitute objects only through "intentional acts." O. Janssen<sup>28</sup> and the present writer have shown that this is untenable. Sense data—very misleadingly called "sensations"—are already themselves intentional objects; they are *given* to us, precisely as are actual objects, as something distinct from the consciousness "having" them. That they are nevertheless dependent upon the subject is revealed only by experience.

It follows that the purely objective aspect of the phenomenological situation—called by Husserl himself "noema"—possesses a thoroughly overshadowing importance in comparison with the act-aspect, called "noesis." Instead of Husserl's act-phenomenology we reach an object-phenomenology, and this appears to the present writer to be only the method of the *Gegenstandstheorie* now familiar to us. The fundamental thought of object-phenomenology is that whatever we find or intuit in any specific *Sosein* in general, quite regardless of whether or not it is actual, must also be present in the corresponding actual *Sosein*. For *Sosein* in general is related to actual *Sosein* precisely as is, for example, the ball in general to a red ball. Just as everything included within the ball in general must also be present in the red ball, so likewise must everything in a specific *Sosein* in general be discoverable in all corresponding actual instances. In the case of *Sosein* in general one need not take into account whether or not the aspect of actuality is to be found. Hence it may be adequately intuited in imagination; we are not dependent upon observations of anything actual, and thus not upon empirical facts. By reference to any merely imagined movement I can determine that movement is impossible without direction and velocity. We have here a connection purely of *Sosein*. I am, however, totally unable to determine, by reference to a merely imagined movement,

<sup>28</sup> Janssen, *Vorstudien zur Metaphysik*. Halle, 1921.

that every actual movement gradually comes to an end and is eventually transformed into heat. For here we have a connection of empirical facts. The connections of *Sosein* represent for us the justifiable kernel, though of course also an important modification, of Kant's a priori, of his forms and categories. What has been said implies so clear and simple a solution of the problem from which we set out that it is superfluous specifically to formulate it in words. It likewise follows from our position that the categories must be valid not only within experience but also beyond it, and thus for all being. Here again it appears that the categories are to be found within being itself, representing simply the most general characteristics of it. The logical ground falls within being; the supposition of a separate logical sphere is superfluous. We may even say that the "universal" is in a certain sense within things, which means that Husserl has refuted only the psychological and not all theories of abstraction. *Gegenstandssphä-nomenologie* has been applied to the philosophy of nature by Leo Hartmann.<sup>29</sup>

It is a characteristic fact that Husserl's doctrine of a pure consciousness found no echo even among his immediate followers. It was not acknowledged by A. Reinach, who fell a victim to the War; nor was it by M. Geiger or M. Scheler, the latter of whom rather approximates to the *Gegenstandssphä-nomenologie* which we have been sketching. And the *Logik* of the Husserl school, the text-book by A. Pfänder, also finds no place for a pure consciousness. Nevertheless Pfänder introduces an independent logical order in the form of "thoughts"; and, as Mally has already emphasized, he refuses to admit the fundamental importance of an objectively oriented logic. The same is true of Külpe, who in a similarly one-sided way introduces the notion of "meanings."<sup>30</sup> While we chance to be speaking of

<sup>29</sup> Hartmann, *Sind Naturgesetze veränderlich?* Halle, 1926.

<sup>30</sup> Külpe, *Vorlesungen über Logik*, Leipzig, 1923.

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comprehensive treatments of logic, we would mention, in addition to the works of Höfler and Ziehen described some distance above, the book of von Kries.<sup>31</sup> Its orientation is Kantian. Its importance, however, lies in the fact that its author is a student of nature, a physiologist, and exhibits an often amazingly penetrating understanding of the logical problems immanent within the sciences.

Hans Driesch holds a position similar to *Gegenstandsphänomenologie*.<sup>32</sup> His starting point reminds one of Descartes. The further development of his ideas, however, is most apt to call to mind J. Volkelt's well-known doctrine of the self-certainty of consciousness,<sup>33</sup> and, in so far also, Brentano. The proposition, "I have consciously something," is for Driesch the basis of all philosophical certainty. This something is ordered: it stands over against us as ordered. Very properly Driesch identifies thinking and knowing not, as it were, with an ordering activity, as is done by Kantianism and, with especial emphasis, by P. Menzer, but exclusively with intuiting the order that already prevails. Thus this prominent thinker likewise is in disagreement with Kant. He calls his basic science *Ordnungslehre* (also *Logik*) and he regards the latter as the propaedeutic to metaphysics, which he also designates as *Wirklichkeitslehre*. Driesch's science of order includes his doctrine of the categories. He enriches the categories by adding that of individuality. The latter has to do with the relation of a whole to its parts and is regarded by Driesch as the basis of his renowned vitalistic theory. In contrast with the doctrine we uphold, he maintains that the categories can not be demonstrated to be valid beyond experience. Driesch, whose thoughts we

<sup>31</sup> von Kries, *Logik. Grundzüge einer kritischen u. formalen Urteilslehre*. Tübingen, 1916.

<sup>32</sup> Driesch, *Ordnungslehre. Ein System des nichtmetaphysischen Teiles der Philosophie*. 2. umgearb. Aufl., Jena, 1923.

<sup>33</sup> Volkelt, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit. Untersuchung der Geltungsfragen als Grundlage der Erkenntnistheorie*. München, 1918.

have been able to present but very partially, has also made contributions to the doctrine of causality. Along with the students of Brentano, of whom, in addition to Kraus, we would mention A. Kastil, he must be counted among those who reject the theory of relativity.<sup>34</sup> He belongs to that now ever-increasing group of thinkers who regard logic as the mere propaedeutic to metaphysics. Very similar to his view is that of T. K. Oesterreich,<sup>35</sup> also significant as a religious philosopher.

This revival of metaphysics, so thoroughly characteristic of our times, is very naturally in particular evidence within the camp of new realism. It had already manifested itself in the thought of Külpe. More remarkable is the fact that it is to be found also among the Kantians. We might here mention A. Liebert of the Marburg school and, very especially, the theologian E. Troeltsch, recently deceased (1923). At first under the influence of Windelband, Troeltsch gradually drew away from Kantianism and, with an orientation primarily religious and historical, more and more adopted Leibnizian and Hegelian ideas.

Most significant of all is the fact that one of the men most thoroughly informed in the traditions of Kantianism, Nikolai Hartmann, a student of Natorp's and the latter's successor in Marburg, came to espouse both metaphysics and realism at the same time.<sup>36</sup> In sharpest contrast to the rest of the school with which he has been associated, he has even come to regard epistemology itself as a metaphysical discipline. On the other hand, it must be admitted that he still exhibits a surviving bit of Kantian influence in that he conceives the primary task of metaphysics to be a scientific comprehension of problems that are in themselves insoluble. The importance of analyzing such prob-

<sup>34</sup> Driesch, *Relativitätstheorie und Philosophie*. Karlsruhe, 1924.

<sup>35</sup> Oesterreich, *Die Phänomenologie des Ich*. Leipzig, 1910.

<sup>36</sup> Hartmann, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. 2. Aufl., Berlin, 1925.

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lems and others related to them (that is, the significance of aporetics, to use the term which he has derived from Aristotle) is very properly emphasized by him. He subsumes aporetics, along with phenomenology, under what he calls the analysis of phenomena (*Phänomenanalyse*). Thus he is led to lay strong emphasis upon the irrational factors of knowledge. Insofar as "irrational" denotes simply that which is purely actual and is not reducible to logical terms, his position is thoroughly tenable; but it ceases to be so insofar as the reference involves the logical elements as well. For, in the latter case, we have but a remnant of the old mystical interpretation of the logical and of knowledge. As a matter of fact, Hartmann conceives the logical as an independent order. He holds, moreover, that the question as to how consciousness draws the object within itself, that is, overcomes the transcendence of the object—a question falsely formulated, as we know—presents an almost insoluble difficulty.

Because of his emphasis upon the aspect of irrationality, Hartmann has a kinship with all the various movements that stress the presence of an intuitive factor in the knowledge process. But one must consider what is to be understood by the latter. The phenomenologists to whom we have already alluded speak of a direct consciousness (*Schauen*) of the object. Distinguishable therefrom, in the second place, is the emphasis sometimes placed upon intuitive comprehension, that is, upon reproducing in one's own experience, through an act of sympathy, the experiences of others and the spiritual complexes within historical life. We already find this in Th. Lipps, Brentano, and J. Volkelt. But it was W. Dilthey who first saw in the doctrine something novel, namely, its important bearing on the problem as to the logical foundations of the social sciences. Of his students it was particularly E. Spranger,<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Spranger, *Lebensformen*. 3. verb. Aufl., Halle, 1922.

and Th. Litt who worked further in the same direction. The point of view of K. Jaspers and Th. Erismann likewise shows a kinship with that of Dilthey. In the third place and finally, intuition is sometimes identified with that romantic and irrational attitude which approaches precisely the decisive and fundamental problems of life naively and instinctively, and thus fundamentally renounces the endeavor for scientific certainty—indeed, in the manner of pragmatism frequently renounces all objective truth. This attitude is indeed intelligible as a reaction against antiquated methods. In the absolute form in which it commonly appears, however, it represents a serious spiritual danger, perhaps the greatest danger that now threatens our culture. For it gives the right of way, not to the truth of an idea but to the suggestive power of its expression. Thus it defers to the suggestibility of those who are intellectually inferior and these, of course, everywhere constitute the majority, even among persons interested in philosophy. Moreover, it makes portentous concessions to that tendency to confusion of thought now so widespread precisely in Germany. Here one might mention the epistemological views of O. Spengl. Reference might be made with a certain justification also to Graf. H. Keyserling and R. Müller-Freienfels; and likewise to some of the Protestant theologians, most definitely perhaps to F. Gogarten and K. Barth, similar to whose position is that of E. Griesebach. The school of Husserl likewise has of late here and there made concessions to the view we have indicated.

L. Nelson, though not hostile to scientific procedure in the attainment of knowledge, as are the thinkers just mentioned, nevertheless attacks epistemology, at least verbally. His attacks, however, are due to a misunderstanding of the tasks of epistemology. For Nelson has, as a matter of fact, doubtless devoted himself to epistemology,

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that is, in its psychologistic form. Ever since his youth he has held with remarkable persistence to the uncommon view that the system of the Kantian Fries (died in 1843) offers the only key to philosophical truth. Nelson founded a neo-Friesian school which includes a number of thinkers, such as G. Hessenberg and O. Apelt, who, with the outlook of their master, are active particularly in the fields of mathematical, of legal and of political philosophy. In spite of what his psychologism might lead one to expect, Nelson is not at all a relativist, but precisely the opposite. With superb irony his keen thought discloses the pseudo-brilliant absurdities with which the fool's philosophy of Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* so successfully capitalized the craving for sensation prevalent among the culture-crazed German philistines.<sup>38</sup>

To summarize: German logic and epistemology at present exhibit a fairly universal tendency more and more to draw away from Kant; to overcome "rationalism," psychological as well as anti-psychological; and, in consequence, to construct, on the basis of a pure *Gegenstandstheorie*, a logic that no longer places obstacles in the path of a scientific and critical realism and of metaphysics. The men who deserve the greatest credit for the increasing success of this tendency are B. Bolzano and F. Brentano. Both of them were opponents of Kant and of German idealism. Indeed, the epoch of the latter was always regarded by Brentano as a period of extreme philosophical decadence. Both Bolzano and Brentano, it is worthy of mention, were pacifists and hostile to all narrow-spirited nationalism.

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<sup>38</sup> Nelson, *Spuk. Einweihung in das Geheimnis der Wahrsagekunst O. Spenglers*. Leipzig, 1921.



CONCERNING THE MOST RECENT GERMAN  
PUBLICATIONS ON THE HISTORY  
OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS  
METHODOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

THE last ten years, which we propose to survey in this paper, have certainly not been favorable as regards furnishing steady nourishment for the growth of the historiography of philosophy in Germany. That we can here report really notable contributions in this field speaks well of the spirit of the German people. There are two reasons why the break caused in our life by the war has not been felt more severely. The more peaceful times that followed did not have to return to successful traditions of pre-war times, for the coming of the war coincided with a stage in the historiography of philosophy that harbored matured principles and invited the initiation of a new phase of development. One reason for this state of affairs lies in the fact that the generation that had brought the writing of the history of philosophy to a culmination during the second half of the nineteenth century had either passed away or was devoting itself, in its old age, to original thought. Men like Trendelenburg, Brandis, Prantl, Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Ueberweg come to one's mind as representing the beginning of the past generation, while the works of Cohen, Windelband and Natorp characterize its end. The new generation, of which we are to report here, is linked with the old in the person of Cassirer, who is at the same time also the leader of the new. His influence extends over all

<sup>1</sup> Translated by Hans Kurath and Edward L. Schaub.

the active forces in the historiography of philosophy on account of the immense scope of his knowledge and his refined aesthetic sense. The other reason for the condition referred to is connected with the intensified interest in the methodology of historiography and its peculiar problems. I refer the reader to the excellent paper by Julius Stenzel on *Zum Problem der Philosophiegeschichte* (*Kant-Studien*, 1921, pp. 416-453), and the article by Hans Hess concerning *Epochen und Typen der philosophischen Historiographie* (*Kant-Studien*, 1923, pp. 340-363) where this idea is advanced.

Let us turn to the *studies* in the history of philosophy before taking up the *problem* of a history of philosophy. We do not propose to give an exhaustive catalogue of all the literature that has appeared in recent years. We only wish to call attention to some of the recent publications from which we ourselves have drawn information and inspiration.

First we must mention the new printing of the second edition of a work of pre-war times which is as yet unexcelled in certain respects, the *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, which appeared as part of *Kultur der Gegenwart* (Teubner, Leipzig). The section dealing with modern philosophy is by Windelband. It is a masterpiece of refined diction and artistic sense, plastically presenting the various minds, each in its own peculiar cast. We do not fail to see the dangers that lurk in the virtuosity of this type of historiography. We are apt to admire the large bold lines while the problems discussed evade our attention and fail to take root in us. Windelband's contribution thus makes enjoyable reading but it does not show clearly how inexhaustible the problems of the history of philosophy are. The patristic and Christian philosophy is treated by Baeumker, the philosophy of Islam and the Jews, by Goldziher. Both were abreast of their times in their respective

fields. Baeumker's work is still important because of the wealth of his knowledge and his exact formulations. In Hans von Arnim's treatment of the history of European antiquity I consider his discussion of the Stoics the best. As the critical study of the sources in this field has still not arrived at definite conclusions, even the most recent treatises on the Stoics are heavily indebted to Arnim's work.

Starting with this comprehensive history of philosophy one comes to realize that the work of the new generation must measure up to a very high standard if it is to compete with that of the older. A large collective work on the history of philosophy is now being published by de Gruyter & Co., Berlin. I have before me Hönigswald's *Die Philosophie von der Renaissance bis Kant* (Vol. VI of this series, 300 pages), Bauch's *Immanuel Kant* (Vol. VII, 3rd ed., 482 pages), Nicolai Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, Part I: *Fichte, Schelling und die Romantik* (Vol. VIII, 282 pages). Hönigswald's book is a history of the problems of philosophy; it is designed to reveal in the constant flux of the historical forms of philosophic thought "the intrinsic connection between objective motives." To be sure, "the presentation is interspersed with references of a biographical nature and allusions to the times" in order to do justice to individual philosophemes. It is in the very nature of philosophy, as Hönigswald says, "that its history must be approached again and again," to which one should add that each new approach should be made with increased vigor and improved strategy. Anyone who has mastered Cassirer's books on the problems of epistemology will not refer to Hönigswald's book; but his book will be welcome to those who are in need of a simpler statement of approximately the same problems.

Bauch's Kant is a book of different dimensions. It has as predecessors the classic book of Cohen and innumerable

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other attempts at an "interpretation of Kant." There is, for example, Cassirer's work representing the last volume of the Marburg edition of Kant's works. This volume excels through the usual energy of the author in carrying a striking and illuminating idea through a maze of historical facts—in this case, the idea that the work of a genius must be comprehended from the point of view of his life. At the present time a book on Kant must have a novel viewpoint if it is to receive attention. Bauch finds a new basis for constructive procedure in the consciousness to which Kant had attained in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft* regarding the systematic character of the critical philosophy as a whole. From this basis Bauch attempts to understand Kant's system in its entirety. The "problem of experience" is thus relieved of the burden imposed on it by reason of its having been generated by the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* which centered upon the peculiar character of mathematical science. Because of the problems set by the faculty of judgment the merely theoretic scope of experience had to be expanded to include the teleological structure of biological experience, inasmuch as "nature" must be "the totality of all objects of experience." And thus Bauch finds the transition to the *praktische Vernunft*. For, firstly, theoretic teleology is only an aspect of teleology in general; and secondly, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is regarded by Bauch under the "aspect of value, validity, norm." To the latter it remains subordinated down to its very culmination in the teleological "idea of systematic unity." Thus it appears that the scope of the theoretic is included in that of the practical; and that the primacy of the practical asserts itself. Bauch's path indicates that he is a follower of the Kantians of the Windelband—Rickert school and insofar we depart from him. We see in his generalization of the concept of values but another sort of one-sidedness, a criticism which he urges against the Marburg school of

Kantian interpretation in connection with their separation of pure reason from practical reason. The idea of values is, in his interpretation, carried so far as to lose all its significance. In an account of Kant's system, if anywhere, the distinct significance of the idea of values ranging between price and dignity must be scrupulously observed, otherwise one imports into Kant a mode of thought entirely foreign to him. How the clearness of the Kantian system suffers through the use of a generalized concept of values appears clearly in Bauch's attempt to subsume various significant realms of value under one head, namely, those of ethics, religion, law, and the State, so that "practical philosophy" is differentiated into ethics, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of law and of the State. Here Kant's highly important philosophy of history is practically overlooked. Indeed, in the appendix to the third edition, Bauch even justifies the omission by claiming that Kant's philosophy of history has no importance for his philosophic system as such. We are of a different opinion. In Bauch's procedure, then, branches are joined together that are independent in their worth. To treat the philosophy of religion as a chapter of practical philosophy does violence to its place within the system of thought, even though Kant himself treated it thus; for Bauch emphasizes repeatedly that "this book on Kant is intended to be historical, to be sure, but wholly in the interest of critical idealism" inasmuch as it aims to smooth the way "to philosophy itself, by pointing out the shortcomings and the weaknesses of the Kantian philosophy." We can not enter upon a detailed criticism of Bauch's book. Our evaluation of it may be summarized as follows: The selection of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* as the point of departure for systematic construction was a happy thought. As a result many things are seen in a new light, as, for instance, the relation of the concept of the *Ding-an-sich* to the "particular object." But Bauch's gen-

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eralized idea of values betrays him into a closed system of too simple a structure. On the other hand, Bauch has such an intimate knowledge of Kant's ideas that even where we must reject his not always dignified polemic and where we object to his one-sidedness we find his book suggestive and provocative of new thought. So one may assert that Bauch's work must be reckoned as an important contribution to the vast literature on Kant.

Vorländer's *Immanuel Kant, der Mann und das Werk* (2 vol., Leipzig, Felix Meiner) is of a different nature. This author had the intention of filling a serious gap by giving the German people a comprehensive, scientific, and yet easily readable, story of Kant's life, showing how Kant's work grew out of his life and his personality and the background of his times. Kant's life is told in great detail and in the objective fashion characteristic of Vorländer. His description of Kant's philosophy in its three branches is not intended to be a contribution to philosophy; it is purposely limited to a presentation of the fundamental motives in simple form. The reader's interest is again and again aroused by significant anecdotes and terse, striking statements. The beginning of the second volume is devoted to Kant, the man, at the height of his intellectual powers, while the larger part of it deals with "the aged Kant." The chapters on Kant's conflict with the government regarding his treatise on religion and on Kant as a *Politiker der Freiheit* are written with delightful sympathy (at this point so utterly lacking in Bauch's book) and are especially well done. The chapter concerning the significant and but slightly known *Opus Postumum*, soon to be published by de Gruyter & Co., aims to give some idea of its importance and its fate. The last stage of the latter, one may hope, is Adickes' prodigy of scholarship relating to this as yet unpublished manuscript of Kant's. Incidentally I may state that Vorländer is mistaken when he con-

siders himself the first to point out "that idealism and its method is most emphatically retained precisely in this posthumous work." In my *Aristoteles und Kant*, reviewed by Cassirer in the *Kant-Studien*, this point is brought out in detail. Vorländer's two volumes contain two good contemporary pictures of Kant. All in all, they represent a very thorough popular treatise, as well as a scientific contribution of the first rank to Kant biography.

Before taking up Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, we shall consider another book on the same subject. Kroner published through Mohr, Tübingen, a work of two volumes entitled *Von Kant bis Hegel* (Vol. I, 612 pages, in 1921; Vol. II, 526 pages, in 1924). Kroner attempts to show the unity of this entire development. His work is characterized by his slogans: "To understand Kant is to go beyond him" and "To understand Hegel is to see that one can in no way get beyond him; if there is to be a post-Hegelian philosophy, a new start must be made." He is especially concerned to interpret the Hegelian system; and as this can best be done by following the path taken by German Idealism, Kroner begins with Kant. For the same reason he slights the rationalistic in favor of the anti-rationalistic aspect of the Dialectic, "even at the risk of bringing about new misunderstandings through this sort of emphasis." So it is but natural that Kant becomes a mere mile-stone in the history of philosophic problems, the study of which opens a scientific gateway to the problems of metaphysics. For in Hegel's philosophy the intentions of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling find their fullest realization. If we are to understand Hegel by following Kroner, we must accept the view that we can not get beyond him. To essay a new beginning, not to mention a new development with Kant as a starting-point, lies outside both the intention and the hope of Kroner. Hegel must then be our guide in sounding the depths through

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Each our own present is to be interpreted, for there is a *philosophia perennis* according to Hegel, and, says the author, "in this respect I agree with him."

One easily understands that Bauch's and Kroner's works on Kant have no essential traits in common, unless it be the methodic and systematic utilization of the primacy of the will. While Bauch's book is the work of a Kantian, Kroner gives a fundamentally wrong view of Kant's place in the history of philosophic problems. He plays the glaring searchlight of the Hegelian mind on Kant's field of ideas and as a result his picture is full of high lights and shadows, totally unlike the real Kant.

But in spite of all this I must confess that no other book has of late so powerfully impelled me to reflection. By its stimulating and skillful employment of antitheses it has forced me to a conceptual opposition even more than have outright philosophical opponents. The work is least of all suitable as a text. It is rather a book of confessions by an Hegelian desirous of settling the doctrinal conflicts of the present through the power of his philosophical master. I regret that I can do no more within the scope of this article than simply set my views over against those of Kroner. Although I am sure that the philosophy of the Marburg school to which I adhere can never lead to Hegelianism, I feel it my duty to recognize Kroner's book as a significant indication of the speculative tendencies of the time. I shall therefore briefly portray Kroner's attitude toward Kant.

Kroner says that Kant was the first to introduce into logic the concept of self-reflection; that he substituted for the philosophy of ideas represented by Plato and Aristotle the philosophy of the self; that he made the self the creator of the causal order of the universe. Was it this that made Kant the critic of Hume and the disciple of Newton? Kroner's view is disclosed in his statements that Kant's ideal-

ism was essentially ethical and religious, being derived from the same source as the mysticism of Eckhart, the piety of Luther, and even the mysticism of Boehme; that he places the individual self in every respect above the objective order of things, the individual soul above the visible church, the person above the State, conscience above science; that in his philosophy the spirit for the first time triumphs over perception and understanding, the will over ideas, action over being, the practical reason over theoretic reason. Does, then, the historian Kroner attach no value at all to the self-reflection of the *thinker* as such?

In his critical observations, appended to the discussions of all the philosophers except Hegel, Kroner contends that Kant treated the *a posteriori* as absolutely opposed to the *a priori*, as separated from the latter by an unspanned gulf. When he further contends that the Kantian forms fulfill their function by impressing their *a priori* nature on matter and thus transforming the *a posteriori* into something *a priori*, Kant's short-comings indeed blaze forth. Kroner presents us also with the only possible remedy: "Consciousness resolves the antithesis between itself and its object through its own activity." At this point no comparison is possible between Kroner as the advocate of post-Kantian idealism and the critical philosopher of the Marburger school. "Absolute consciousness" and all absolute concepts are conceptual perversions of correlations or members of correlations. "Objectivity" cannot be annulled by "consciousness." It must be regarded as a *correlative category*. It must not merely be retained in its correlativity with laws but it must also be given a part in the correlative-categorical determination of the unity of experience. There is a *principium rationis sufficientis*, but there is also a *principium individuationis*. One is not absorbed in the other, but serves rather to determine its significance by functioning in reciprocity with it as a factor of correlation. To seek

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a deeper basis for this correlativity in an "absolute consciousness" or "ego" may indeed afford delight to the metaphysician. For the criticist, however, these are pretentious but empty words. He is concerned with the unity of a system of correlations, i. e., the unity of experience, and not with dependence upon an "absolute." Maimon's concept of "complete determination," and with it annulment of objectivity, by an "infinite reason," and the further development of this thought by Fichte and Hegel are speculative attempts that are indeed imposing but that fail to reach their goal. The procedure of scientific experimentation and that of an "axiomatics" seeking bases through deductive and reductive reasoning are alike dominated by a demand for totality; they are not reducible but are polar correlatives. Hermann Cohen says that the individual is the most difficult problem of logic; Kroner, the Hegelian, that it can completely be absorbed by the "ego." Problems like that of the so-called constants of nature, or of the requirement for the translation in terms of one another of different systems of interpretation of one and the same fact are of such a nature that no help can be found in an appeal to an "infinite understanding" with *its* powers of complete determination. Kroner follows Hegel also in not seeking close contacts with "empirical" science but in holding himself aloof. And this explains many things in his book, among others his attitude to the Marburg school. Kroner says: The study and interpretation of Kant during the nineteenth century was as yet too much under the influence of a materialistic age to see the unity of Kant and the philosophers following him. The natural sciences were so dominant and their methods seemed so authoritative for all the sciences that the interpretation of Kant's philosophy fell a victim to their overpowering influence. The critical theory of knowledge was turned into a handmaid of the natural sciences, designed to safeguard their existence. The

Marburg school, too, did not entirely escape the danger of regarding the reasoning of the transcendental logic in the light of the mathematical natural sciences. It is not to be denied that all these elements are to be found in Kant; or even that his personal attitudes may perhaps at times have been similar to that of his interpreters. Yet the "real essence," the "deepest significance" of his philosophy is lost in the type of interpretation characteristic of the nineteenth century.

Such statements must not be made by a historian. Otherwise he risks losing his reputation even if his critics allow him considerable latitude because of his interest in the history of philosophical problems. The "philosopher in himself" is but a poor creature; philosophy will be respected as part of the work of the human spirit only insofar as it respects the work of the sciences, not that of the natural sciences alone, to be sure, and yet not excluding this. All thought, philosophy not excepted, has but *one* problem: to achieve the unity of experience. According to Kant's immortal formulation of the question, this problem is set for philosophy by the multiplicity of the specific sciences. This requires a close linking of the efforts of all. This multiplicity compels philosophy to inquire into the conditions of its unity and thus of the unity of the multiplicity of experience itself. And so the philosophy of today may rejoice over the wealth of problems presented to it because of the powerful originality of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian mathematics and natural science. This insight the Marburg school, which has its origin in the philosophy of Kant, will continue to maintain; thus will it fulfill the "true mission" of philosophy at the present time.

In conclusion, let us turn to a brief consideration of Kroner's treatment of Hegel, which forms the culmination of his volume. The slight attention given to the so-called romantic philosophy as it appears in Herder's *Ideen*, in

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Schleiermacher's *Monologne* and in several of his later academic addresses, for instance in *Über den Begriff des grossen Mannes*, seems to me a defect. These writings give expression to an idea which furnished the vague "aesthetic idealism" with its central principle of method: the idea of the *Lebensstil*. In it is to be found the indestructible energy of the experience of self and Herder's conception of "happiness"; from it, and not from religious experience, sprang the pantheistic conception of totality. The decisive feature in Kroner's interpretation of Hegel is his section on *Grundzüge der Philosophie des Geistes*. Here the aim is to apply the results obtained in the introductory portion of the book to the main problems, and thus to furnish an introduction to Hegel's philosophy. The section is divided into three parts, dealing, respectively, with Hegel's relation to Kant's critique of reason and Fichte's critique of science, with Hegel's most characteristic work, his *Logic* and with the methodical role of contradiction as the central problem connected with dialectic procedure.

The nucleus of Kroner's interpretation of Hegel may be indicated by reference to the following contention: The logical-metaphysical root of the identity of the mind that manifests itself in art and religion becomes evident only if the All exhibits itself in logic not only as the All but likewise as a Self inclusive of all determinations, if the Logos is understood not merely as a work of art but also as a creative personality which comprehends itself in the wealth of its thoughts.

The discussion of the dialectic process is naturally introduced by a discussion of identity. Identity is regarded under the form of  $A=A$ , and it is shown that the principle of identity involves that of contradiction. For in  $A=A$ , A identifies itself with itself. In this process A first differentiates itself from itself and then annuls this differentiation. This is the dialectics of the *principium identitatis*

*indiscernibilium*; but here, in contrast with the thought of Leibniz, it is turned into a principle of (speculative) logic. Unfortunately, I can not enter into a discussion of this matter, but the reader may be referred to Cohen's criticism in his *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*.

Kroner distinguishes between empirical and speculative contradiction. The former finds application, for instance, in the sciences; the latter, in the philosophy of the mind. For in the sciences, including mathematics, cognition is not self-knowledge aware of itself as such; it thinks contents only as contents; it expresses itself in principles without positing itself in antithesis thereto, that is, without contradicting itself. In the realm of the sciences (that is, empirically) the principle of contradiction has significance only as a prohibition, not as a command. In its speculative use, on the contrary, the "principle of contradiction" signifies a "principle for the avoidance of a (mere) freedom from contradiction." Here lies the weakness of the Hegelian dialectics. Each sphere of thought requires the principle of contradiction as a principle of destruction; Hegel himself is a master in such destroying judgments, and not least so in his logic. The homogeneity of any sphere of thought must be secured by some principle, and that principle is the Aristotelian principle of apophasis. All else that is represented as contradiction is enantiosis; the one is "rejection," the latter, "opposition," *contrast*. Why does not Hegel formulate his central dialectic principle as the "principle of contrast" rather than as the "principle of contradiction"? The principle of contrast is creative, especially in the sciences (that is, in the empirical realm). I would refer to the genesis of non-Euclidean geometry. The problems relating to contradiction and contrast are very complicated, much more so than they appear in Kroner. Here, too, the limits of space preclude further discussion. In concluding my discussion of Kroner's book, I would repeat

that it has greatly fascinated me. In spite of its bold one-sidedness it is a notable contribution, and it will certainly have a deep influence upon our times.

If we now turn to Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, we find a work of calm historical investigation. One is strongly impressed by the wide difference in intention between this and Kroner's work when Hartmann states it is not his purpose to enter upon the grandiose one-sidedness of the point of view of the great masters but rather the multiplicity of the problems they discuss and the power of their penetration. From this it appears that Hartmann does not write in defense of any one philosopher or group of philosophers but aims to exhibit the immanent movement of philosophic thought expressed in the writings of the post-Kantian period. Hartmann is clearly conscious of his contrast with Kroner. He refers to the latter's first volume as a pioneer work in method, which for the first time presents a dialectically thorough analysis of the problems of the early Fichte and Schelling, and is based entirely on a fresh investigation of the materials. It must certainly be unpleasant for Hartmann to present his conception of Hegel so shortly after Kroner's legerdemain (the present volume is concerned only with Fichte, Schelling and Romanticism; Part II, Hegel, has not yet appeared). But considering his penetrating mind, Hartmann will certainly produce a very valuable book on Hegel. We hope that it will disclose those formative influences on Hegel that are too much neglected by Kroner because of his decided slant: namely, the systems of Aristotle and Spinoza. Kroner, in his second volume, praises Hartmann's book for the emphasis it gives to Romanticism in this period of German philosophy. But despite this more thorough presentation in Hartmann's book, I, here too, as in the case of Kroner's treatment, find grounds for dissatisfaction. Hartmann, as well as Kroner, fails to



grasp the essence of Schleiermacher's philosophic significance in this speculative period and in the history of philosophic systematization as well. Schleiermacher understands, with all the one-sidedness of the genius, the "idiot," the problem of the *Lebensstil*, and that of the unique "personality." Up to his time aesthetics as a philosophic discipline had dealt only with the genius of the artist, in contrast with whom all others were merely receptive lovers of art. The Romanticists, beginning with Herder, treat personality (the moral ego is called "person") as a principle of creative activity and a subject for systematic philosophy. To deal satisfactorily with it the earlier methodology of aesthetics is too narrow. (I may here refer, for example, to my own work, *Die Idee der Glückseligkeit* in the Natorp *Festschrift*, published by de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.) But, as already stated, this criticism is not leveled specifically at Hartmann's book. It is a very useful handbook because of its plastic delineation and the objective poise of its thought.

Let us now turn to the co-operative work edited by Dessoir under the general title of *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* (Ullstein, Berlin, 1925). This work falls into two parts, one dealing with the separate branches of philosophy, the other with the history of philosophy. We are concerned only with the latter, *Die Geschichte der Philosophie* (645 pages), in which Cassirer treats Greek philosophy down to and including Plato; Ernst Hoffmann, Aristotle and late antiquity; Geyser, medieval philosophy; von Aster, modern philosophy, while the late Frischeisen-Köhler offers an outline of the philosophy of the present. According to Dessoir's preface, the book aims to give the "essentials of what can be taught and learned in philosophy." The leading idea was "to limit the treatment to the established facts" and "to sacrifice all non-essentials in order that the important points might stand out with the utmost

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clearness" It was the intention to establish a vital connection with the systematic portion of the work. Thus this history of philosophy was designed to be an "introduction to philosophy." It is its task to show "how metaphysical thought unfolds in controversy and exercises a decisive influence on philosophic thought even today." Cassirer tends to emphasize this "unfolding," whereas Hoffmann, extremely cautious, lays more stress on the "established results"; Geyser and von Aster lean toward the usual type of the cursory manual; Frischeisen-Köhler realizes that he is on the threshold of history and living speculation where the task of the historian becomes illusory.

Cassirer sets himself the most fascinating task. Incidentally, his treatment seems like a protest against Kroner's removal of Greek philosophy far from the present—the result of his claim that the philosophy of the *ego* begins with Kant. Kroner says, for example: "In the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics, logical self-analysis and knowledge of the objective world are confused. There is no recognition that the two are distinct; reflection on self and knowledge of being are not distinguished. The relation between logico-ontological essences and sensuous objects must on this basis remain an insoluble problem. For the metaphysics of the ontological *ideai* and *eide*, the two spheres dissolve into each other. Greek thought failed to reach an abstract and pure conception of the logical." In contrast with this view, Cassirer, disregarding all that is irrelevant to his purpose, treats the history of Greek philosophy precisely as the "history of the self-discovery of the logos" on which is based in all clarity philosophy's self-consciousness of its nature as pure knowledge. It is not possible here to follow out Cassirer's splendid line of argument. But for the sake of setting it off against Kroner's conception we quote two sentences from his discussion of Plato: "Not how objects are possible in space and time or

how they have come into being is Plato's problem, but from what sources we derive our knowledge, our understanding of these objects." "The ideas are not simply data of consciousness, creations of our ego; the situation is rather the reverse, for our true ego can only be conceived, can only be constructed, on the basis of these ideas."

Hoffmann's *Aristoteles* unfortunately does not continue this direction of thought. His lines are all clear, sharp, exact. For this reason his exposition does not really develop problems as does that of Cassirer with its dramatic verve. I realize that Aristotle is a philosopher of a different type from Plato. Yet, he, too, is part of the philosophic drama of the Greek mind, and the history of the problems of the *philosophia perennis* must remove him from his rationalistic, sharp lines into the dimmer light of the motive forces of the human spirit. To mention but a single point in this connection, I would call attention to the fact that the constructive-dialectic intent of the principles of contradiction, opposition and excluded middle, which furnish our metaphysical conclusions with their dialectic justification, lead directly by way of scholasticism to Hegel. Hoffmann's chapter on Aristotle's criticism of Plato's doctrine of ideas is likewise very illuminating. Hoffmann has also published a remarkably solid and exemplarily careful, scientific outline of *Die griechische Philosophie bis Plato* in the valuable Teubner series *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*.

I would refer further to three additional works recently published on ancient philosophy. All of them, though for different reasons, are important publications. Joel's great *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, Volume I, carries the account through Socrates. This book, which is part of the series including Kroner's volume, is a simply astounding piece of work. The material, which is thoroughly elaborated in the light of the results of other historical scholars, is presented in a remarkably fine style. Philosophy is rep-

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resented as the flower of the mind that grows out of the total life of the age. Economic, political and cultural life furnish the conditions that receive their homogeneous, cosmic form in philosophy. From this point of view, time and temporal life, together with philosophy, are seen as an infinitely active and significant whole. Joel has a style that enables him to make the deepest thoughts and the most sublime speculations appear as the natural issue of events strikingly real and intimately connected with life. Were I asked to name a book that would arouse in the highest degree a sense of the value of philosophy for our times and our civilization—I am thinking of the modern man of general culture, not versed in technical philosophy—I could think of none better than that of Joel. It at all points seeks analogies to our own times; in illustration, I mention only the brilliant reference to the kinship between Heraclitus' and Robert Mayer's mentalities.

The other two books above referred to are *Die Philosophie des Aristoteles als Naturerklärung und Weltanschauung*, by Rolfes (Meiner, Leipzig, 1923; 380 pages), and *Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland*, by Petersen (Meiner, Leipzig, 1921; 542 pages). Rolfes, long esteemed as a translator and interpreter of Aristotle, characterizes his book, as well as himself, by saying in his preface that he seeks not indeed tacitly to assume the truth of the Aristotelian teachings but primarily to confirm it. "The philosophy of Aristotle is historically the philosophy of educated mankind; if it is at fault, the basis of all science sought, is still to be and this without the hope of finding it. The Aristotelian system is the unshifting basis of all sound speculation." Aristotle's logic, ethics and politics are not treated, but reference is made by Rolfes to the notes in his various translations. This book discusses only the Aristotelian philosophy of nature and metaphysics, which bear close relations with each

other. In direct connection with the freely quoted Aristotelian text it presents Aristotle's doctrines of knowledge, nature and God, together with the numerous proofs for the existence of God and his attributes.

Petersen's *Habilitationsschrift* is a work of earnest scholarship on a new subject. It for the first time gathers all the material relating to the influence of Aristotle on Protestant Germany. For this reason it is of extraordinary value. On reading it one is impressed by the fact that for constructive and critical power Protestantism can in no way compare with Catholicism. As regards his bearing upon the religious (or, better, the ecclesiastical) interest, Aristotle was fully exhausted by Catholicism. So Protestantism could not compete with the tremendous achievements of Scholasticism. It had sprung from different sources. But this is in no wise derogatory to the task which Petersen very fortunately set himself, and which at some time called for attack.

Let us now turn briefly to the current methodology of the history of philosophy. Here I shall refrain from expressions of personal views, even by way of criticism, and shall simply report. In volume one (pp. 17ff.) of the work above discussed, Kroner distinguishes three types of historiographic methods in the field of philosophy. One proceeds from the standpoint of cultural development, as does Joel in the book reviewed above; another is biographic, as is Cassirer's *Kants Leben und Lehre* (Vol. XI of Bruno Cassirer's edition of Kant); and the third is systematic, combining historical and critical aims, as does Kroner. The systematic method, which today doubtless enjoys the preference, is sometimes referred to as the history of problems. It permits of two procedures. One may subsume the multiplicity of problems under several general problems and then, having determined which of these is dominant in a certain period, select it for historical treatment. This is the

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method pursued by Windelband in his *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Mohr, Tübingen, 11th ed., 1924, prepared by Rothacker). Windelband divides Greek philosophy into three periods: the cosmological, the anthropological, and the systematic; and the Hellenistic-Roman philosophy into the ethical and the religious periods. Kroner, from his point of view, remarks concerning this method: "The substantial advantages in thus viewing and organizing the problems is not to be underestimated. But the development of German Idealism offers no real opportunity for this sort of grouping. In the section which he devotes to it, Windelband adopts a three-fold division: the *Ding-an-sich*, the system of reason, and the metaphysics of the irrational. But in fact the problem of the *Ding-an-sich* can not be sundered from that of the system of reason. Hence the particular head under which the ideas of Fichte for example, are brought, must be arbitrarily determined. Through such separations the systematic nucleus of problems is obscured rather than clarified. Nor is any other division of the subject-matter—into theoretical and practical philosophy, for example, or the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the mind—tenable. For the relation between these groups of problems undergoes changes in the course of development, and it is precisely the nature of these changes that constitutes the essential feature of the development." For this reason, Kroner concludes that the second method, namely, the chronological unfolding of the whole set of problems, including their entanglements and their disentanglements, is the only practical one for the particular period of his study.

After these methodological remarks of Kroner, written largely *pro domo*, we must in conclusion consider a study of Stenzel's devoted solely for its own sake to the methodology of the historiography of philosophy. Stenzel's central question is: What is the relation of philosophy

to the history of philosophy? He approaches it from two extreme positions: (1) Philosophy bears the same relation to its history as the special sciences bear to theirs. But can philosophy dispense with its history as can, for instance, mathematics? (2) Philosophy is not an exact science, but a view of life (*Weltanschauung*). The history of philosophy would then be merely a description of existing philosophemes. But the phenomenon of manifoldness must be rendered intelligible by reference to the concept of truth and science as found in philosophy. Philosophy thus has problems connected with the specific approaches of the various sciences to empirical facts; also with extra-scientific subjects, namely, morality, art and religion; and, lastly, in general with the consciousness that is aware of an outer world.

Scientific history of philosophy begins with Hegel. He harmonizes the historical and the systematic interests. Philosophy becomes historical and vice versa; the development of philosophy (and culture) is the unfolding of the objective mind. In this there is danger of arbitrary construction, of "metaphysical teleology." Philosophy must exhibit the individual, unique, concrete facts of history. Windelband, to be sure, recognizes that his task has two aspects, the philosophic and the historical, but he takes up only the one, namely the history of problems. Cohen is the first to realize the weight of the question: namely, the "actual significance" (*tatsaechlichen Sinn*) of a fact of the past. The historical itself becomes a direct problem. Even in history philosophic content does not lie at hand, needing simply to be read off. It comes into being only through the relations into which individual data are put. "This hitherto disregarded and seemingly insignificant fact is of the greatest importance!" The individual datum must be considered as an element with significant interrelations. By virtue of his philosophic method the observer



(that is, the historian) discerns a new meaning in this or that series of motives of a philosopher.

Is it admissible to base historical investigation on a particular philosophical system? Or is there such a thing as "pure" historio-philological history of philosophy? All history is interpretation, and one must be "free" in one's interpretation if one is to be "faithful." Interpretation is possible only when there is an anticipated sense of the whole (cf. Schleiermacher's "anticipation of the whole"). Without a system of one's own, one must rely, in the study of a philosopher, upon the problematic power of intuition or empathy. He who lacks a system is subject to a merely empirical time-consciousness.

The history of special problems is of the greatest importance for the history of philosophy. For systematic clearness regarding the place of these problems in the whole of philosophy, and in their nexus with other problems, alone exhibits their ramifications and obscurity, and reveals the role of the philosopher in the evolution of truth. The concern with the history of problems is therefore a prerequisite for research in the history of philosophy, and represents its earliest form. The history of philosophical problems must never lose sight of fundamental historical requirements. It must assume stages that appear in individuals or periods. It aims to establish connections between philosophers, even though not describing the individual systems as such. But the movements immanent within thought at all times have an historical index. And therefore, attention to the history of problems is one of the coördinates of historical writing in philosophy.

But what is the criterion of historical truth? And to what extent were the various philosophers whose ideas are treated in the history of problems conscious of the latter? Our procedure here must be to determine whether the consequences that the problem has for us can be reconciled

with the utterances of the philosophers in question. One must always try to grasp the earlier consciousness as a system free from contradictions, as an immanent, concrete, unique complex. The significance of the history of philosophy stands or falls with the idea that the problems in some way always form a totality; that one problem or another of this totality presses forth into conscious attention, but is determined to some extent, and shaped, under the influence of those not consciously present. In part still retaining their original connections, the problems emerge, obstruct and illuminate one another. An infinite number of connections result, all of which, however, must be referred to a general system if they are to enter into consciousness and be at all understood. This view of the systems of thought is individual as regards the arrangement and the selection of the problems, but its underlying idea of the oneness and the wholeness of mind has universal validity. It opens up the inexhaustible task of understanding systematic possibilities as such.

Complementary to an account of the development of problems is the history of the systems of philosophy. This discloses the degree of consciousness to which any specific problem attains in the case of any one philosopher. The aim of a history of philosophy that aspires to historical concreteness is thus two-fold, namely, historical and philosophical. First, it is through the history of the problems, which is a *conditio sine qua non*, that the history of *philosophy* is delimited within the general field of history; second, it is through its application to historical individualities that the *history* of philosophy becomes historically defined. The individual whole in its specific consciousness, must be fixated within the flux of the history of problems. The two approaches, namely the history of problems and the history of systems, mutually condition each other. The former accepts historically fixed stages whereas the latter

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presupposes connections that link the present formulations of problems with those of the past. Both approaches are based on the system involved in the inquiry as to what questions may rationally be raised, that is in the search to ascertain the scope and the content of what can intelligently be investigated. They are thus based on the same conception of system that must be attributed to every true philosopher of the past, if we are to understand the whole of his conscious mental life as a totality.

The study of the history of philosophy has its value, not in affording comparisons with current doctrines, but in disclosing systems which exhibit in their own peculiar illuminations and shadings the problems that likewise stir our minds and which thus clarify and enrich our problems. The wealth of the thought of the past is at the basis of our own thought. If we grasp the former we also comprehend the latter, and vice versa. Hence the task of the history of philosophy is unending. Every age must translate the past into its own language, and so the old text is ever read afresh. But, on the other hand, a certain age may lack the key to a certain philosophy of the past. The close connection between philosophy and its history does not indicate a systemless relativism. It rather serves to overcome the temporal limitations to which the point of view of every age is subject; and thus philosophy is spared the necessity of perpetually starting anew.

Let us conclude with an assertion which, in view of the subject we are discussing, may seem strongly paradoxical: the ability to forget is an indispensable condition for the maintenance of the energy of life. It is, of course, true that life never really discards anything. Forgetting is merely a technique of memory in the regulation of life. It is the wonderful process of removing that which thought has achieved; through it the rigidity of present experiences is resolved into the rich flux out of which creative thought

ever rises anew. Just as the essential content of "what was" reverts from its individual existence into the depth whence all its powers are derived ( $\tau\acute{o} \tau\acute{i} \eta\nu \epsilon\lambda\nu\alpha\iota$ ), so the mind, in forgetting, removes its eternal content from the accidental conditions of the present in order to justify life eternally in the face of the present. It is the passing that cradles the future; the present has only the hardness of the accidental.

ALBERT GORLAND.

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## THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE IN GERMANY

### I. INTRODUCTION

THE concept of a *philosophy of nature* depends on the concept you have of philosophy in general, and this concept varies according to whether you admit the possibility of *metaphysics* or not. If you do not admit metaphysics, philosophy remains a mere theory of order and cannot be more: the logical schema or structure of all that I consciously possess, of my "objects" in the broadest sense of the word, is its only theme, and this in particular with regard to the objects of nature. But if you admit that the words *absolute* or *in itself* have a meaning and, more, that the quality of the absolute may be known, to a certain extent at least (in other words, if you admit the possibility of a metaphysics) not only the structure of nature but also the *meaning* of nature is the object of discussion.

Until about 1900 most philosophers of recent times denied that metaphysics is possible. There were many who did not even admit that the word "in itself," i. e., "not only for myself," has any meaning at all. And of those who were of the opinion that "absolute" or "in itself" are legitimate concepts, the majority were to such an extent influenced by the philosophy of Kant that they regarded the investigation of the quality of the absolute as an impossibility. These were the real agnostics: for them the absolute exists. but is unknowable.

This attitude has changed in all countries since about 1900. Subjectivism or, rather, solipsism, as well as agnos-

ticism, has broken down. The "in itself" does not only exist, but we may even know a little of it; this is the opinion of almost all modern philosophers. We may therefore study the actual state of the philosophy of nature from the logical as well as from the philosophical point of view. Our own conception of both, of logic and of metaphysics, will, of course, be explained in full.

Let us begin with *logic* in the broadest meaning of the word. Logic is the *theory of order*. There cannot be any doubt that logic must stand before metaphysics; for, in order to know what the meaning of *essence* of nature is, one must first know in its very details the structure of that which is supposed to possess an absolute meaning or essence.

Much discussed in our days is the old problem of a sound starting-point of all philosophy. And this with the result that Augustine and Descartes are seen to have been right in putting the *scio* or *cogito* in the first place. Personally, I have proposed to translate these words by the phrase, *I have consciously something*, the word "have" being designed to exclude any sort of activity on the part of the conscious "ego." For such a conscious activity certainly does not exist; as to this almost all modern thinkers are agreed. An unconscious mental activity must, of course, be admitted; but this is a theoretical concept, and is not anything that is immediately experienced.

The *cogito*, though indubitable, can yet not be the foundation of philosophy without a certain addition. And this addition is possible: for I know by intuition that the something which I consciously possess is *ordered*, and I also know what *order* means, though I am unable to define the word. And now the first theme of philosophy has appeared: In what respect is there an *order* in the midst of my "something"? To make this out is the endeavor of logic.

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Logic, in the first place, has to deal with a number of indefinable concepts, such as *this*, *not*, *such*, *relation*, *so many*, *because*, *whole* and *part*; and with systems of relations prevailing in the realm of these concepts. It finds the principles of identity, contradiction and *exclusi tertii*; it prepares the formulations of syllogism, arithmetic, geometry, etc. In these fields logic has to do exclusively with what I call *immediate objects*, i. e., with objects which "exist" only insofar as they are consciously possessed by an "ego." Some authors deal with all these subjects in a neo-Platonic or neo-realistic way—in the scholastic sense of the word "realism"—but I believe that neo-realism is hidden metaphysics and must not stand at the beginning of philosophy. I have "somethings" in order; and I try to discover this order in detail—that is all at first.

From immediate objects I proceed to *mediate* objects. For I see by intuition that there is more of *order* in the realm of the "something," if I say that certain—not all!—of my immediate possessions *mean* or *denote* or *indicate* somethings or objects, as if they existed in an independent way. Part of these mediate objects I call mental (unconscious) objects, such as "associative affinities," "determining tendencies," etc.; they form the basis of all psychology. The other part I call *objects of nature*.

An object of nature, then, is a something which I *mean* by an immediate conscious possession or content, such as a perception or thought, *as if* it existed independently. Note the "as if": it is designed to *exclude* metaphysics at this point. Natural objects continue to remain my objects; something absolute or "in itself" does not yet stand in question.

It is a rather difficult problem, the problem of a so-called theory of knowledge, to find out *which* of my immediate possessions *may* denote objects of nature and which may



not. In other words: what is the difference between objects of nature and objects of dreams?

The concept of nature being established, logic proceeds to define the concepts of being, becoming, causality, etc.; and here it comes into clear contact with science proper. Science, in fact, may be defined as a part of logic; and the scientist is a logician, even if he himself does not know it.

## II. LOGIC OF NATURE

### I

The main questions of discussion in the field of a logic of nature are, at present, the following:

First, the question concerning the value of the concepts *substance* and *causality*; this is more or less a question of method.

Second, the theory of so-called matter and force in the inorganic world.

Third, the problem of life, both personal and superpersonal. The question "mechanism or vitalism" here stands in the center of interest.

"Thing" and "cause" are popular concepts; and they are at the same time concepts that can withstand logical criticism. They are concepts that have quite a clear and definite logical meaning; the one being, under the name of *substance*, the purely logical concept of *identity* thrown out, so to say, into the realm of Nature and the other, the natural correspondent to logical *consequence*.

Mathematical physicists of today usually reject these concepts. And there are even some who call them mystical or mythological. And they put mathematical equations in their place, conceiving nature under the aspects of a system of such equations. This means that they only know

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and apply the concept of functional dependence in the mathematical sense, but nothing more.

What I object to in mathematical physics, if it believes itself to be the last word about nature, is this: causality means more than mere functional dependence. And, since this "more" is possible in a legitimate way, as general logic is able to prove, it must be recognized. There is the one change, which is later, and the other change, which is earlier; and between the two stands the "why," i. e., causality. It would be absurd, of course, to deny the value of mathematics as applied to physics and chemistry. But mathematics applied in this way can only deal with relations of quantity which accompany causal natural events, but never with the *propter* in the causal sense. Mathematical formulation, therefore, is never the last word in physics and chemistry.

Think of what "pushing" means—the clearest instance of a truly causal event. I do not forget that every equation may be read from both sides. This fact alone is sufficient to show, so it seems to me, that the concept of functional dependence can never replace causality. Mathematical physics is not "wrong," of course, but it leaves open many questions, which *are* legitimate logical questions; and among them is the question as to *why* the one occurs *after* the other has happened. Mathematics is even unable to deal with the concept of *becoming*; the more is it unable to replace causality.

Einstein's so-called theory of relativity must shortly be mentioned in this connection. It shows where mathematical physics may lead the mind. While being mathematically beyond any doubts, Einstein's theory is in strict contradiction with ontology (or phenomenology, as you may like to call it). It speaks of "many times," measured, however, by different unities; and it speaks of a so-called metageometrical space. But time is one by its essence; and

space is ontologically Euclidean. Of course, you may speak of an  $n$ -dimensional manifoldness and of "curved" manifoldness in the general theory of relations; but space is a thing for itself. No objections are to be made here if you only say that we are *practically* unable to know about simultaneity in a definite way. But the Einsteinians prefer to make statements about essence and not only about practical possibilities. Quite rightly most *philosophers* have declined to follow the theory of Einstein, if it sets itself up as more than a mathematical formulation of what we are able to observe. For time and space in their very *essence* are not matters of "observation."

## 2

The second problem of a philosophy of nature as part of logic relates to what may briefly be called *matter* and *force*; the concepts of substance and causality being conceived now as legitimate concepts.

The main result in this field is this: there are only very few really elemental sorts of matter, namely the positive electron, the negative electron and, perhaps, ether. Probably even the electra may be nothing but specific states of the latter. We are on the way to a theory of matter that operates with but one sort of material element—the dream of the old atomists.

Chemistry, in this way, has become a part of physics. The modern "metachemistry" is a wonderful thing.

And, on the other hand, there is but *one* kind of physics. The old doctrine of various so-called "forces of nature," as advocated by Schelling and Schopenhauer, but also by many physicists in earlier times, has been completely given up. There is one sort of matter and one sort of "force." And what seem to be differences of forces are only

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"subjective"; our psycho-physical organism accounts for them. For this organization can only be affected by certain special distinct areas of "force," in the electromagnetic fields for example; every area giving us specific sensations. Thus there is a break only in the realm of psychophysics, but not in the realm of physics; for qualitative differences in inorganic Nature do not exist.

We may call this doctrine the doctrine of *physical continuity*. There exist in nature *all* possible forms of, say, wavelengths, but some give us the sensation of light, some that of heat, while others may only be known by their physical effects (Hertz waves, X-rays, etc.).

Theoretically this doctrine is old, but for a long time it could not be proved. And for a short period at the end of the last century it even seemed as if the theory of qualitatively different "forces of nature," under the form of qualitatively different forms of "energy," might be the last word of physics. Ostwald has advocated this view. But at the present time the doctrine of one matter and one "force," i. e., the doctrine of physical continuity may really be said to be proved.

The question is merely what the "one" matter and the "one" force are; or, mathematically, of what form the fundamental equations are, whether of that of Newton-Lagrange, or of Maxwell, or of some other sort. Yet the hope that Newtonism will some day be the last word of physics must not be given up. For Newtonism is the most rational form of physics, i. e., that form which we should "like" to find realized—the word "like" taken in the logical sense.

## 3

We leave inorganic nature and proceed to the organic world.

Here, no doubt, vitalism is the original theory, if, at least, one includes under "theory" the view of the unscientific man. Primitive peoples and also primitive individuals of our day regard everything as "living." This sort of an all-vitalism prevails even in the system of Aristotle. By and by the concept of the "non-living" is created. And then science comes and finds that it can "understand" only that which does *not* live. Dogmatic mechanism is the result: life is nothing *sui generis*, but only a very complex sort of mechanics. The living does not "live," for living is not a thing for itself and is not bound to specific laws of its own.

This attitude of dogmatic mechanism in the field of biology began with Descartes—although he excepted the conscious actions of man—and with but very few exceptions (E. von Hartmann, Bergson) prevailed in science and philosophy until about 1900.

In 1899 the writer of this article tried to show by a proof *per exclusionem* that certain embryological facts are opposed to any "mechanical" explanation whatever. The word "mechanical" is taken here in its widest sense, irrespective of any particular physical theory. We mean that the facts in question cannot be explained in what might be called the summative way, i. e., the way which goes from the parts to the whole.

Other proofs were added to the first one; and today we may say that but very few philosophers defend mechanical

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biology. And there is no biologist who pretends that he can explain the phenomena of life on a mechanistic basis.

The way in which a vital individualizing or totalizing agent—called *entelechy* by the present writer, *élan vital* by Bergson, *das Unbewusste* by E. von Hartmann—may act upon the material world, may be formulated in various ways, and even in such a way that the principle of the conservation of energy is not violated.

Of great importance is the logical justification of such a conception as entelechy. Here the present writer has tried to show, first, that *individuality* is a real category in the Kantian sense, and that it may even be “deduced” from the “table of judgments,” if only you add the “complete-conjunctive judgment” ( $S \text{ is } P_1 \text{ and } P_2 \text{ and } P_3 \text{ and } \dots P_n$ ) to the list as given by Kant; and, second, that we are able to deduce *a priori*, from the very essence of the concept of “causality,” the *possibility* of four different forms of natural causality, one of them being *individualizing causality*.

The vitalistic biology breaks nature into two parts. There are “two sciences of nature,” biology and physics, as J. A. Thomson has well formulated the matter. Here, then, we have a great gap in nature, whilst we are unable to admit any such gap in its inorganic part. The adoption of a vitalistic biology carries with it a rejection of the theory of ordinary, or psycho-physical, parallelism in the field of psychology. I say “ordinary,” because a certain sort of parallelism between what is “natural” and what is conscious must also be accepted by the vitalist: conscious living goes parallel with the (unconscious) action of entelechy. But there is no parallelism between conscious life and a mechanics of the brain. For the brain, as the whole living organism as an object of nature, is, though a natural, yet not a mechanical system, i. e., not a “machine.”

But all this does not belong to the sphere of this article, which has to do solely with a philosophy of *nature*. Let me





determined by their structure to give but one. The theory of the One World-Machine cannot be properly refuted. But it can be led into absurdities, as we believe to have shown.

As to the suprapersonal problems of biology, i. e., the phylogenetic ones, not much is really *known* at the present time, and probably this accounts for the fact that phylogeny has ceased to be popular. We know that the factors introduced by Darwin and Lamarck are only secondary agents. But what the primary evolutionary agent in phylogeny is, we do not know. And we shall *never* know this agent. For there is but *one* phylogeny, and of this we ourselves form a part. Hence we cannot "experiment" with phylogeny. To compare phylogeny with *one* embryological case—of a suprapersonal nature, of course—is the only thing we can do. And we say that most probably there is at work a suprapersonal entelechy, making all living things basically one. This is the view of Bergson, Becher and myself. But we have here only suggestion, not knowledge.

At the end of all biological problems stand those connected with so-called "psychical research." It is my opinion that the physical phenomena established in this realm, i. e., levitation, telekinesis, etc., *are facts*. But the time is not ripe for theory. A sort of supravitalism is in question; that is all we can say. Psychical phenomena, such as telepathy, do not belong to the field of a philosophy of nature.

## III. METAPHYSICS OF NATURE

## I

The second part of philosophy, as we have said, or, rather, the second philosophical aspect of that which is consciously given, is metaphysics. There are those who begin with it without any critical justification. In my opinion metaphysics must be derived, so to speak, from logic, or the theory of order, and this in the following way: A good deal of order can be found within the realm of nature (as well as within the realm of the mind or soul), but *why* there is such a thing as *nature* (and soul) at all, or, otherwise put, how it comes *that* the concept of *nature* (and soul) may be established among the "somethings" which I consciously have or possess—this question is unanswerable for logic as such. But I see intuitively<sup>1</sup> that the concept *real* or *in itself* has a clear meaning, and that by admitting it I get more of order than without it.

The theory of order or logic, therefore, is led beyond itself by the *ideal* of "order." It becomes theory of reality or metaphysics. And the whole content of so-called experience, in the widest sense of the term, may *now*, but not earlier, be called *appearance*, namely, appearance to the ego of something that exists in itself.

The method of metaphysics can only be induction, for that which we have, appearance, is like a "consequence" of which we are in search of the "reason." And, according to a well-known logical principle, the way from the consequence to the reason is never univocal.

<sup>1</sup> In German I should say: *Ich schaue*.

The relation between reality and appearance, however, must not be taken as a form of causality, as if there were reality *and* something else, the ego. This would simply be nonsense. That relation may be called a "function" of the relation *consequence* ( $f(c)$ ), causality being another "function" of it ( $p(c)$ ). In other terms: Reality is such that parts of it appear to other parts, the egos, under the forms of experience.

## 2

Now with respect to nature in particular, we may say that what we call space, time, matter, and causality in logic, have each a corresponding system of relations in reality, the *suchness* of which in itself we are unable to know. We may speak of a real S-, T-, M-, and C-system. And the only thing we know about these systems of relations in reality is that they contain at least as many specificities and differences as are contained in the corresponding systems of relations in experience. In other terms: cube and tetrahedron, ellipse and parabola in the realm of appearance mark differences and specificities, of an unknown *suchness* in itself, in Reality and are not in the last resort "the same."

Here, as you will have seen, we do not agree with Kant who has said that space, time, etc., are of a *merely* subjective nature. It may be that our space is not "space" in itself—we are unable to decide that—but differences in space *are* "real" differences. This was the view held by Herbart and Lotze. It rests, of course, upon one foundation, which is merely a postulate, namely, that Reality is *rational*, or, rather, approachable in a rational way. But without this postulate—and this eliminates all mystics—metaphysics is impossible.

Vitalism is not in itself metaphysics but a mere doctrine of order. But if you accept vitalism, you have at once gained a very important metaphysical conclusion, for vitalism tells you that appearance so far as it is spatial does *not* characterize Reality in *full*, but only in part. And this conclusion is in contradiction to the philosophy of Spinoza according to which all *modi* of the absolute *extensio* are a *complete* expression of the *substantia* or the *natura naturans* or *deus*.

## 3

The only point where we approach Reality *as it is*, is in our conscious possession, our knowing of what "consciously possessed" or "knowing" means. Knowing knows itself *as it is*. In my knowing or consciously having, Reality, or, at least a part of Reality, knows itself in its very suchness.

And we know about real knowing also in an indirect way. Wherever we find wholeness or individuality in appearance and, in particular, wherever we meet acts of totalizing or whole-making or individualizing causality, we have "knowing subjects" among our objects. Some of these "knowing subjects," namely, the other human egos, we understand. But there are forms of knowing which we understand only in part, e. g., the egos of higher animals—while all instinctive and entelechial "knowing" is quite incomprehensible to us. We only know that the *genus* "knowing" is in question here, but we are unable to understand the *species*.

Reality, therefore, is such that it knows itself in various forms, only one of which—I may call it the "ego-knowing"—is comprehensible to me. And I am myself a part of Reality.

Spirituality, thus, personal and suprapersonal, pervades Reality everywhere. But it only pervades Reality. Reality is not throughout spiritual. For there is matter; and there is no basis for the hypothesis that the "real" correspondent of that which appears under the form of matter is something spiritual. Leibniz, Schelling, and Schopenhauer have advocated such a monistic view. But I see no reason for it; in any case, it is not self-evident.

## 4

This, now, brings us to the question of *dualism*. Dualism, in our opinion, must be the last word of metaphysics, even if we should like to be monists. But we cannot be monists with a good conscience. For there is the diversity and discrepancy between what is *whole* and what is *not-whole*, or contingent; the logical contradiction between wholeness and contingency being, in our opinion, the very foundation of all dualism.

Empirical dualism is an illustration of logical dualism: individuality (a frog) and mere sum (a heap of stones), healthy and sick, truth and error, good and bad are forms in which the fundamental logical dualism is empirically illustrated. And there is nothing in nature which is *quite* free from contingency (in the sense of non-wholeness). For, even if you accept vitalism, entelechy guarantees only the type in general; the position of the single cells in the different organs are contingent and are different in each individual.

*Why* is wholeness never pure? *Why* does it mix itself with the principle of non-wholeness, i. e., with that side of Reality which appears in the form of *matter*? Or, exists there even a principle that is not only *non-whole*, but *anti-whole*? Let us leave this question also and let us admit,

hypothetically, that there is merely the Whole-making, "Spiritual," and the "Neutral," i. e., matter. Or, in Aristotelian form, εἶδος and ὕλη. In any case there *is* dualism. *Why* must it be?

## 5

Here we meet the highest problems of all metaphysics: the problems of death, of freedom and of God, all of them being very legitimate *problems*, even if answers are not possible.

We may speak here of a metaphysics of the second degree in contrast with the metaphysics of the first degree which we have thus far treated. The first metaphysics inquires only concerning "the real" in general, starting from its "consequence," i. e., experience. But the second metaphysics must take into consideration the possibility that there may be various phases of Reality, following one another in timeless "sequence" and having their ultimate source in an all-embracing One.

Let me speak a word about this second metaphysics insofar only as the interpretation of nature is concerned. The problem of *freedom* is in a certain way the connecting link between the two types of metaphysics. Causality in appearance means something real metaphysically. So it is at least with regard to inorganic causality and to biological causality, so far as the individual is in question. Vitalism does not break the principle of universal determinism. But what about suprapersonal biology, i. e., phylogeny, and about its continuation, history? Here the determining factor, supra-entelechy, endowed with a fixed *essentia*, is only postulated by logic, but cannot be discovered; for we have before us a "class" with but "one" case, as we have said before. It *may* be that phylogeny is a process that "makes itself in freedom," as Bergson believes of his *élan vital*, of

*le dieu qui se fait*. I have shown elsewhere that the problem of freedom is insoluble, both cosmologically and psychologically, i. e., when it relates to the so-called freedom of the will.

What is usually called pantheism, as for instance the theory of Spinoza and Schelling in his younger years, is by no means a theory of freedom. For the *substantia* or the *Absolute* of these thinkers has a fixed *essentia* out of which the world "*sequitur*." Bergson's *dieu* has no *essentia*, but is "making" it!

Half-way between Bergson's freedom and determinism stands what we may call the freedom of *realization*, or, in short, the freedom of the "that" (not of "such"). This means that it is thinkable that the *suchness* of the world is determined by the *suchness* of God, but that a free act of God determines whether there will *exist* a world or not. The same relation may prevail between the *suchness* of willing in men and the realization of that willing.

We must never forget that the word "freedom" is used in a rather easy way by many philosophers. Freedom *ought* always to denote indeterminism. But when Spinoza (also Kant) speak of freedom, they only mean behavior according to the proper essence, and nothing more. Real freedom, however, negates *essence*. It is very interesting to note that the problem of real freedom has now again become quite central after having been put almost completely aside during the materialistic and mechanistic period.

## 6

About death and immortality no proper answers are possible. But the problem of immortality has also again become popular, and by no means among spiritualists exclusively. Vitalism has opened the door to it, as Uexkull has



once well said. I believe that in a certain sense immortality may even be regarded as a fact, for wholeness and knowing are inherent attributes of the real and are therefore indestructible. But whether there is a personal immortality we cannot know, nor can we know whether there are phases or states of Reality which are not bound to that system of relations which we call "time" in the form of appearance.

And, finally, the problem of the all-embracing or God. There are many possibilities, and dualism is the greatest crux for them all. If we agree to call God, or at least a side of God, the whole-making and knowing essence of Reality, we may even say the existence of God has been proved. But this covers only one part of the general theological problem. The rest is mystery. And dualism remains a mystery. Is contingency in God or extraneous to Him? And if it comes from Him, why does it? If it exists without Him, in the appearing form of matter, why does the knowing wholeness of Reality mingle with it? Why does it not remain in purity?

Here the word is given to religion. Our short survey of the present state of the philosophy of nature must end at this point. And perhaps you may say that we have already gone beyond our boundaries.

HANS DRIESCH.

LEIPZIG, GERMANY.

## AESTHETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

THE two disciplines mentioned in the title have, at the present time in Germany, reached a certain degree of independence. This manifests itself even externally, namely in the fact that for the last twenty years there has been published a journal<sup>2</sup> devoted exclusively to æsthetics and to the general science of art; that in Berlin two congresses<sup>3</sup> have been held; and that now again there has been launched a society for aesthetics and the general science of art<sup>4</sup> as a continuation of an organization existing prior to the war. It might thus appear that we are here concerned with an object of investigation which has emancipated itself from philosophy. Nevertheless, this is not the case in the true sense of the word. For the most reliable indication of such an independence, namely, the establishment of separate professorships in the universities, is still lacking. Among the European countries, France, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have special professorships for aesthetics; in Germany, however, the philosopher still carries also the main responsibility for aesthetic

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> *Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und Kunstwissenschaft*, herausgegeben von Max Dessoir. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart. Bd. Iff., 1906ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Kongress fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Berlin, 7-9, Oktober, 1913. *Bericht herausgegeben vom Ortsausschuss*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1914. *Zweiter Kongress fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Berlin, 16-18, Oktober, 1924. *Bericht herausgegeben vom Arbeitsausschuss*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1925.

<sup>4</sup> *Gesellschaft fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft (E. V.)*. *Anfragen und Anmeldungen sind zu richten an den Ersten Schriftfuehrer*. Dr. Werner Wolffheim, Berlin W. 9, Bellevuester, 16-18.

instruction. This undoubtedly has its drawbacks, but, as in the similar case of psychology, it likewise has its advantages. For, as a result of this connection with philosophy, the aesthetician is compelled to keep his investigations within the nexus of the mental life as a whole. Just as, up to the present time, German psychology has not suffered, at least in my opinion, as a result of having retained its connection with philosophy, so likewise I see no disadvantage in the fact that aesthetics remains conscious of its original place within philosophy. What most gives rise to question is doubtless the fact that the interpretation of art demands an inner relation to the arts, a direct comprehension of artistic values, such as not every philosopher possesses. An intimate understanding of music, more especially, is possessed by only few philosophers. And so it may occur that one philosophizes about art not from within the subject itself but from a point of view extraneous to it. And, therefore, it is cause for distinct gratification that German historians of art, of literature, and of music are devoting themselves in an ever-increasing degree to aesthetic problems. In our exposition, therefore, we will first refer to philosophic tendencies insofar as they are reflected in aesthetics and then to the contributions to aesthetics for which we are indebted to the specialized sciences of art.

There are few comprehensive expositions of the field if, as is necessary in this instance, we disregard the smaller handbooks. We must mention the large work of Hermann Cohen,<sup>5</sup> who regards aesthetics as the doctrine of pure feeling. Alongside of this theory of pure feeling are the theories of pure cognition and of pure will. Pure feeling is first of all feeling with reference to form, and, indeed, to rhythmic form. It is also, however, feeling with reference to content and, insofar, is love and communication.

<sup>5</sup> Cohen, Hermann: *Aesthetik des reinen Gefuehls*. 2 Bde. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1912. 2. Auflage, 1923.

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From these fundamental principles Cohen derives specific conclusions, the most valuable of which, to be sure, could also hold good, as it seems to me, apart from the former. On a different basis is erected the aesthetics of Theodore Lipps.<sup>6</sup> As even the subtitle of his volume indicates, the theory maintains a strictly psychological character—not in the sense of a purely experimental psychology, but of the Lippsian psychology in general. With a unique energy and with an unexcelled plasticity of thought as well as of exposition, Lipps develops the theory of empathy (*Einfühlung*), that is, the doctrine according to which aesthetic value and aesthetic experience involve the transference to the object of the subject's feeling. Volkelt,<sup>7</sup> likewise, makes fruitful use of the empathy theory in his three-volume work. But he distinguishes between psychological and normative aesthetics and is more unbiased than Lipps in his evaluation of facts; moreover, he does not center his attention so exclusively on the formative arts as does Lipps but is particularly happy precisely in his choice of poetic illustrations and analyses. I myself<sup>8</sup> have attempted to bring together into a volume the conclusions yielded by my own experience and by the critical examination of other doctrines. I stress the thesis that aesthetics and the science of art do not coincide; and in aesthetics I attempt to carry through an objectivism which insures to the object an existence of independent worth. Following these views, Emil Utitz<sup>9</sup> wrote his work, *Fundamental Principles of the General Science of Art*, which contains everything that may be said with reference to the world of art, the structure of the art object, and the creative activity of the artist.

<sup>6</sup> Lipps, Theodor: *Asthetik. Psychologie des Schoenen und der Kunst*. 2 Bde. Verlag Leopold Voss. Hamburg u. Leipzig, 1903, 1906. 3. Auflage, 1923.

<sup>7</sup> Volkelt, Johannes: *System der Aesthetik*. 3 Bde. Verlag C. H. Beck, Muenchen, 1905, 1910, 1914.

<sup>8</sup> Dessoir, Max: *Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1906. 2 Auflage, 1923.

<sup>9</sup> Utitz, Emil: *Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, 2 Bde. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1914, 1920.

I now turn to a brief portrayal of the influence of the main philosophical tendencies upon the problems of aesthetics. The school of Cohen has only of late occupied itself with aesthetic problems. Ernst Cassirer has published single essays on the science and philosophy of art<sup>10</sup> and has recently devoted himself to the connection of art and the myth.<sup>11</sup> He points out that the beginnings of art are to be found in the immediate and undifferentiated unity of the myth-consciousness; and he explains further that this connection is not merely genetic in character. According to the principle of neo-Kantianism, even ordinary thinking concerning being and objectivity involves a system of synthetic formal principles which invest every object with its objectivity and give it a place in the system of nature. Insofar, now, as art also exists and, indeed, exists as something distinctive, it can not free itself from the laws of space and time and of causal connection. Even the creative activity in the soul of the artist is not conceivable without reference to the synthetic principles fundamental to theoretical reasoning.<sup>12</sup> Thus the point of departure is here a fact which is particularly striking in the realm of the formative arts, namely, that every statue, for example, certainly constitutes a part of empirical reality, fills a space which belongs to real space, and belongs to the same temporal order and is subject to the same causality as an unformed block of stone. In addition to this relation between art and empirical reality, the relation of art to historical reality is a favorite topic of the Marburger philosophers. The conception of the will to art (*Kunstwollen*) has led to a history of art which calls itself interpretative science and which seeks to connect the theory of art with a purely

<sup>10</sup> Cassirer, Ernst: *Idee und Gestalt, Goethe, Schiller, Hoelderlin, Kleist*. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1921. 2. Auflage, 1924.

<sup>11</sup> Cassirer, Ernst: *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. 1 Teil: *Die Sprache*, 1923. 2. Teil: *Das mythische Denken*. 1925. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin.

<sup>12</sup> Vgl., Pavet, Hans: *Konrad Fiedler. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XVI, 1922, S. 320ff.*

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empirical history of art. Here, also, the viewpoints and the empirical orientation of the neo-Kantianism founded by Cohen and Natorp have remained authoritative.<sup>13</sup>

These typical references may suffice, and we now raise the question as to the results for aesthetics of the philosophical movement founded by Windelband and led by Rickert. Inasmuch as this southwest German school of neo-Kantianism finds its central concern in the problem of value and locates value in the transcendent sphere of the *ought*, it must first create a transition to the actualities of art. This transition is achieved by presupposing that things possess a meaning which connects the realm of values with the realm of actuality. Whereas the mere perception of a color, for example, is void of meaning and significance, the aesthetic impression of a color in itself contains a non-theoretical meaning—that is to say, we understand the color and take pleasure in it without conceptually reflecting upon it. Upon this simple basic thought the attempt has been made to erect a value-aesthetics<sup>14</sup> which, to be sure, exhibits a weakness in the fact that it must be based upon intuition.

As concerns the influence of the phenomenological school<sup>15</sup> upon aesthetics, this is to be found less in developed doctrines than in the transformation of the methods of aesthetics and the science of art. We need not here concern ourselves with an analysis of the nature of phenomenology, so difficult to understand and to define. We will

<sup>13</sup> Vgl. Panophy, E.: *Ueber das Verhaeltnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie*. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XVIII, 1925, S. 129ff.

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. Muensterberg, Hugo: *Philosophie der Werte*. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1908.

Kreis, Friedrich: *Ueber die Moeglichkeit einer Aesthetik vom Standpunkt der Wertphilosophie*. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XIX, 1925, S. 42ff.

<sup>15</sup> Vgl., Utitz, Emil: *Die Gegenstaendlichkeit des Kunstwerkes*, Philosophische Vortraege veroeffentlicht von der Kant-Gesellschaft, No. 17. Pan-Verlag, Rolf Heyse, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1917.

Geiger, Moritz: *Phaenomenologische Aesthetik*. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XIX, 1925, S. 29ff.

simply point out that this philosophy explains the peculiar category of the aesthetic by advancing the more general doctrine that not everything that is "given" need be located in the nexus of empirical reality but that we are enabled to intuit pure phenomena. The previously mentioned problems of neo-Kantianism which arise from the inclusion of art objects in the actual world here accordingly disappear. For, in the opinion of the phenomenologists, the phenomenon of a tone, for example, may be adequately described without reference to the nature of its physical origin or of its psychological functioning. One might advance the comment that this procedure of investigating given phenomena objectively has always been followed by historians of the individual arts who are concerned with the criticism of style. When the historian of art describes the draping of a garment or the historian of music sets forth the construction of a particular symphony, he is dealing with phenomena, for the fact that the particular drapery in question, as a manifold of color surfaces or color points, belongs to the realm of the actual concerns him not at all. And the same is true as regards the nature of the feelings and associated ideas experienced by the individual in hearing a symphony. However, the aesthetics of the phenomenologists goes further than does the analytical historian of art and of music. It aims not merely to understand the style of an individual painter or of a certain specific historical period by reference, for example, to the draping of a particular garment; it seeks not merely to elucidate the structure, for example, of the third or fifth symphony of Beethoven, but it is concerned with determining the structure of a symphony as such. To be sure, it believes that one may ascertain the essence of the thing in general from a specific instance. And it cannot avoid the presupposition that the individual investigator must possess a special endowment in order to achieve such

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a comprehension of essences. In the case of a number of writers, phenomenological aesthetics is carried to the point of proclaiming the existence of indemonstrable intuitions concerning the essential nature of a type of art, for example, architecture, but such works may no longer be included within the field of scientific aesthetics.

Psychology has contributed to German aesthetics a large number of experimental methods. For a long time it seemed as if one could not, by experimental methods, go beyond the traditional investigation of proportions and rhythms. Very recently, however, Schultze of Königsberg and Kroh of Tübingen have blazed new trails concerning which, unfortunately, it is impossible as yet to say anything definite inasmuch as adequate publications are lacking. New vistas are opened also by the investigations of the modern psychology of youth.<sup>16</sup> The familiar doctrine that the child is, in a definite sense, man in his early state, and that the artist has preserved much of this child nature, has been most brilliantly confirmed by the psychology of youth. We can no longer doubt that mental characteristics which, in the case of adults are, as a rule, displaced or preserved only in an impoverished state, are widely prevalent and clearly defined in the case of children. This is particularly true as regards the relation of the observing person to the visible world. Most children have visual experiences of perceptual pictures; that is to say, in their case, perception and imagination (or memory imagery) are not as sharply differentiated as among adults. Otherwise expressed, many children have experiences intermediate between imagination and sensation, and these intermediate forms are experienced as something external. A similar inten-

<sup>16</sup> Jaensch, Erich R.: *Ueber den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und ihre Struktur im Jugendalter*. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1923. *Psychologie und Aesthetik. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 11ff. *Ueber das Wesen der Kunst und die Kunst des Kindes (Neuer Versuch einer Grundlegung der "Aesthetik von unten")*. Verlag Benno Filser, Augsburg, in Vorbereitung.

sity of visual imagery is elsewhere to be found only in the case of the pictorial artist or the poet, or of an adult who is gifted with endowments for one of the two arts, even though not actually making contributions to it. On the basis of these recent investigations, we may emphasize with all the precision one might desire a fact which was formerly only surmised and advanced as an ingenious suggestion: the artist is a person who has preserved the characteristics of the child mind in the realm of visual experience.

Another movement in psychology which has likewise been carried over into aesthetics goes back to Wilhelm Dilthey.<sup>17</sup> As opposed to the psychology which seeks to build up consciousness out of elements, Dilthey advanced a doctrine that regards mind as a functional complex. This complex, he believed, may without difficulty be understood. In his view, every single mind, although individual, maintains a very close relation with that which is universally human. But this relation is mediated by types. One such type, according to him, is the aesthetic person. The aesthetic person and, even better, the artist, affords the proper avenue for the comprehension of art. These ideas have of late received further development.<sup>18</sup> At their basis there lies this truth: one can indeed more easily understand the nature of the particular mental fields, such as that of art or of philosophy, after one has attained a clear insight into the nature of the artistic or the philosophic person. The attempt, however, to derive the characteristic laws governing the art object from the nature of the artistic conscious-

<sup>17</sup> Dilthey, Wilhelm: *Ideen ueber eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie. Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. V, S. 133ff.* Verlag B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1924.

<sup>18</sup> Vgl. Spranger, Eduard: *Lebensformen. Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persoenlichkeit.* Verlag Max Niemeyer, Halle (Saale). 2. Aufl., 1921.

ness is misguided. The latest tendency along these lines<sup>19</sup> seeks to combine life and work in the concept of *Gestalt*. Nor does this attempt appear to me entirely successful. For the meaning of *Gestalt* suffers from a serious indefiniteness. One must not confuse this concept, which we owe to the followers of the poet Stefan George, with the concept of like designation which has recently been introduced into experimental psychology.<sup>20</sup> Common to them, indeed, is the fact that both are designed to connote an inner structure which is meaningful and intelligible. But in the one case the term has been coined primarily for the purposes of the history of mind; in the other, however, for the purposes of psychological experimentation and of psychological theory. In any event, aesthetics may enter into very much more intimate relations with *Gestalt*-psychology than with the atomistic and constructive psychology of past decades.

Closely related to the attempts just mentioned is the so-called philosophy of life. For Georg Simmel<sup>21</sup> philosophy was a form of life. He also, as does the *Gestalt*-psychology of today, entered into opposition to atomistic thinking. The impression made by a work of art, he maintained, is not equivalent to a summation of the impressions produced by all of the aspects and qualities emphasized by an

<sup>19</sup> Vgl. Gundolf, Friedrich: *Goethe*. Verlag George Bondi, Berlin. 11. Aufl., 1922.

Bertram, Ernst: *Friedrich Nietzsche*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin. 6. Aufl., 1922.

Kahler, Erich von: *Der Beruf der Wissenschaft*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin, 1920.

<sup>20</sup> Vgl. Koehler, Wolfgang: *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand*. Verlag Vieweg Sohn, Braunschweig, 1920.

Wertheimer, Max: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie*. Verlag der philosophischen Akademie, Erlangen, 1925.

Koffka, Kurt: *Zur Analyse der Vorstellungen und ihre Gesetze*. Verlag Quelle und Meyer, Berlin, 1912. *Beiträge zur Psychologie der Gestalt*. (Koffka Hrsg.). Bd. 1. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1919. *Psychologie. Lehrbuch der Philosophie, herausgegeben von Max Dessoir*. Bd. II. *Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*, S. 497ff. Verlag Ullstein, Berlin. 1925. *Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung. Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie*. Verlag Zickfeldt, Osterwieck, 1921.

<sup>21</sup> Simmel, Georg: *Lebensanschauung*. Verlag Duncker und Humblot, München. 2. Aufl., 1922.

analytical aesthetics. Its distinctive feature, much rather, consists in a thoroughly unified character which arises out of or which transcends these separate impressions. This unitary character present throughout experience and prominent also in art, is designated in Simmel's philosophy by the term *life*. "Every moment of life is life in its totality, whose constant flux—and this precisely is its unique form—possesses reality only in that wave-height to which it rises at a given moment; every immediate moment is determined by the previous course of life as a whole—it is the efflux of all previous moments and, for this reason alone, every living present is the form in which the life of the subject possesses actuality." Hence psychology can do justice neither to life nor to art. For psychological treatment always involves a certain solidification. It would be erroneous to refer to great portrait painters as good psychologists. The portrayal of the human being by Rembrandt, for example, is, according to Simmel, animated to an extreme degree, but not in a psychological sense. From these essentially negative reflections Simmel then advanced to positive conclusions. Actuality and art, he tells us, are related to each other as are two languages which seek to express the same idea. Nature and spirit, actuality and value, reveal their profound unity in the individual creation of the artist.

The problem of art has been attacked from an entirely different side by the philosophy of the "as-if." To the thinkers of this school, art appears as the capacity of peculiarly endowed persons to interpret phenomena, by virtue of their creative imagination and by means of a valuable "fiction," with greater unity and depth than other people.<sup>22</sup> This interpretation comes by way of illusion or of conscious self-deception. Thereby he who sees or hears acquires the feel-

<sup>22</sup> Volkmann, Ludwig: *Das Kunstwerk als wertvolle Fiktion. Ein Beitrag zur Aesthetik des Als-ob. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XVI, 1922, S. 69ff.*

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ing of a deeper comprehension of phenomena and of a satisfying enjoyment. Representatives of this fictionalism concede that such a definition does not completely exhaust the nature of the functioning or the purpose of art. But it is doubtful whether the meaning of art is thereby adequately described even as regards pure aesthetic enjoyment.

From the above survey it is not difficult to see how strongly certain tendencies of contemporary German philosophy have affected aesthetics and the philosophy of art. On their part, however, investigators of the various fields of art have now also pressed forward to philosophical considerations and have made their own contributions to the enrichment of aesthetics. It is not here pertinent to go into details. It will suffice to mention the names of Woelfflin<sup>23</sup> and Worriinger,<sup>24</sup> Schmarsow<sup>25</sup> and Dvorak,<sup>26</sup> Unger,<sup>27</sup> Strich<sup>28</sup> and Walzel,<sup>29</sup> Riemann<sup>30</sup> and Mersmann.<sup>31</sup> Among the historians of formative art, as well as among the historians of literature and of music, there are now a number of investigators whose interest is likewise directed to systematic treatment. They all seek purely theoretical concepts and strictly systematic ideas. Their work has already born rich fruit and will doubtless constantly continue to

<sup>23</sup> Woelfflin, Heinrich: *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. Verlag Bruckmann. 6. Aufl., 1922.

<sup>24</sup> Worriinger, Wilhelm: *Abstraktion und Einfuehlung*. Verlag Piper, Muenchen. 5-8. Aufl., 1919.

<sup>25</sup> Schmarsow, August: *Die reine Form in der Ornamentik aller Kuenste. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XVI, 1922; S. 491ff.; XVII, 1924, S. 129ff., 209ff., 305ff.

<sup>26</sup> Dvorak, Max: *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei*. Verlag Oldenburg, Muenchen, 1918.

<sup>27</sup> Unger, Rudolf: *Weltanschauung und Dichtung*. Verlag Rascher, Zuerich, 1917. *Literaturgeschichte als Problemgeschichte*. Verlag Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Politik und Geschichte m. C. H. Berlin, 1924.

<sup>28</sup> Strich, Fritz: *Klassik und Romantik*. Verlag Meyer und Jessen, Muenchen, 2. Aufl., 1924.

<sup>29</sup> Walzel, Oskar: *Wechselseitige Erhellung der Kuenste. Philosophische Vortraege der Kant-Gesellschaft*, Nr. 15. Pan-Verlag, Rolf Heyse, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1917.

<sup>30</sup> Riemann, Hugo: *Die Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen*. Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek. Verlag Peters, Berlin, 1914-16.

<sup>31</sup> Mersmann, Hans: *Zur Phaenomenologie der Musik. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 372ff.

expand. Participating in this work are Austria,<sup>32</sup> Switzerland<sup>33</sup> and Holland<sup>34</sup>; but it is not necessary to describe their participation in detail.

MAX DESSOIR.

BERLIN, GERMANY.

<sup>32</sup> Strzygowski, Josef: *Die Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften Vorgefuehrt am Beispiele der Forschung ueber bildende Kunst. Ein grundsatzlicher Rahmenversuch.* Kunstverlag Anton Schroll u. Co., Wien, 1923.

<sup>33</sup> Ermatinger, Emil: *Das dichterische Kunstwerk, Grundbegriffe der Urteilsbildung in der Literaturgeschichte.* Verlag Teubner, Leipzig, 2. Aufl., 1923.

<sup>34</sup> Havelaar, Just: *De symbolik der kunst.* Verlag Bohm, Haarlem, 1918. Berlage, H. P.: *Schoonheid in samenleving.* Verlag Brusse, Rotterdam, 1919.

Holst, R. N. Roland: *Over kunst an kunstmaan.* Verlag Meulenhoff, Amsterdam, 1925.

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## THE MAIN TENDENCIES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

### I. THE MATERIALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY ADVANCED BY SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

THE materialistic conception of history is based on the fundamental doctrine that the production and exchange of goods forms the basis for every form of state, society, and law; that in each and every society the distribution of goods and the social differentiation into classes or ranks is governed by the objects and the mode of production as well as by the manner in which that which is produced is exchanged. In every social investigation, in every critical evaluation of law, state, and society, the basic consideration is the particular nature of the economic order. According to this doctrine, the legal and political systems of every people are always *causally* conditioned by the peculiar character of its economic life; this relation is one of rigid, inescapable, natural necessity. The theory may perhaps be best characterized by quoting from its creator and master, Karl Marx.<sup>2</sup> In the preface to his famous

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> Marx was born on May 5, 1818, in Trier; he died in exile, in London, March 14, 1883. In his youth an enthusiastic admirer of the Hegelian philosophy with its doctrine of the absolute primacy of the *logos* as the demi-urge of reality, he later turned into its bitter opponent. His inseparable friend, Friedrich Engels, lived from 1820 to 1895. Their most important writings are: Marx's *Das Kapital*, the first volume of which appeared in 1867, volumes two and three being literary remains published posthumously by F. Engels in 1885 and 1894 respectively; and Engels' *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (1878) of which three chapters have appeared in separate print under the title, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*.



work, *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, which appeared in 1859, he has portrayed his doctrine with striking significance and terseness:

"In the productive processes of society man enters into determinate and necessary relations, independent of his will—a mode of production which corresponds to a particular developmental level of his powers of material production. In its totality, this mode of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis from which a juristic and political superstructure arises. To it there corresponds a specific form of social consciousness. The mode of production in the sphere of material life conditions the social, political, and mental life-processes in general. It is not the consciousness of man that determines his mode of existence but, conversely, his social state that determines his consciousness. At a certain level of development the powers of material production within society come into conflict with the prevailing conditions of production, or, to state the same in juristic terms, with the property relations within which they have previously functioned. These relations are thenceforth no longer specific forms of productive power; they are transformed into chains that bind the latter. There then appears an epoch of social revolution. With the shifting of the economic basis there come more or less abrupt upheavals throughout the whole of the enormous superstructure. In considering such upheavals, the material transformations and the economic conditions of production, always to be established with scientific accuracy, must always be distinguished from the juristic, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic—in brief, the ideological—formulae under which men become conscious of this conflict and in terms of which they carry it on. One's conclusions regarding the nature of an individual should not be made to accord with the opinions which the latter forms of himself; just as little may one judge a period of social

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upheaval by reference to its own consciousness. On the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained in terms of the conflicts within the sphere of material life—in particular, the existing conflict between the powers of production and the conditions of production. A form of society never disappears before all the powers of production are developed for which it affords adequate scope; and new and higher conditions of production never arise before the material conditions of their existence have come to life within the old society itself.”<sup>3</sup>

The materialistic interpretation of history in no wise denies, as is often thought, the significance of ideas and the presence within human thought and effort of ideal purposes. Nor is it oblivious to the undeniable fact that such ideas have often been the immediate causes of historic changes in legal and political organization. However, it most emphatically denies that the pursuit of such ideal purposes is the *ultimate* cause of social changes. On the contrary, it represents ideal purposes as merely phenomenal manifestations, as mirroring specific economic conditions. According to Marx and Engels, the socialistic order of society will some day come to mankind with the same iron necessity as winter follows upon autumn; all human efforts for reform in state and society are in the last analysis causally conditioned; not the conception, or the law, of purpose but the law of causality is dominant. Freedom may not be predicated of the human will. All economic phenomena are *manifestations of nature*. Their origin and their nature are to be explained in terms of the laws of *natural science*, not those of social science. If the socialistic order of society with its collectivization, that is, socialization, of all the means of production must come with logical necessity, then all purposive action is fundamentally meaningless. Let us note the famous contention of Karl Marx: “The working

<sup>3</sup> See *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, sixth edition, (1920), p. LV.

class need not realize any ideals; it need only release those elements of a new society which have already formed themselves within the very midst of the crumbling bourgeoisie society." With the emergence of the new social order, wherein class distinctions disappear and property becomes collective as regards all the means of production—factories, machines, implements, and lands—the State will completely vanish and the institution wherein the propertyless classes are forcibly exploited by the capitalists will exist no more. Taking its place will be the new socialized society.

This doctrine, which we have very briefly sketched in only its salient features, is unquestionably of basic importance in two respects. On the one hand, it was the *first* doctrine to undertake a critical examination of the bases and laws of social life; through it the relation of law to the economic order and the question as to which of them is primary was illumined for the first time and in a manner which is indisputably ingenious and penetrating. On the other hand, the doctrine has a *practical* importance of incalculable magnitude. In the largest political party of the German Commonwealth as well as of Austria, it represents down to the very present the inviolable dogma which serves as the Holy Grail for all but a few of the less devoted disciples of the socialistic faith. True, Eduard Bernstein, who is scientifically the most prominent leader of present-day socialism and of the social-democratic party of Germany, sought in his intrinsically valuable works, *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*" (1899) and *Der Revisionismus in der Sozialdemokratie*" (1909), to tone down and to develop further the doctrinal system transmitted as precious dogma to socialistic disciples. His attempts, however, encountered indignant opposition on the part of the guardians of the Grail, particularly von Mehring and Karl Kautsky, and

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this, indeed, in spite of the fact that the changes proposed were not at all extreme. For many hundreds of thousands, perhaps even for millions of Germans, within and without the boundaries of the German Commonwealth, the Marxian doctrine represents the last word of wisdom, presumably the most mature conclusions ever pronounced concerning law, the State and society. They adhere to it with an almost blind faith in its dogmas. And yet it is only a creation of the imagination, though indeed a creation of magnificent proportions.

The demonstration that this Marxian doctrine does not fully develop its logical conclusions and in no wise exhibits thoroughly clarified thought represents a great and imperishable achievement which we owe to the gifted legal and political philosopher, Rudolf Stammler.<sup>4</sup> Stammler points out that Marx and Engels have nowhere given an explanation of what they meant by "economic phenomena" and by "conditions of production." There is every indication that they had in mind corporeal, spacial, tangible, natural phenomena. But this is a thoroughly untenable notion. As a matter of fact, these terms connote but legal relations; their whole being must be conceived as subject to legal regulation. Throughout all known history, regulation of the relations of men to one another has been dependent upon legal norms. The coöperation of men for the achievement of economic results is *logically* conceivable only under the presupposition of an external control. The so-called "powers of production" which Marx and Engels represent as the dynamic element in all social, legal, and political development are not at all economic but are purely *technological* phenomena, as is, for example, our modern power machin-

<sup>4</sup> Born in 1856, now a professor of law living secludedly in Wernigerode, a beautiful spot in the Harz Mountains. Stammler's comprehensive and basic works, more especially *Recht und Wirtschaft* (first edition, 1896; fifth edition, 1924) and his magnificent *Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie* (second edition, Berlin, 1923) may be most warmly recommended to all who seek a deeper insight into these matters.

ery. They become economic phenomena only when they are incorporated within some particular legal order. It is only their inclusion within the externally regulated coöperation of men that is of social interest. If, however, any legal regulation is to be undertaken, the legislator must proceed with specific ideas and teleological considerations. "The mode of regulation . . . has the *logical* priority, even though it is not necessarily the temporal antecedent. Without it the phenomena of social-economic life can not be understood. Take away the concepts of private property, of freedom of contract and of the particular legal institutions of today and not a single trace of the concepts of bourgeoisie and proletariat, of surplus value and of rate of profit will remain. . . . Economic phenomena are nothing other than uniform phenomena of groups with legal relations."<sup>5</sup> In the concept of the social existence of man, law represents the form, that is, the logically conditioning aspect, whereas the economic life represents the matter, that is, the logically conditioned element. The Marxian doctrine remains undeveloped, "for it has not logically arrived at the thought that social life is subject to law." The question whether an attempt or result is justifiable cannot be answered by reference to its history. "Error and condemnable efforts likewise arise with causal necessity. . . . Social history treats of the development of the modes of human coöperation. It is, accordingly, a history of purposes. . . . In its entirety, it is a continuous chain of human strivings."<sup>6</sup> Not the economic but the legal order may therefore lay claim to the logical, even though not to the temporal, priority. There can be no economic order without a controlling activity which logically preconditions it and makes it possible.

<sup>5</sup> Stammer, R., *Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung in der Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (fourth ed., Vol. 6, p. 530).

<sup>6</sup> Stammer, R., *Rechts- und Staatstheorien der Neuzeit* (second ed., 1925), p. 80.

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## II. THE SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL

In his essays on contemporary sociology, Ward discusses no less than twelve distinct meanings of that many-colored and highly ambiguous collective term "sociology." Perhaps it might have been possible to discover even more. The very fact that the term has received so many different meanings renders it useless for the delimitation of a specific discipline and unsuitable as a method for legal and political philosophy. Sociology's greatest defect lies in its use of analogies drawn from natural science. It is particularly attracted to the so-called "organismic" conception of law and of the State.<sup>7</sup> The State is compared with an organism, and its organization and differentiation are described after the pattern of the human body. Toennies compares the city of mediaeval Germany, which supplied its needs from within itself and its immediate environment, with an organism. The modern city and world metropolis, on the other hand, he likens to a mechanism. In very recent times Rudolf Steiner and his anthroposophic school have advocated a three-fold differentiation of the social organism. Corresponding to the head, chest, and digestive system of the human body are the mental, the political-legal, and the economic orders within the social organism; each of these possesses a certain independence and is governed by laws of its own. This confused doctrine fails to make clear how the legal and economic orders can be administered without reliance upon the mental order. The untenability of the thesis that there are independent economic laws, free from connection with a legal system, we

<sup>7</sup> We would refer to the works of the late Otto von Giercke of Berlin—the great German historian of law; also to the various writings of the famous German national economist, Schaeffle, likewise deceased; and still further to the thoughtful and stimulating book, *Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft* (fifth ed., 1924) by the well-known sociologist, Ferdinand Toennies, of Kiel.

have already shown above. The concept "organic," as also its antithesis "mechanical," belongs exclusively to the field of natural science, as Kant has argued in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. The science of law, however, is a *teleological* science. Its proper method of investigation is teleological and not causal. Law and the State, as must ever again be expressly emphasized, are conscious and freely willed creations. For their interpretation, therefore, natural science can furnish at most certain illustrations, and even these must be used with great caution; never can it supply the principle for the organization of ideas.

### III. RELATIVISM IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

In recent times this movement may count a numerous following in Germany. Its main leaders are: the elder Jellinek (1830-1905) with his very stimulating book, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (third ed., 1923); Müller-Erzbacher; Radbruch, of Kiel, author of *Grundlinien der Rechtsphilosophie* (1914); the well-known nationalist economist, Max Weber, now some time deceased; and Bendix. Historically, it may be traced back to the positivism of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Though exhibiting differences in matters of emphasis and of detail, these thinkers are thoroughly at one in their unqualified denial that legal and political philosophy possesses absolute validity. A weary skepticism is apparent in all their writings and theories; likewise, resignation and acceptance of a limited status. Only thorough-going relativities are recognized, more especially only subjective and historically conditioned value-judgments relating to law, the State and society. "This is a view as weak as it is inconsistent.



. . . The possibility of science depends upon the principle of unity. The latter definitely determines the synthesis of the relativities, and without a unitary synthesis we would have only a wild confusion of unmeaning accidentalities."<sup>8</sup>

This unifying principle, fundamental in every investigation of law, we will describe in the last section of our paper, where we set forth the legal and political philosophy of Stammler.

#### IV. THE MOVEMENT FOR EMANCIPATION FROM THE DOMINANCE OF LAW

This school envisages a legal system that is plastic and adaptable to the requirements of individual cases as these arise. The judge is to be bound as little as possible by compulsory legal prescriptions. Dominated by the spirit of *Treu und Glauben*, in all instances, he is to shape his decisions by reference to the requirements of the case in question. At first glance this contention is attractive. However, it cannot withstand close, critical examination. Its adoption would lead to an unparalleled legal uncertainty. In numerous legal relationships, rigid formalism is inseparable from legal security. This is apparent, for example, if we consider the law of exchange, with its rigor and its prescriptions with respect to legal forms; or, likewise, checks, and all public registers, such as that of real estate, of commerce, and of property held jointly by husband and wife. Similarly, legal security often requires strict time specifications as, for example, in the case of

<sup>8</sup> Stammler, R., *Die grundsätzlichen Richtungen der neueren Jurisprudenz*, No. 38 in *Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen und Vorträge* (Vol. 2, p. 326).

terms of limitation and the attainment of majority. "The insistence, on the part of those who advocate emancipation from the dominance of law, that the legislator shall be prohibited from using a rigidly formulated system of law as the means for the attainment of desirable social conditions is a doctrinaire limitation without parallel. Such action would impoverish our legal condition without yielding any moral advantage."<sup>9</sup> This movement, to be sure, has not been without significant results, more especially as it is represented by the university professors, Stampe of Greifswald and Kantorowicz of Freiburg. These thinkers energetically insist that the judgments of the courts should not represent an uncritical application of, or appeal to, the so-called "ruling ideas." The content of the latter is very difficult to determine; moreover, they occasionally diverge completely from the standards of *Treu und Glauben*, and thus of that which is really valid. The thought movement now under discussion, however, exhibits its unsystematic character and its great weakness in the fact that it does not know what should be set up as the objective criteria in place of the ruling ideas. To refer the individual judge to his own "free decision" would be to create a complete vacuum; subjective inclination can not be our goal, and, indeed, is not that for which we strive. A satisfactory outlook is afforded solely by a legal and political theory which is most recent in point of time and which stands alone in being completely elaborated. To this we now turn.

<sup>9</sup> Stammler, *ibid.*, p. 382.

## V. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW AND OF THE STATE

The founder of this theory is the profound social philosopher, Rudolf Stammler, the only one in Germany, and indeed in German-speaking countries, who deserves the name of legal philosopher. Thanks to his contributions, we, for the first time since the death of Hegel, again have a philosophy of law. Joseph Kohler and von Jhering are frequently described as legal thinkers, but only inappropriately. Kohler was a general historian, and Jhering an empiricist. The fundamental conceptions of the imposing thought-structure erected by Stammler are about as follows: Legal philosophy is concerned with that which is universally valid within the field of law. But that which is thus universally valid is alone the mode of organization of our thoughts. Legal philosophy, therefore, has to do with pure *forms* of the law. By form, however, is meant that which conditions the manner in which thoughts may be organized into a unity; and this is accordingly the object of separate, independent investigation. Law is a manifestation of human *will*, and is governed throughout by purposiveness. In contrast with natural science, it is based on the teleological principle. It does not fall within the field of external phenomena. It is not an object in the spacial order; and for this reason it is likewise not subject to the causal law, the latter being simply a formal method for the organization of corporeal changes within space. Law differs fundamentally from morality and from ethics in that their commands are directed towards the purification of man's inner life whereas law seeks to regulate the external rela-

tions of men to one another. Conceptually, law connotes a will that is autocratic and in its intent inviolably valid. It lays claim to a validity that is independent of the consent of those subject to it. It itself prescribes that the citizen shall be subject to it, and it determines with sovereignty whether and under what conditions the citizen may separate himself from it by withdrawal or emigration. The claim to inviolable validity, conceptually intrinsic to law, cannot, of course, at all times be completely carried through in the sphere of every day life—consider the numerous violations of law by theft, bodily injuries, fraud, and a host of other crimes. Nevertheless, it is by this claim that law may be distinguished from so-called “rules of convention” and from social customs such as expressions of politeness. Social custom, of course, often becomes evil in character, as in the case of a social compulsion to duel. Logically, or conceptually, the validity of the rule of convention depends upon the consent of those to whom it is addressed; and the conventional society, represented for the most part by classes or other special groups, is such that those comprised therein have the liberty of withdrawing according to their pleasure. If the member of a certain feudal or semi-feudal social group in former Germany (as, for example, of the Prussian officer-group) refused a challenge to duel, he was automatically excluded from the circles of those “privileged to satisfaction”; but so far as concerns the reserve officer, at any rate, there never was any legal compulsion to participate in the “knightly” duel. Indeed, the law in Germany *universally* prohibited duelling on the part of officers. Herein is exemplified a direct clash between law and the customs of a social class. To be sure, the rule of convention often possessed, as it still continues to do, a far greater *psychological* power than the opposing regulation of the legal order; for the failure to observe the rule of convention seriously prejudiced one’s social standing,

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if, indeed, it did not even lead to a boycott. This circumstance, however, in no wise affects the logical distinction between the legal system and the rules of convention.

The ideal goal of the law, that is, the *idea* of law, is the free community, an order representing that which is objectively valid, free from the turbid, purely subjective desires and feelings of pleasure characteristic of man as a volitional being. As a matter of actual fact, of course, this ideal can never be completely realized, any more than can any other idea or ideal.

"Earth's residue to bear  
Hath sorely pressed us;  
It were not pure and fair,  
Though 'twere asbestos."

—(Goethe).

But this social ideal, this concept of community, must ever be the goal of our thought and the guiding star on our earthly voyage. Upon this star we must fix our eyes as does the sailor upon the pole star gleaming in the heavens.

Justice consists in judging a particular empirical content by reference to the concept of community in such wise, and with such an orientation, that each person respects every other as a member of the social community, and, following the admonition of the great sage of Königsberg, Kant, never uses him as a means to his personal ends. Much rather must every debtor be regarded as obligated in the first instance to himself. Without the concept of will in accordance with law, there can be no permanent norms that bind the volitions of man, and therefore no universal social regulations. The latter, however, are indispensable if those activities that possess a social import are to be regulated along universally valid lines. For, conventional regulation, briefly described above, by its very nature makes itself felt only from case to case as these

arise. Herein lies the "right of law," so strongly contested by theoretical anarchism. The latter seeks to dissolve the entire legal and political order into merely loose, and always easily terminable, associations of free egoists.<sup>10</sup> Anarchism can never be applicable to all of the infinitely numerous social phenomena, for it takes into account only persons capable of entering into contracts and conducting business affairs; in the case of persons lacking such capacities—children, and individuals requiring tutelage and guardianship—it must resort to the legal compulsion which it rigorously proscribes in principle. We have here an inadequately considered and an inconsistent theory.

In the first section of our paper we referred to the exceedingly important role that was played in the history of ideas by Stammler, as the scientific conqueror of the historical materialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. In the present connection we would again offer a warning against the fatal, though popular and ever-recurring, misconception that Stammler asserts a *temporal* primacy of law over the economic order. According to him the primacy of law obtains only for *systematic, logical* investigation. And in thus contending, he is entirely in the right. As a matter of temporal fact, there was never, of course, even in the earliest times, an economic order without law, or law without an economic order. The two belong inseparably together, just as in life there is never matter without form. Law is simply the logically conditioning form of the economic order; and the economic order is the content whose eternal flux of becoming is regulated by law. It is only the organization, however, the regulating form of our social will, that is universally valid; the material itself of law, the content of social life, is in eternal flux. There are—and this is a further and important insight that we owe to Stammler—no natural rights which, in their con-

<sup>10</sup> One might refer to a work, well known though in ill repute, by Max Stirner (1806-1856) on *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*.

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tent, are the same for all ages and peoples. Not a single legal dictate may lay claim to unchangeable and unconditional validity as regards its content. The objects of human desire differ, and are necessarily always involved in change. The conception of permanent natural rights is no less untenable than the doctrine, advanced by the romanticists and the historical school of legal thinkers in Germany, of a mystical, ineffable folk-mind represented as the invisible creator of law.<sup>11</sup>

Stammler's critical philosophy of law, necessarily sketched but briefly above, rests on a Kantian basis. But building beyond Kant, so far as concerns political philosophy, it erects a proud and imposingly complete thought-structure for which Kant laid not even so much as the foundation walls. Just as the work of the great "all-destroyer," Kant, will ever remain indestructible in general philosophy, so Stammler's monumental edifice will remain for legal and political philosophy a *κτῆμα εἰς ἀεί*, that is, an abiding possession.

S. BOVENSIEPEN.

KIEL, GERMANY.

<sup>11</sup> Leaders of this movement are: Karl Friedrich von Savigny (1779-1861) and Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846).



## TO EXIST OR NOT TO EXIST

IT IS no small degree of audacity that impels one, at this moment when the philosophical world is bordering upon ennui, to attempt to renew interest in the overworked and almost hackneyed subject of "general propositions and existence." Such affrontery must inevitably be rewarded with an impatient, "Is there nothing new under the sun?" And in this day when no one reads *Principia Mathematica*, and everyone reads *Sister Carrie*, such a response has a measure of justification. Metaphysical problems fare poorly in an age in which everything is measured in terms of "social reconstruction."

One is not surprised to find such problems characterized as "metaphysical lumber" immediately upon their presentation, and promptly relegated to the scrap heap. Indeed, were it not for the fact that science, in spite of its claims to positivism, continually finds itself face to face with such fundamental questions and is compelled willy nilly to answer them: if only with an *ignorabimus*, metaphysics might disappear entirely as the worthless remnant of an outworn scholasticism.

It is fortunate that recent years have witnessed in connection with the contemplation of metaphysical problems, the development of a new factor, the importance of which it is impossible to exaggerate. I refer to the symbolic or mathematical logic, championed by such men as Russell, Whitehead, Couturat, Schroeder, and others. These men have emphasized among other things two points: (1) A large portion of the supposedly metaphysical questions are

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matters for logic purely and simply. (2) Much of the Aristotelian logic is in need of immediate revision.

It is with the second of these that I shall be primarily concerned in this discussion. The precise problem is this. Here is a body of knowledge which has fittingly been called "traditional" logic suddenly subjected to the most disastrous criticism. Some of its most treasured possessions have been shown to contain nothing but a mass of inconsistencies and sophisms. Witness, for example, the following: Immediate inference has been critically examined, with the result that it has been shown to be valid only with certain very specific limitations. In view of a heretofore unexamined distinction between the relations individual-to-group, and species-to-genus, the older logic has been forced to re-examine its formal identification of the singular proposition and the universal proposition. The reduction of all propositions to the subject-attribute form has been proven impossible with regard to certain relational propositions; this limits the syllogistic logic quite definitely and calls for a new emphasis on extra-syllogistic arguments.

In what follows I shall concern myself with only one of these—immediate inference, for it is at this point that traditional logic has most severely felt the blow. With regard to this question specifically, symbolic logic has clearly demonstrated three things. In the first place conversion of an A proposition, and contraposition of an E proposition are no longer possible, and inversion is never permissible. In the second place the square of opposition needs re-interpretation. Inference from a universal to its subaltern is unwarranted, and the truth of a universal proposition does not demand the falsehood of its contrary, *i. e.*, the propositions, "All S is P," and "No S is P" may both be true at once. In the third place, and as a direct result, certain moods of the syllogism are fallacious, *viz.*, all of

those in which we draw a particular conclusion on the basis of premises both of which are universal.

The attack of symbolic logic upon this particular concept is centered about the problem of "existence." Stated as explicitly as possible, the question is this: Is it possible to deduce from an asserted universal proposition on the one hand, and an asserted particular proposition on the other, anything about the existence or non-existence of the elements of those propositions? Traditional logic has never answered this question because it has never asked it. Symbolic logic insists that the problem of immediate inference cannot possibly be answered without first definitely considering this question.

Let us determine first of all the solution which symbolic gives to this problem. Russell, who may be taken as the general exponent of the critical view, writes as follows: "General propositions are to be interpreted as not involving existence. When I say, for instance, 'All Greeks are men,' I do not want you to suppose that that implies that there are Greeks. It is to be considered emphatically as not implying that. That would have to be added as a separate proposition." On the other hand, "the contradiction of any general statement does assert existence."<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to state what is involved here without introducing the propositional-function,<sup>2</sup> for general and particular propositions reduce to propositional-functions of certain kinds. The proposition, "All S is P", reduces, for example, to " $x$  is S implies  $x$  is P" is true for all values of  $x$ ." Thus, as far as the element, "S" is concerned, this proposition is entirely independent of existence, for it is true for all  $x$ 's, both those which are S and those which are not. If there should happen to be no  $x$ 's which are S, the proposition would still be true. Consequently the universal affirm-

<sup>1</sup> "Philosophy of Logical Atomism," *Monist*, 1918-19, p. 191.

<sup>2</sup> Russell's best treatment of this notion is to be found in his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Chap. XV.

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ative proposition does not assert existence. The universal negative, "No S is P" becomes " $x$  is S and P' is true for no values of  $x$ ." This, as can be readily seen, not only fails to assert existence, but actually denies the existence of  $x$ 's which are both S and P. Hence we may generalize our results thus far in the form of the statement, Universal propositions do not assert existence. On the other hand, particular propositions are interpreted as follows: "Some S is P" becomes " $x$  is S and P' is true for some values of  $x$ ." "Some S is not P" becomes by obversion, " $x$  is S and non-P' is true for some values of  $x$ ." The truth of particular propositions therefore depends upon the existence of the elements of the propositions. In general, then, we may say, Particular propositions do assert existence.

If I may be pardoned the momentary digression, I should like to here examine a further development of this notion which Russell makes. Out of the notion of a propositional-function as sometimes true, and consistent with his whole atomistic view which endeavors "to formulate a metaphysic upon the basis of a logic,"<sup>3</sup> he attempts to *define* existence. He says, for example, that the notion of a propositional-function which is sometimes true gives us the "fundamental meaning of the word 'existence'," and that "other meanings are either derived from this or embody mere confusion of thought."<sup>4</sup> Now any attempt to define existence tends at the outset to arouse suspicion. One feels with Aristotle that we can talk of its "aspects" but that *being* itself, because of its universality must always escape definition. The suspicion is supported when we note that "existence" is defined by Russell in terms of a propositional-function—a notion which, on the surface at least, appears to be of greater complexity than the idea of existence itself. When we recall that a propositional-function is "noth-

<sup>3</sup> *Monist*, op. cit., p. 496.

<sup>4</sup> *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 164.

ing";<sup>5</sup> it seems strange that by adding the notion of "sometimes" to that which is nothing we can produce that which is in a sense "everything." It can be shown, quite conclusively, I think, that Russell's attempt involves a circular definition, for most of the notions involved in it, *viz.*, propositional-function, variable, truth, *etc.*, themselves imply existence. And so with every attempt to define existence. A definition of existence must either be of the notion "existence" or the word "existence"—but both of these are themselves instances of existence, consequently existence is given before we define it. Existence can never be defined or reduced to any simpler notion; it is given immediately just like Wittgenstein's concept of object.<sup>6</sup>

To return to our main topic, it is now clear why certain processes of immediate inference are faulty. Conversion of an A proposition is fallacious because we pass from a universal proposition to a particular, and therefore tacitly introduce the existential element. This suggests the difficulty noted by Keynes,<sup>7</sup> with regard to the partial inverse of an A proposition which gives the predicate distributed whereas it was not distributed in the original. The explanation given by Keynes must impress one as unsatisfactory. Furthermore we are now able to see how it is that contrary propositions may both be true. If there are no S's, then the two propositions, "Some S is P" and "Some S is not P" will both be false. But if they are false, their contradictions must be true, in which case the propositions "All S is P" and "No S is P" would both be true.

Let us now ask whether it is possible to reconcile the two views, that of the older logicians which maintains that immediate inference is a valid process throughout, and that of the newer critical school which maintains that it is only partly true. Is it possible, that is, to retain imme-

<sup>5</sup> *Monist*, p. 196.

<sup>6</sup> *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Prop. 4.127.

<sup>7</sup> *Formal Logic*, 4th ed., pp. 139-40.

mediate inference as a *formally* valid process by supplying it with a new interpretation? It seems to me that an affirmative answer to this question is justified. The reconciliation of the two views lies, therefore, in showing that each is a correct but one-sided approach to the problem. Symbolic logic considers the question from the side of extension; traditional logic from the point of view of intension. The conflict lies in a two-fold over-emphasis. In the first place traditional logic was not aware that its approach was intensional; as a result it introduced, consciously or unconsciously, a great deal of the extensional element. When the newer logic made its attack, its weapons were directed only against the extensional view, and immediate inference was clearly shown to be impossible from this approach. The older logic, not realizing the double approach, felt that immediate inference as a whole had been demonstrated to be false. In the second place, symbolic logic, in its eagerness to condemn, has maintained that its own point of view is the only possible one—the meaning of general-particular propositions is *exhausted* by the propositional-function. In accordance with this suggestion, the remainder of this paper will attempt to show (1) that everything involved in the extensional approach is quite in accordance with facts, but (2) that the intensional approach is also warranted in view of the fact that it may be consistently formulated.

(1) It is evident that such a proposition as "This is a man," implies that a man exists. The word "this" is a pointing word, or what Russell calls a proper name, and it can only be used when the particular which is named is present in perception. We have a generalized form of such propositions, which is indicated by "There are men." Such a proposition obviously implies the existence of men (or at least one man) as does the former. According to the same pattern, the proposition "There are good men"

implies the existence of good men. This is usually stated in the form of a propositional-function as "The propositional-function ' $x$  is a good man' is true for some values of  $x$ ."

Now take the proposition "Some men are good." For Russell this proposition is *equivalent* to the proposition, "There are good men." As a consequence his whole interpretation of general-particular propositions is determined. For if the latter is equivalent to the former, it may be looked upon as its *definition*. Since, therefore, a particular proposition is defined in terms of an existential proposition, that particular proposition itself will assert existence.

Consider further. If I assert the proposition "There are no centaurs," I evidently imply that, search where you will in perceptual experience, you will never find anything that can be called a centaur. Such a proposition implies the non-existence, or if you prefer, "denies the existence" of centaurs. In the same way the proposition "There are no two-legged centaurs" implies the non-existence of two-legged centaurs. Let this be taken as equivalent to the proposition, "No centaurs are two-legged," and we have determined the relation of an E proposition to the question of existence. The question of existence as related to A and O propositions can be determined by simply obverting the E and I propositions which we have defined.

Now this process seems to be beyond criticism. If general and particular propositions are approached thus empirically, they do have the relations to existence which are designated above. And clearly from this point of view immediate inference is not in general possible. Let us turn to the opposing point of view.

(2) Every general and every particular proposition may be looked upon as a statement of a dyadic relation of a definite and specific kind between concepts. From this

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approach, the words, "all," "no," and "some" are devoid of all quantitative significance; they simply serve to designate the nature of the relation which subsists between the subject term and the predicate term. This type of proposition may therefore be symbolized by  $aRb$ , where " $a$ " and " $b$ " denote non-relational concepts or qualities, and " $R$ " designates a relational concept.

Since we are giving no content to our symbols, let us suppose, for convenience of symbolism, that " $R$ " represents the relation between the subject term and the predicate term in an E proposition. The the E proposition may be symbolized by  $aRb$ . Let the negative of  $R$  be designated by  $R'$ ; then

$$-(aRb) = aR'b \quad (\text{Definition})$$

Now if  $a$  has a definite relation to  $b$ , then it must also have a definite relation to the negative of  $b$  or  $b'$ . Designate this relation by " $r$ ". Then we have  $arb'$ . Call the negative of this relation  $r'$ ; then

$$-(arb') = ar'b' \quad (\text{Definition})$$

Let the relation  $r$  be defined by the following propositions:

- I.  $aRb = arb'$
- II.  $aRb < ar'b$

Since according to both approaches conversion of E is valid, we have as a result

- III.  $aRb = bRa$

Now on the basis of these assumptions, and those immediately involved in the use of the implicative symbol, " $<$ ", it becomes possible to derive a number of direct relations of equivalence and implication between  $R$ ,  $R'$ ,  $r$ , and  $r'$ , together with corresponding adjustments and arrangements of  $a$ ,  $a'$ ,  $b$ , and  $b'$ . This is a formally correct process regardless of what particular content is given to the symbols. In order to show that this derivation corresponds precisely to what has been called immediate inference, we may let  $R$ ,  $r$ ,  $R'$ , and  $r'$  designate, respectively, the relations

between qualities in the E, A, I, and O propositions of traditional logic. The validity of immediate inference is shown in the following:

1. Obversion of E and A:  $a R b = a r b'$  (Prop. I).
2. Obversion of I and O:  $a R' b = a r' b'$  (Neg. of I).
3. Conversion of E:  $a R b = b R a$  (Prop. III).
4. Conversion of I:  $a R' b = b R' a$  (Neg. of III).
5. Conversion of A:  $a r b < b R a$
- Proof:  $a R b < a r' b$  (Prop. II).
- $a r b < a R' b$  (*Modus tollens*).
- $< b R a$  (Prop. 4).
6. Contrapos. of A:  $a r b = b' r a'$
- Proof:  $a r b' = a R b$  (Prop. I).
- $= b R a$  (Prop. III).
- $= b' r a'$  (Prop. I).
- $a r b = b' r a'$  (Substituting  $b$  for  $b'$  and  $b'$  for  $b$ ).
7. Contrapos. of E:  $a R b < b' r a'$
- Proof:  $a R b < a r' b$  (Prop. II).
- $< b' r a'$  (Neg., Prop. 6).
8. Contrapos. of O:  $a r' b = b' r a'$
- Proof:  $a r b = b' r a'$  (Prop. 6).
- $a r' b = b' r a'$  (Neg., Prop. 6).
9. Inverse of A:  $a r b < a' R' b'$
- Proof:  $a R b < b' r a'$  (Prop. 7).
- $b R a <$  (Prop. III).
- $b' r a' < b R' a$  (*Modus tollens*).
- $a r b < a' R' b'$  (Sub.  $a$  for  $b'$ ,  $b$  for  $a'$ , etc.)
10. Inverse of E:  $a R b < a' r' b'$
- Proof:  $a r b < a' R' b'$  (Prop. 9)
- $a' R b' < a r b$  (*Modus tollens*)
- $a R b < a' r' b'$  (Sub.  $a$  for  $a'$ ,  $b$  for  $b'$ , etc.)

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11. Contrad. A-O:  $\neg(a r b) = a r' b$  (Definition)  
 12. Contrad. E-I:  $\neg(a R b) = a R' b$  (Definition)  
 13. Subaltern of E:  $a R b < a r' b$  (Prop. II).  
 14. Subaltern of A:  $a r b < a R' b$  (*Modus tollens*  
 of II)  
 Contraries:  $a R b, a r b$   
 Subcontraries:  $a R' b, a r' b$

Since  $r$  is a transitive relation, it becomes possible to formulate the doctrine of the syllogism, as follows:

15. Mood AAA:  $(a r b)(b r c) < (a r c)$  (Principle of trans.)  
 16. Mood AEE:<sup>8</sup>  $(a r b)(b R c) < (a R c)$   
 Proof:  $(a r b)(b r c) < (a r c)$  (Prop. 15)  
 $(a r b)(b R c') < (a R c')$  (Prop. I)  
 $(a r b)(b R c) < (a R c)$  (Sub.  $c'$  for  $c$ )  
 17. Mood IAI:  $(a R' b)(b r c) < (a R' c)$   
 Proof:  $(a r b)(b R c) < (a R c)$  (Prop. 16)  
 $(a r b)(b R c) (a R' c) = O$  (Restatement of impl.)  
 $(a R' c)(a r b) < (b R' c)$  (Restatement of impl.)  
 $(c R' a)(a r b) < (c R' b)$  (Prop. 4)  
 $(a R' b)(b r c) < (a R' c)$  (Sub.  $a$  for  $c$ ,  
 $b$  for  $a$  and  $c$  for  $b$ ).  
 18. Mood IEO:  $(a R' b)(b R c) < (a r' c)$   
 Proof:  $(a R' b)(b r c) < (a R' c)$  (Prop. 17)  
 $(a R' b)(b r c) (a R c) = O$  (Restatement of impl.)  
 $(a R' b)(a R c) < (b r' c)$  (Restatement of impl.)  
 $(b R' a)(a R c) < (b r' c)$  (Prop. 4)  
 $(a R' b)(b R c) < (a r' c)$  (Sub.  $b$  for  $a$ ,  
 and  $a$  for  $b$ ).

Such a symbolism evidently suffices to justify the traditional interpretation of propositions from the point of view of immediate inference and the syllogism. This means

<sup>8</sup> In order to emphasize the transitivity of the relation, the premises are left in this order. Consequently to compare these with the valid moods of the first figure the premises will have to be interchanged.

simply that these notions may be reduced to certain fundamental and primitive propositions which are mutually consistent. The notion of immediate inference is therefore not entirely false, but capable of a valid interpretation.

It remains to be seen whether any definite content can be given to these symbols, which will serve to relate them to the common sense interpretation of general and particular propositions. Our failure to find such a content will not condemn the symbolism, for it may be true that the common sense interpretation is either too vague to fit into any precise symbolism, or else is internally inconsistent. What follows may be considered as an attempt to give to these symbols a content which will serve to relate them more definitely to the ordinary interpretation of general and particular propositions.

The relation "R" may be called "incompatibility" or "inconsistency." It is a relation which exists between concepts and is ultimately a matter of definition. Two concepts, *a* and *b*, are incompatible when the complete definition of *a* involves a term which is contradictory to one of those involved in the complete definition of *b*. A complete definition of a term is a statement of all of its "essential" attributes. Determination of definition is usually a matter of reference to experience; hence the notion of incompatibility is ultimately derived from and verified by what exists. But existence is no part of the *meaning* of such a notion. I can define any notion without supposing as a part of my definition that there are actual instances in perceptual experience of the defined notion. Consequently incompatibility does not involve existence. The same is true with regard to R', which may be interpreted as "compatibility." Two concepts, *a* and *b*, are compatible when they are not incompatible, i. e., when the complete definition of *a* involves no term which is contradictory to any involved in the complete definition of *b*. Compatibility is therefore

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purely a matter of meanings of terms, and has only an indirect relation to existence. Consequently, such a proposition as "Some fairies have wings" may be true provided we know only what is involved in the definitions of "fairies" and "wings." It is possible, that is, to make true particular propositions which do not involve existence.

It is not so easy to give a content to the relation symbolized by " $r$ ". To interpret it as "implication" is not to be led far astray if one guards against passing over to Russell's extensional use of the word. From the intensional side, the interpretation of  $r$  again involves definition. Universal affirmative propositions, according to Joseph,<sup>9</sup> are of two types: scientific and historical judgments. Obviously, from an intensional point of view, only the former are significant for logic. In this type of proposition, a complete definition of the subject must include the predicate. Consequently, we may interpret " $arb$ " as "the definition of  $a$  includes  $b$ ." This makes every universal affirmative proposition analytic—precisely what is meant, it seems to me, by the term *scientific*. In accordance with this interpretation of  $r$ , the symbol " $r$ " will indicate its negative, i. e., the proposition " $ar'b$ " signifies that  $b$  is not included in the definition of  $a$ . Both of these notions are entirely independent of any existential implication; hence propositions which express them cannot be said to imply existence.

It will perhaps be well to interpret our three primitive propositions in the light of these notions. The first proposition says that " $a$  is incompatible with  $b$ ," is equivalent to "the definition of  $a$  involves not- $b$ ." This is evidently true, for the *definiens* could hardly include qualities which are incompatible with the *definiendum*. Proposition II, which expresses the relation of E to O, says that "the incompatibility of  $a$  and  $b$  implies that  $b$  is not included in the definition of  $a$ , but the converse is not true," i. e., if two

<sup>9</sup> *An Introduction to Logic*, p. 177.

qualities are incompatible, one cannot be included in the definition of the other, but the fact that one of two terms is not used to define the other does not imply their incompatibility. Taking the *modus tollens* we can interpret the relation of A to I: if one of two qualities is involved in the definition of the other, they must be compatible, but compatibility alone is not a sufficient warrant for assuming that one is involved in the definition of the other. Proposition III asserts simply that the relations of compatibility and incompatibility are symmetric relations, which is evidently true.

In conclusion, space forbids that I more than indicate the implications of this view as they would exhibit themselves in the theory of knowledge. A priorism is definitely repudiated. The notions of implication, incompatibility, definition, etc., have their basis ultimately in sense experience. This does not mean that one thing may imply another, or that one object may define another; it does mean, however, that all of these logical relations which refer primarily to concepts, take their origin in certain definite and specific relations which particulars may have to one another. Outside of spatial and temporal relations, probably the most fundamental of these is that of similarity or resemblance. It seems possible to develop the whole notion of implication from the empirically observed relation of similarity. This is not done after the pattern of Jevons' equational logic, but through the medium of degrees of resemblance, which again is an empirical fact. Since the laws of logic themselves are made up of such notions as implication, incompatibility and definition, this view makes even these laws referable to experience for their validity, and as a result might be called empirico-rationalism.

The outcome of the whole discussion is simply this. Profiting by its conflict with symbolic logic, the older logic is discovering the methodological value of self-criticism.

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Realizing that there can be only *one* logic, and therefore that its disagreement with the newer viewpoint must be a matter merely of vagueness or ambiguity of terms, the traditional logic is attempting to justify its own existence by re-examining its subject-matter. It is discovering in this process that underneath the inaccuracy of terms there is to be found accuracy of meaning. Consequently it is re-defining many of its notions. Fortunately, in this process of self-examination, the traditional logic is beginning to appreciate the value of a precise symbolism, and is thus adopting the weapon of those who are attacking it. This promises well. In particular I have tried to show that out of the conflict has come the realization of the need for a sharper distinction between extension and intension, or, with regard to propositions, between derivation and meaning. This can be done only by formulating an intensional symbolism. Such a symbolism has been suggested above, though this makes no claim to simplicity or accuracy. At this moment I can see no reason why all of logic could not be developed from such a point of view and according to such a symbolism. If such a development can be carried out, then it will be incumbent upon someone to construct a "table of translation," by means of which the intensional logic could be transcribed into terms of the extensional. This would serve to definitely relate the problem of meaning to the problem of existence.

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## A REALIST VIEW OF ILLUSION AND ERROR

THE fundamental doctrine of modern Realism may be expressed as follows: "When we know anything, we know it as it really is"; or again "knowing is not making, but finding." We are sometimes asked, what evidence is there for this? Why this blind act of faith? The answer is simple; the doctrine is really self-evident—we see by mere reflection upon it that it must be true. This is the proper answer: but we may also point out that the contrary view—the view that knowing *is* making—turns out on examination to be unintelligible and self-contradictory. For unless we know things as they really are, there can be no argument about anything whatever; indeed there cannot be any affirmation, let alone argument: even the judgment—"knowing is making"—even this judgment cannot on its own showing be true; for the fact which it purports to assert is (on its own showing) made by him who asserts it, and when he ceases to assert it, or to think about it, it "goes out bang" as Tweedledum said.

Thus in his fundamental doctrine the Realist, it appears, is right: indeed, he is perfectly entitled to say that all philosophy—if only it understood itself—is and must be, in this fundamental sense, realistic. And this would be just as true of, say, Hume and Mill as of Reid or Dr. G. E. Moore. For Hume and Mill admit and assert the reality of sensations and images: it does not matter that those sensations and those images are fleeting: they really do occur, whether

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we think about their occurrence or not: similarly the laws which govern their occurrence, their coexistence or sequence—these laws really do hold whether any philosopher thinks about them or not: and this (so far at least) is realism.

Thus the fundamental principle of realism seems unassailable. But as soon as we try to apply it to details, we are plunged into a sea of troubles. A realistic theory of perception or of the physical world is at once confronted with the problem of illusion, or (more generally) with the problem of relativity in its widest sense. A realistic theory of judgment is confronted with the problem of error, and (we might add) with the problem of belief. Finally a realistic theory of the good or of "values" seems powerless to explain the diversity of opinions upon this matter which prevail and have prevailed among mankind.

All these difficulties have of course a certain common character: the trouble is always that the nature of the subject seems to alter the object in some way. Now, of course, this fact (if fact it be) is not fatal to the fundamental basis of realism—the principle that when we know a thing we know it as it is. For unless illusion, error, and prejudice really existed, and existed whether known and thought about or not, there would obviously be no problem at all. A subjective idealist for instance cannot use the fact of error against the fundamental principle of realism. For unless that fundamental principle be true, the facts of error, like everything else, cease to be facts at all—they become mere dreams which only exist when subjective idealists are dreaming about them; and which don't even exist then, for the subjective idealist (as we saw) is not even entitled to assert that his dreams really occur, or that he is really dreaming. Thus the facts of error, for instance, cannot possibly be fatal to Realism as such, but only (at most) to mistaken applications of Realism.

But in any case those facts, together with the facts of illusion and prejudice, are there and must be dealt with somehow: it is no good to pretend that they don't exist. And there seem to be two main ways of dealing with them: first there is the dogmatic way; the realist may say firmly and flatly, "In spite of certain errors, we really do apprehend the Real as it is; in spite of illusions which sometimes occur, we really do perceive an independently existing physical world; and in spite of prejudices, which certainly exist among unenlightened people, there is an objective good or moral law." This seems a curious position to take up, though I think we could easily find examples of it. And in some ways it certainly is a strong position; the holder of it asserts that his views, or their main principles, are self-evident. "But," he will add, "the self-evident is only self-evident to people who reflect upon it; and if you are not capable of reflection, so much the worse for you." Now no doubt it is quite true that (as has been said<sup>1</sup>) the self-evident need not be evident to everybody. We do not "see" its truth unless we reflect. And it is clear that there are certain self-evident principles which cannot be proved. The law of contradiction is an instance, and so perhaps is the principle that when we know a thing we know it as it is. But surely we ought to be very careful indeed about admitting self-evident propositions: it is obvious for instance that feeble mortals like ourselves cannot for purely psychological reasons "grasp" a principle easily until we have seen its applications; again a proposition which is thought to be self-evident may in part really be so, but there may be irrelevant additions,<sup>2</sup> which have to be got rid of. In other words it really comes to this: we must be very careful about first the scope and secondly the expression of self-evident principles. And it follows that although we may think that

<sup>1</sup> I think by Mr. H. W. B. Joseph of New College.

<sup>2</sup> As apparently was the case with the doctrine of the Syllogism discovered (independently) by Hindu philosophers,

the dogmatic realists of whom we have spoken are "right in the end," yet it appears almost certain that (1) some of these supposedly self-evident propositions are of larger or narrower scope than they think—need extending or limiting; (2) others, though true, are not primary but derivative; (3) others are ill-expressed, perhaps with irrelevant additions. Thus we ought for conscience sake to be suspicious of those philosophers who constantly appeal to the self-evident in dealing with the problems of illusion, error, and prejudice.

But these problems may be dealt with in another way. This we may call the way of Neo-realism, using that name to cover the American New Realists and those who sympathize with them. "Illusory" *sensa*, we may say, are just as real and independent of minds as "normal *sensa*." When we put our stick into the proverbial pond, we see something bent: but this bent something is in no way illusory, it is a real member of that group of *sensa* compendiously called the stick. The stick simply is the whole group of the *sensa* which are commonly called appearances of it. The problem of perspective can be dealt with in a similar fashion. With regard to error, we may say that there are in the real world true propositions existing independently of our minds, and false propositions likewise. When we err, or make a false judgment, what happens is that we choose one of those existing false propositions and assert it, instead of choosing and asserting a true one. And we might take the same line with regard to the theory of "value" or of the good. All kinds of false or partly false propositions about the good subsist, we might say, independently of all minds: and some people, though not of course we ourselves, unfortunately assert and believe the false ones.

This kind of solution is at first sight a very attractive one. But on reflection we begin to wonder whether after all it doesn't raise more difficulties than it solves. The Neo-

realist theory of illusion cannot give an adequate account of change: it cannot (if conscientious) avoid saying that all perceived change is real change—in other words it cannot distinguish between what Kant called subjective and objective succession of sensa. If in the course of a train journey Lancashire succeeds Cheshire<sup>3</sup> in my field of vision, then (it seems) the Neo-realist is bound on his own principles to assert that Cheshire has really and objectively turned into Lancashire; and if in the course of my journey I had fallen asleep and so had ceased to perceive any sensa at all, then on Neo-realist principles, Lancashire must have ceased to exist while I was asleep: for all succession is *ex hypothesi* objective, and Lancashire was succeeded by blank nothing in the field of my consciousness. "Yes, in your consciousness" it may be replied "but not in reality: of course not." But the Neo-realist cannot reply in that way: for such an answer presupposes that at any rate some characteristics of our sensa are what they are because of their relation to us, and this is as good as surrendering the Neo-realist position. Thus the Neo-realist is caught either way: if he says that all succession is objective, he must admit that sensa pass out of existence when they "pass out of my ken," i. e., that they exist only when known, but if he says that some succession is subjective—would not be what it is if the character of the percipient mind were different—then again he has admitted that the nature of the percipient modifies what is perceived. And if in some cases this modification occurs, why not in all? "Apparent" successions of sensa do not differ *qua successions* of sensa from so-called "Real" or "Objective" successions. If in some cases their succession character depends upon the percipient mind, so it does in all cases: and if this be so, then not only the succession of the sensa, but also the sensa which are in the succession, must depend somehow upon

<sup>3</sup> Or the classes of sensa commonly so called.

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the percipient mind. For we cannot separate the *sensa* from their relations, and say "the *sensa* themselves are real, but the relations are dependent upon the mind." At least this would be a very odd proceeding. And even if we said something of that kind, it would not save us. For if once you admit that the percipient mind has *some* influence upon the nature of what is perceived, where are you going to stop? You may say, the mind's influence goes thus far, but no farther: but this statement must be proved. And how shall we prove it?

The Neo-realist theory of error is likewise open to a very simple objection. Granting that true and false propositions subsist by themselves in the circumambient void, how do the true ones differ from the false ones? The answer will be, the true ones correspond with the facts, and the false ones do not. This seems satisfactory, provided that we know what "correspond" means here (e. g., Does it only mean "are true of"?) We may also ask, what exactly are those independently subsisting propositions: if they are there, whether assorted or not, how do they come to be there? But leaving that, a more serious difficulty arises: why do some misguided persons choose false propositions instead of true ones? If such false and true ones are really there at everyone's disposal, it does seem strange that anyone should choose and assert the false ones. In other words, the problem is only thrust one stage further back, but it is not solved. We began by asking "Why do people assert false propositions": and Neo-realism answers, because the false propositions are there waiting to be asserted. But the question now arises: Why then do people select false propositions? The obvious reason is, because (at the time at any rate) they think them true; because, in other words, they are in error about the real nature of those propositions. Thus we seem to be committed to an infinite regress of errors. First there is the erroneous proposition: then

there is the erroneous belief that this proposition is true—and this, on the theory before us, must be a belief in an erroneous proposition about the first proposition. Then there is a further false belief that this belief is true, and so on forever. At every step, we come up against the question "If this proposition is false, why is it believed to be true?" And we never get an answer. Thus the theory of subsistent true and false propositions does not at all explain the fact of error: and if it does not, should not so bizarre a theory be abandoned?

A similar argument would hold with regard to false propositions about the good or about "values." If those false propositions really subsist independent of those who believe and assert them, why, we must ask, are they erroneously supposed to be true? The stubborn root of error is not so easily got rid of.

Thus the Neo-realist solution of our problem, attractive though it be, seems to break down. It gives us a weird world in which entities are painfully multiplied, a world full of strange existent *sensa*, and strange subsistent propositions: but the problem of illusion and the problem of error (with its two sides, error as to fact and error as to good) is not really solved at all: we have only to wait a little, and like Nature it comes running back. And on the other hand the dogmatic solution which relied on self-evidence will not do either. Thus we are left in a very uncomfortable position, convinced that the fundamental principle of Realism is true, and indeed that it cannot intelligibly be doubted: but powerless to apply that principle to the complicated facts of experience. We must try then to look afresh at those facts woefully complicated though they are.

Let us consider illusion first. People often confuse illusion with error, or speak as if they did. But the distinction is clear enough, at least *prima facie*. An error is a false *judgement* (or inference): an illusion is an unusual

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*fact*, which misleads the unwary. More particularly; an illusion or, better, an illusory sensum is a sensum which is not succeeded<sup>4</sup> by the *sensa* which an ordinary ignorant person would naturally have expected to succeed it. It in itself is a perfectly good sensum, like any other: if we are misled by it, owing to an ignorance or inattention, so much the worse for us. Thus an illusory sensum, though it is sometimes the occasion of error, is not an error itself, and is not even necessarily connected with error. Surely nothing could be clearer than this. It is surely high time that people learned not to mix up the problem of error with the problem of illusion.

But what is the problem of illusion? Simply this: that "illusory" *sensa* are qualitatively similar to "normal" *sensa*. The face which I see in the mirror (as we say) is just like a "real" face, though its position in space is peculiar. Or, to take a rather different case of what is really the same difficulty, the colored shape at which I look really does grow smaller and less distinct in outline as the distance between it and "me" (i. e., the complex of *sensa* commonly called "me" or "my body") is increased. I don't merely think that it grows smaller: it really does grow smaller. And in the same way the face is really seen behind the mirror: and if (to use the language of the plain man) I press one eyeball, my visual *sensa* really are doubled.

Such facts, the endless facts of illusion and perspective, can only lead us to one conclusion: "illusory" and "normal" *sensa* must stand or fall together: if normal *sensa* exist unperceived, so do illusory ones too; and if illusory *sensa* do *not* exist unperceived, neither do normal ones either. We must choose one or other of these alternatives. Neo-realism we saw chooses the first: *all* *sensa*, it says, exist unperceived and independent of minds. We may admire this view for its bold and uncompromising methods: but we

<sup>4</sup> Or preceded or accompanied.

have seen that it comes to a bad end; first it multiplies entities to a terrible degree, and then, by its failure to deal with the problem of subjective and objective succession, it destroys itself. So we have to choose the second alternative: we must hold that *no* *sensa* exist unperceived; all *sensa* alike whether "normal" or "illusory" depend upon the percipient mind.

But at once a difficulty of the gravest kind confronts us. Have we not insisted that things known are independent of the knowing mind? And surely perception is a kind of knowing? Yes, certainly it is: are we then driven by our realist view of knowledge (the only possible view) to adopt the Neo-realist view of perception? Many advocates of realism, and nearly all opponents of it, seem to think that we are. But surely this is a strange mistake. *Sensa* are independent of minds in respect of perception. But why should they not be dependent on minds in some *other* respect? After all, knowing is not the sole activity of the mind, even if you say that it is the sole activity of the *subject*. Let us say then that *sensa* are dependent upon minds in respect of sentience,<sup>5</sup> though not in respect of perception; or again, let us say that minds "have" *sensa*, as well as perceive them. It does not follow of course that *sensa* are dependent *only* upon minds: very far from that; and this is where the facts of subjective and objective succession come in. Indeed, it seems quite probable that *sensa* are largely dependent upon a real system of bodies, extended in space, enduring and changing in time; or if this is going too far—if the use of the word "bodies" here is misleading and unwarranted—at least we can say this much: our *sensa* are dependent in some respects upon sentient minds, but in most respects upon a something or system of somethings, which if it is not *in* space and time, at least acts

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Dr. Stout's doctrine of immediate experience in his paper "Things and Sensations."

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diversely *at* various points in space and various instants of time. Thus in some sense there is a real physical world, though by no means in the plain man's sense; and this physical world, interacting with sentient minds, produces the world of *sensa* (or of appearances) which in perception we know.

Of course it may still be said that we have merely taken cover behind a word. "Sentience," it may be objected, or "having" for that matter—these are only names for the problem. They do not help to solve it. There is obviously some excuse for this objection; especially as the conception of a "mind," to which we have assigned sentience as an attribute, is terribly vague. When we want, in our philosophising, to dispose of some inconvenient entity, we call it mental or spiritual, and put it into the mind; if not into the individual mind, then into some super-individual mind, which is invented or discovered for that purpose; and this seems to satisfy most people. Let us try, then, to state our result in a more agnostic and less question-begging form. What are the indubitable facts of this matter? Simply these: *sensa* are independent of the percipient mind (since perception is a kind of knowing) and yet we cannot without contradiction suppose that they exist in the absence of percipients. It follows from this that *sensa* are (partially) dependent upon something *S*, which is present where the percipient mind is present, and absent where it is absent. This *S* may be a "part" of the "mental structure" of the percipient though not his percipient "part"; on the other hand it may not; all we know is that *S* somehow or other is intimately connected with the percipient mind. We must add one word of warning. We are *not* entitled to hold that *S* is the nervous system, as some rash people think. For what we commonly call the nervous system is nothing but a collection of *sensa*: and these *sensa*, like any others, are dependent upon *S* for their existence.

No one would pretend for a moment that the above account was satisfactory. Still there seems to be no glaring contradictions in it. But perhaps it may serve as an example to show that a theory of perception can be framed which is faithful to the fundamental principle of Realism (as any feasible theory must be) and yet does not come into obvious conflict with the observed facts, nor destroy itself, as Neo-realism does.

The problem of illusion is puzzling enough, but it is as nothing compared with the problem of error. The problem is, why do people make false judgements instead of true ones—since they are intelligent beings? We have seen before that this problem cannot be used to destroy the basic principle that when we know anything we know it as it is; for all arguments, arguments about error just as much as others, presupposes that principle, and so do all statements. Still, the problem remains: why do people make false judgments; or (if you will) how are false judgments possible? The plain man would probably answer, why shouldn't they be possible? Could anyone expect anything else? But the plain man, if he said that, would not have seen the difficulty. Obviously it is this: if some judgments are false, why should not all be so? And yet all cannot be so; else, what are we arguing about? Now if all judgments are alike in kind *qua* judgments, the difficulty does seem insoluble. For either all so-called false judgments must really be true, or all so-called true judgments must really be false: and either alternative is absurd.

But of course we must never dream of admitting that true judgments and false judgments are alike in kind. They are expressed in the same verbal form, of course, that of the proposition. But we must not be deceived by words. If I say, "The sun is larger than the earth," that is a proposition: and if I say, "The earth is larger than the sun," that is a proposition, too. The two statements are, verb-

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ally, of the same form: and more than that, the entities to which the statements refer are the very same perfectly real entities, namely the sun, the earth, and a system of spatial relations: in the one statement they are combined or arranged in one way, in the other statement, in a different way, but still (we may reasonably say) they are the same entities in both cases. But in spite of these points of similarity or identity, there is a vast difference between the two judgments; a difference in the *state of mind* of him who judges. That is the crucial point. In fact the man who says, "The earth is larger than the sun" is not really *judging* at all; or if we like, he is not *thinking*. What is he doing then? What is his state of mind, since clearly he is in *some* state of mind? Perhaps we may best describe it in the words of the late Prof. Cook-Wilson: the man does not judge or think that A is B; he is only *under the impression that* A is B. It may be said, this is a foolish answer, for it only gives us one word instead of another. Of course, words explain nothing by themselves: nevertheless the verbal difference here signifies a most important difference in the facts—a difference which many people never seem to notice, obvious though it be.

The difference is simply this, that man has a two-fold nature. He is both a psycho-physiological organism, and a rational or intelligent being. This fact, however exactly we express it, is well-known to everybody except a few psychologists: indeed it is almost notorious. Of course, it will not "explain" error—nothing will do that—but it may help us to see exactly what error is. For how, after all, would we account for any particular error made by a particular person? Clearly, in terms of psychological laws, so far as these are known to us. We should say that Mr. A's false belief was due to association, or again to his desires, or his character and upbringing. And we believe that with sufficient knowledge of psychological laws in general, and of

particular psychical facts, we could account for all the false beliefs that ever were held. To account for false beliefs in terms of repressed "wishes" is one of the chief aims of the psycho-analyst; and whatever we may think of his methods or his terminology, we must at least admit that such research into the origin of false beliefs is part of the proper business of psychology.

But although a false belief, a "being under an impression" may be thus accounted for psychologically, a *judgment* as such cannot. For a judgment, in the proper sense of the word, is an operation of intelligence or reason, and this power or principle (whatever we call it) falls quite outside the scope of psychology. To borrow Professor Alexander's term, reason "emerges" out of, or in, the psycho-physiological organism (or again "supervenes upon it") but it cannot be explained in terms of that organism. No doubt, if certain psycho-physical conditions be not present, reason cannot operate at all: it cannot (as we commonly think) operate in a worm, or in a man who is sound asleep. But once it does begin to operate, its operation is not determined by psychological laws in any way whatever. Its movement is determined by the nature of the facts before it, whatever those facts be (of course they may be psychical facts, as we call them). It analyses and synthesises those facts—that is the operation which we call judgment; and the objective connection of one fact with another (including those facts which we call universals) determines its movement in inference. Reason then is determined in its operations by the objective nature of the facts before it: and is *not* determined by the nature of the mind in or through which it operates.

The operations of Reason (or whatever we call it) constitute knowledge, that is, the knowing of facts. Belief on the other hand is as such psychologically determined by the particular nature of the believing mind. But all beliefs of

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course are not erroneous, in the ordinary meaning of the word belief. Many are highly probable, and there are few which do not contain (as we say) "some element of truth." Thus we must express our conclusion rather differently.

We might perhaps make a distinction between pure knowledge and pure belief. Pure knowledge would be a state of mind which was in every respect rationally determined, i. e., determined by the nature of the objective facts: while pure belief would be a state of mind which was in any respect psychologically determined—i. e., determined only by the nature and experience of the believing mind. Our ordinary condition is somewhere between these two extremes. And hence, idealist logicians can plausibly say that all our judgments are more or less infected with error. And we may perhaps accept this wider and looser use of the term judgment,<sup>6</sup> though strictly speaking judgment as an operation of reason, cannot possibly err. We may even accept the doctrine of degrees of truth, if we understand exactly what it means: and in order to do so, we might well restate it somewhat as follows: All our ordinary statements and opinions are in part rationally or objectively determined, by the nature of the facts; and in part psychologically determined, by the nature of our minds. And one statement (or opinion) A is more true than another B, when A is to a greater extent or in more respects rationally determined than B.

But if all our opinions are of this half-and-half consistency, how do we know that they are so? And how do we know which elements are true and which false? This question is fatal to the idealist who says that *all* our opinions are more or less false. For if he is right, of course this opinion likewise, the opinion that all our opinions are more or less false, is itself more or less false, and so cannot stand. In other words, there are some facts, however few, about

<sup>6</sup> Opinion might be better. And we cannot in any case admit that *all* judgments are partially false.



which we don't merely have opinions, but which we *know*. In other words, we must come back at last to the position of the people whom we called Dogmatic Realists, and say that some propositions are self-evident. Only we must reflect very carefully upon propositions supposed to be self-evident: we must assure ourselves by reflection that those propositions really are rational propositions, and that our consent to them is determined not by our desires or our past experience or a pain in our tooth or by anything psychological, but purely by the nature of the propositions themselves, or rather of the facts thereby expressed. There is no other royal road by which we may infallibly escape error. For after all we are not wholly or only rational beings; we are also (unfortunately) psycho-physiological organisms, subject to the laws of the natural world.

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## CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS

PHILOSOPHIE DER SYMBOLISCHEN FORMEN. Bd. II, DAS MYTHISCHE DENKEN.  
By Ernst Cassirer. (Pp. xvi, 320). Bruno Cassirer Verlag, Berlin, 1925.

In his essay on Einstein's theory of relativity (1921) Cassirer defines the task of systematic philosophy as the apprehension of the system "of symbolic forms, the application of which produces the concept of an ordered reality, and by virtue of which subject and object, ego and world are separated and opposed to each other in definite form, and it must refer each individual in this totality to its fixed place. If we assume this problem solved, then the rights would be assured and the limits fixed, of each of the particular forms of the concept and of knowledge as well as the general forms of the theoretical, ethical, aesthetic and religious understanding of the world." The symbolic forms, then, are the systems of symbols by which man objectifies and understands his world. One such system of symbols is that of the mathematical and physical sciences which Cassirer has analyzed in *Substance and Function*. From this limited and technical, although central field, Cassirer has formed the idea of a universal Philosophy of Symbolic Forms which shall trace the function of symbolism through all branches of human culture. The first volume of this new work, published in 1923, dealt with language, while in the present volume the subject is myth; a third volume, on the philosophy of science, is still to be published. In general the two volumes carry out the point of view of the *Erkenntnisproblem* and *Substance and Function*; their standpoint is that of critical idealism. In the earlier works Cassirer dealt with the logic of the most abstract branches of knowledge, primarily mathematics and physics, while he now applies his critical method to the more primitive and universal strata of thought which are embodied in Language and Myth, especially in the language and myths of primitive man. His method remains the critical method, that is to say, it presupposes a mass of empirical material, which has been collected by empirical researchers in the fields of language and myth. In the case of the present work it is the material supplied, for example, by such works as Frazer's *Golden Bough*, which Cassirer makes it his problem to analyze. He makes no attempt to construct the material *a priori* or to force it into the artificial mold of a dialectical scheme; indeed, one might rather wish that he had been able to systematize his material more sharply and definitely. He follows the given contours of his subject-matter although always demand-

ing of it answers to questions formulated from his epistemol. ical standpoint.

His problem is primarily to trace the "logical" motives, the "ideas" which are involved in mythology, more exactly to come to grasp the *form of the mythical consciousness* which manifests itself in the whole system of the world of mythology. For the mythical consciousness has its logical and phenomenological structure quite as much as has the scientific. Cassirer's method is thus equally opposed to the metaphysical interpretation of myth of Schelling, which viewed the development of myth as the actual process by which God comes to self-consciousness, and to the merely psychological interpretation offered by Wundt, which would explain myth primarily in terms of the mechanistic association of ideas. Consciousness is in all its manifestations an active and creative power which has its own structure or form, and it is this latter which the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms seeks to understand. Cassirer thus seeks to apply the "transcendental method" of Kant to a field which seems at first sight merely given over to chaos and irrationality and to show that it too has its categories and principles.

This problem determines the plan of Cassirer's book. After a preliminary discourse on the idea of a philosophy of mythology, the general features of the mythical consciousness of objectivity are described. The basic antithesis of myth is that of sacred and profane: the extraordinary, mysterious and divine on the one side and the everyday routine experiences on the other. It is this distinction which is lacking to modern science, which would seem to be the dividing line between the two. Space, time and number as they are conceived in myth are next considered. Space and time are, of course, not conceived in myth as abstractly homogeneous systems of reference, but as concretely differentiated wholes. Each direction of space has its mythical and magical meaning, while as Cassirer shows in detail each of the religions has its characteristic view of time. The Hindu seeks to escape from time, the Chinese with their ancestor-worship seek stability and perpetuity in time, the Jews and Persians with their prophetic and ethical religions are directed towards the future, while in the Greek consciousness the present comes to its rights. Time is by no means a mere abstract fourth dimension of space in the mythical and religious consciousness; its parts are qualified by a different value and significance according to the basic attitude of the system of myth involved. Number, the great instrument of science, appears in myth not as a mere abstract scale of quantity, but each number has its distinct and frequently magical individuality. After discussing the structure of the spatio-temporal world in the mythical consciousness, Cassirer portrays the discovery of subjective reality, the discovery of the ego, i. e., its separation from the primitive matrix of a universally animated and living nature. Totemism and the personal gods play a very important part in this process.

It is not in accordance with Cassirer's method to draw up, after the fashion of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a definite list of categories or principles either for science or for myth. His interest is not in a clear-cut logical system of categories but rather in tracing certain pervasive atti-

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tudy through the cultural material at hand. The categories of the mythical consciousness are for the most part the same as those of the scientific consciousness, time, space, causality, object, etc., but they appear in a special modality, as Cassirer calls it, in a peculiar shading and nuance of meaning, which is wholly different from their meaning in science. The scientific consciousness is above all characterized by the fact that in it there is a separation made between the essential and the unessential, between reality and appearance. In the world of myth all appearances tend to stand on one plane. The word and its meaning, the image and the thing, the dream and the reality, for example, are fundamentally identical. The nuances of meaning and value which are so significant in distinguishing degrees of objectivity for the scientific consciousness are lacking to the mythical view. Dream and waking perception are not distinguished and primitive ideas of immortality arise from a mere failure to distinguish between the appearances of the dead in the thoughts, dreams and feelings of those still living from the actual existence of the dead. The magical power of the word and of the picture or image, which have been observed in so many systems of myth, are based on the fact that for the mythical consciousness the word is the thing, the image is the man. In general, Cassirer finds mythical consciousness to be characterized by a lack of all those critical distinctions which have been acquired so laboriously by civilized man. All things blend together and are entangled in a network of magical relations, which are however only relations for us, while for primitive man they are substantial identities. The absurdity of the naive symbolic interpretation of myths, the notion that primitive man endeavored to communicate abstract truths with myths as mere metaphors is made clear, since the very notion of symbolism, which implies a clear distinction between symbol and symbolized is precisely what is lacking from the mythical consciousness. In fact, mythical consciousness seems to be characterized negatively by an absence of distinctions. The notion which underlies the more naive understanding of the concept of "primitive animism" would seem to be that the savage has a clear idea of his own mind and personality which he reads into external nature, whereas in reality the most primitive state appears to be a vague apprehension of the universe as a whole, which we would call living, of which the individual is a part. Primitive man has no clear idea of himself as a conscious being, he has even, as Cassirer brings out with reference to totemism, no clear idea of the human species as distinguished from the various forms of animal and even plant life. He is merged in a whole of feeling in which distinctions gradually appear. It is in fact through the development of ideas of creative and personal gods that man comes to possess a concept of personality to apply to himself. It is thus by a development of the immanent dialectic of myth itself that man comes to emerge from the organic continuum of nature.

Cassirer has penetrated into all phases of the mythical consciousness and his work shows throughout that masterly scholarship and understanding of the human spirit which we have learned to expect from him. His failure to go into the psycho-analytic theories of myth-symbolism is

no doubt the expression of a well-founded value-judgment. He has given us in this work something of what Hegel intended in his *Phenomenology of Mind*, an insight into the process by which man raises himself to the level of science. Unlike Hegel, however, he bases his account on a wealth of concrete material which was unknown a century ago. One question arises, however: Is there really any such thing as the mythical consciousness? No doubt there are certain traits common to the primitive way of looking at things the world over. Cassirer would grant that there is and should be expected no rigid identity; the form or structure of mythical consciousness is as such fluid and plastic. It may nevertheless be asked whether the mythical consciousness is not imply the scientific, ethical and aesthetic consciousness at an undeveloped stage. Kant recognized but three fundamental modes of consciousness: Knowledge, Will and Feeling, and this clearly leaves no place for what is called the "religious consciousness." Would it not seem that the mythical consciousness would have to be resolved into an undifferentiated complex of all three modes of consciousness? In other words, the mythical consciousness seems to be inherently imperfect, inherently destined to pass beyond itself in so far as it gains clarity. Cassirer recognizes in fact, in his last chapter, entitled *Die Dialektik des mythischen Bewusstseins*, that the mythico-religious consciousness perpetually strives to free itself from symbolism, in other words, to destroy itself in its very essence. Myth strives to become clear and consistent, but it can only do so by ceasing to be itself. The essential feature of myth appears to be its dim and confused apprehension of things, its failure to recognize the distinctions which are so deeply incorporated in our modern culture and language that they seem self-evident to us. The very material which Cassirer has presented shows that the essence of myth is nothing positive; it is rather simply a confused and unclear way of looking at things. The "mythical consciousness" therefore appears to be a level rather than a kind of consciousness.

This distinction, however, would not essentially affect Cassirer's account. The necessity for a treatment of these deeper-lying strata of thought from the standpoint of critical idealism is obvious. As long as critical idealism confined itself to the "logical foundations of the exact sciences" the field of primitive thought was given over to psychology. The genetic point of view was ruled out of philosophy. Where the forms of thought came from had nothing to do with their validity and was of no concern to the Theory of Knowledge. Cassirer is seemingly the first of the critical idealists to endeavor to follow thought back to its primitive beginnings in language and myth. He shows that there is a method of studying myth from its own point of view, in its immanent structure and meaning rather than in its appearance to a psychological observer. From this point of view Cassirer's exposition has a distinct value which is independent of whether we accept his general epistemological system.

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